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The Mission Operations Directorate's
International Space Station Alpha
Hardware Familiarization Role
Kenneth W. Zingrebe, II
Barrios Technology, Inc.
Houston, Texas
The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Mission
Operation Directorate's (MOD) On-
Orbit Maintenance Operations
Mission Controllers are participating
in space station hardware Tests and
Demonstrations in multiple neutral
buoyancy facilities. This is part of
the controllers' hardware
familiarization work in preparation
to support the astronauts in the
operation and maintenance of the
hardware. This paper describes the
larger context of Mission Controller
hardware familiarization with
specifics of participation in the
Boeing neutral buoyancy tests. Also
covered is what participation has
occurred in the past and future plans.
MOD hardware familiarization as
discussed in the MOD On-Orbit
Maintenance Operations Support Plan
is:
To develop hardware configuration
expertise, the MOD personnel
participate in tests and
demonstrations of maintainability
and maintenance procedures on
mockups:
Flight Hardware Installation,
Removal and Physical Integration:
-The MOD personnel observes
or participates when flight hardware
is installed, removed and physically
integrated.
Tests and Demonstrations:
-MOD supplements knowledge
of design, physical configuration,
and accessibility by observing or
participating in tests and
demonstrations.
Photo/Video Documentation:
AIAA-95-0901-CP
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-MOD uses photo/video
archival of flight hardware as it
progresses through manufacture,
integration, final assembly, ground
processing and delivery to orbit in
performing on-orbit maintenance and
contingency repairs.
This paper was prompted by MOD's
participation in the Boeing Space
Station Hardware Intravehicular
Activity (IVA) & Extravehicular
Activity (EVA) Neutral Buoyancy
Simulation (NBS) Tests at which five
MOD Maintenance, Mechanical &
Logistics (MM&L) Section personnel
attended at various times. Specifics
of the Boeing tests are used to
illustrate the MOD hardware
familiarization process. The MM&L
participants were the author, Edward
(Ted) M. Kenny, Rolunda M.
McDaniel, Richard C. McKeel,
Munish P. Patel, and Joheny D.
Wong. The tests were at Marshal
Space Flight Center, January 17
though March 4, 1994. Tests were:
IVA Hardware:
-Hatch, Common Berthing
Mechanism (CBM) Controller,
Crossover Rack
EVA Hardware:
-Windows, Avionics Feed
Through, Water Vent, Heat
Exchanger, Meteor Orbital Debris
Shield, CBM.
During the EVA hardware tests some
of the EVA section personnel
participated. The hardware test was
run under funds from the Space
Station Freedom (SSF) Program, and
the hardware are all part of the
International Space Station Alpha"
(IS SA).
The purposes in the MM&L personnel
participation were to provide MOD
on-orbit maintenance support and
participation in:
Hardware Familiarization
Evaluation/Influence of Design
I j
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Maintainability/Human Factors
Evaluation/Influence.
Evaluation/Influence of
Maintenance & Operations Task
Descriptions.
Face-to-face
Design Engineers
Interaction w/
Ancillary Benefits:
-Training/Maturation
-Establish Precedent of
Test/Demonstration Participation.
-Work Directly with the Flight
Crew Operations Division (FCOD)
(Astronauts and support personnel to
the astronauts).
MM&L personnel past participation
in SSF NBS tests and demonstrations
were:
Rocketdyne Tests at
Oceaneering:
-Electrical Power System (EPS)
Robotic Interface and Maintenance
Operations.
National Aeronautics and Space
Development Agency of Japan Tests
at Marshall Space Flight Center:
-Three week test of Restraints
and Mobility Aids, Orbital
Replacement Unit (ORU) Remove and
Replace (R&R) and use of Power
Tool.
Rocketdyne, Boeing &
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems
Company Tests at Johnson Space
Center (JSC):
-EPS, Control Moment Gyro,
and Segment Assembly and R&R
tasks.
Summary of Tests:
IVA Hardware:
-About two weeks
-Boeing conducted & subjects
-Some internal suited
operations
EVA Hardware:
-About five weeks:
-Three weeks Boeing
conducted & subjects
-Two weeks NASA
subjects (Astronauts & Flight Crew
Operations personnel)
-During NASA runs some IVA
operations
Live Video was Available
During NASA runs and was piped
back to MOD.
Fidelity:
-Mockup:
-Based on SSF design.
-Hardware still used in
new ISSA design.
very low.
some high.
-Varied from very high to
-Majority was moderate,
restraints/mobility
low.
-Tools:
-Varied
very low.
-Task
-Placement of crew
aids was very
from very high to
-Majority was moderate.
Descriptions:
-Logistics Support
Analysis Record Task Descriptions
were used where available, Boeing
test personnel wrote own if not.
briefing.
-Used photos for
procedures
flexibility.
-As proceeded, modified
or allowed test subjects
-Communication was
through hydrophone (IVA) & suit
system (EVA).
-Test Subjects:
-5% to 95% of Japanese
female and US male respectively
-Experience - past flights
(Astronauts) to none (Design
Engineers, Astronauts, Neutral
Buoyancy Tank personnel, Flight
Crew Operations non-astronaut
personnel, MOD EVA personnel, and
MOD MM&L personnel)
The tests were used or resulted in
confirmation or modification of
op erat i o n al an d m ai n ten ance
activities and the design of hardware,
tools, and support equipment.
The evaluations of the operational
and maintenance activities and the
design were based upon the following
factors:
-Human factors
-Safety
-Accessibility
-Quality of task instructions
-Quality of design
Using the design engineers and the
operators in the actual tests resulted
in very little resistance to
recommended changes in the
equipment or operational and
maintenance activities.
MOD Benefits Summary:
ones, briefidgs,
systems briefs, etc.
presentations,
Became familiar with hardware.
Evaluated/Influenced tool and
equipment design.
Evaluated/Influenced
and maintenance operations
descriptions.
system
task
Conducted face-to-face
discussions with design engineers.
Personnel received training/
maturation.
Reestablished precedent
test/demonstration participation.
of
Worked directly FCOD
Astronauts and support personnel.
Participated as test subject.
Future plans:
Participate in Future ISSA
Tests, Demonstrations, Installation
& Integration Operations, and Photo/
Video Documentation.
Provide test subjects.
Conduct tests.
Since the Boeing NBS test and
because of the good results,
experience and the recommendations
from the MOD's MM&L personnel'
participation in the tests; there have
been other tests and demonstrations
that MM&L has supported. A few of
these tests/demonstrations and they
results/uses are:
An MM&L personnel (Johnny
D. Wong) initiated an ISSA Tool Fit'
Check on a Thermal Control
System(TCS) pump package mock-up.
The test indicated that a 10" 3/8"
drive extension should be added to
the Standard IVA Tool List. A
Passed information to others reach of 20" is required to remove
within MOD, FCOD, Program Office, the mounting bolts on the pump
Engineering, Etc.) through one-on- package. Current tools on the IVA
Tool List do not facilitate this
reach.
MM&L personnel (Mona Mangal
and Rolunda M. McDaniel)
participated in the EVAS5 WETF
Tests with astronaut crew members.
The rigid tether operation and
Payload ORU Accommodation (POA)
Latching End Effector (LEE) were
evaluated. The primary objectives of
the test were reach and access
evaluation and resulted in
recommended design changes.
An MM&L personnel (Mark T.
Davison} lead a Detailed Test
Objective (DTO) 668 Advanced Lower
Body R_straint Test (ALBRT)
training (in the CCT) for the STS 66
crew. The DTO is designed to
provide the crew member lower body
support during RMS and Camera
Operations. The Restraint is
attached to the Aft Flight Deck Panel
and at the ISSA robotic work station
site.
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Alternative Approach To Vehicle Element Processing
Jacob E. Huether
Rockwell International
Space Systems Division
Cape Canaveral, Florida
Albert E. Otto
Rockwell International
Space Systems Division
Downey, California
ABSTRACT
The National Space Transportation Policy
(NSTP), dated August 5,1994 best describes the
challenge facing today's aerospace industry.
"Assuring reliable and affordable access to space
through U.S. space transportation capabilities is
a fundamental goal of the U.S. space program".
Experience from the Space Shuttle Program (SSP)
tells us that launch and mission operations are
responsible for approximately 45 % of the cost of
each shuttle mission. Reducing these costs is
critical NSTP goals in the next generation launch
vehicle.
Based on this, an innovative alternative approach
to vehicle element processing was developed
with an emphasis on reduced launch costs. State-
of-the-art upgrades to the launch processing sys-
tem (LPS) will enhance vehicle ground opera-
tions. To carry this one step further, these up-
grade could be implemented at various vehicle
element manufacturing sites to ensure system
compatibility between the manufacturing facility
and the launch site. Design center vehicle stand-
alone testing will ensure system integrity result-
ing in minimized checkout and testing at the
launch site. This paper will addresses vehicle
test requirements, timelines and ground checkout
procedures which enable concept implementa-
tion.
brought about an increased interest in the proba-
bility of launch (POL) and life cycle costs (LCC)
associated with current and proposed launch
programs. High recurring SSP costs have been
attributed to the "standing army" at the launch
site who support vehicle ground turnaround op-
erations. It should be noted that the cost break-
down from SSP cost-per-flight data, NASA FY'94
budget inputs to the Office of Management &
Budget, does not support these beliefs. Of the
dollars spent on each launch, 27 % is attributed
to vehicle ground operations at the John F.
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), see Figure 1.
Other/misc.
5%
JSC
33%
MSR3
35%
KSC
27%
INTRODUCTION Figure 1. STS Cost Per Flight By NASA Center
Currentfundinglevelsassociatedwiththenation's The SSP budget at KSC is distributed in eight
launch systems (expendable and man rated) have categories. While the largest portion of the
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center'sbudgetisallocatedfor hands-onelement
processing,it shouldbenotedthatapproximately
42%is spenton supportactivities. Thealloca-
tionof SSPfundsatKSCis illustratedin Figure
.
BOC
LSS2%
3%
Payload Ops.
6%
Launch Site Equip
6%
NASA
9%
Orb. Logistics
17%
Other
5%
Launch Ops
52%
Figure 2. KSC Funding By Category
SPC funds are subdivided to encompass major
functions performed in support of SSP opera-
tions, remainder being allocated to support func-
tions. Of the SPC funds, approximately one third
is devoted to hands-on processing activities with
the remainder being allocated to support func-
tions. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
Systems Engineering
Support
LPS/Instrumentation & 7%
Calibration
8%
Program Ops. Support
10%
Shuttle Processing
33%
Other/Misc
13%
Facilities 0 & M
Technical Ops. 15%
Support
14%
Figure 3 - SPC Cost Breakdown
This data supports the need for an alternative
processing approach which extends to all centers
thereby reducing overall program LCC by use of
built-in efficiencies which reduce the number of
requirements during each step in preparation for
"Copyright © American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 1995.
launch. SPC data indicates that a typical STS
flow, includes six thousand Operations and Main-
tenance Requirements & Specifications (OMRS)
which must be satisfied. A cultural change in
vehicle testing philosophy must be introduced to
minimize these requirements. This cultural change
must reduce requirements that drive both inte-
grated factory and launch site processing.
BACKGROUND
The reduction of hands-on processing activities
can be best accomplished through the reduction
of ground checkout requirements. While the
reduction of processing requirements sounds
simple, the level of confidence in the vehicle's
ability to safely achieve mission objectives must
be maintained. The requirements document de-
tails procedures that must be performed and the
frequency of performance in the ground process-
ing/testing sequence. In order to satisfy vehicle
design criteria have been met and insure the
vehicle has been properly tested, all requirements
must be documented prior to launch.
The number of test procedures performed for
each vehicle turnaround determines the amount
of schedule time required for the processing of
these space vehicles prior to launch. In the case
of the STS many of these requirements are dupli-
cated at both the design center/manufacturing
facility and again at the launch site because the
test programs and test equipment at these respec-
tive facilities are not compatible. The perfor-
mance of redundant testing results in the escala-
tion of the LCC of these launch programs. The
Integrated Factory/Launch Site Processing Con-
cept identifies & reduces these redundancies while
satisfying vehicle design criteria and ensuring the
level of confidence required at the launch site.
Our studies assessed vehicle processing of sev-
eral launch programs (both manned & unmanned)
which included S aturn/Apollo, Shuttle, Delta and
Titan IV. This analysis revealed that in each of
All rights reserved."
6
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
theseprogramsmuch of the factory testingis
repeatedat the launchsite. Therewereseveral
reasonsfor this aslistedbelow :
• Vehiclesareshippedshortof equipment to
meet schedule constraints.
• Manufacturing completion/vehicle integra-
tion is performed at the launch site.
• Modification kits are installed at the launch
site resulting in system retest.
• Additional testing at the launch site creates a
sense of improved reliability.
• Maintenance is performed on reusable ve-
hicles at the launch site.
These reasons were common to all the programs
we analyzed. This suggests that a processing
concept which minimizes the time required at the
launch site for ground test activities of both
manned and unmanned programs is desirable. In
order for this to happen several things must occur
• Vehicle elements must be completely as-
sembled at the factory (No assembly opera-
tions are deferred to the launch site).
• Factory testing is not deferred to the launch
site.
• Modification kits are not installed at thelaunch
site.
• Factory and launch site personnel require
access/input to factory test procedures. The
launch site must have connectivity to the
factory and be able to transfer design/build/
test data electronically for use in verification
testing at the launch site.
• Multiple database access is implemented to
allow both manufacturing and launch site per-
sonnel to share data with each exchanging
their "viewpoints".
• A system environment which allows for end
user configuration which links multiple loca-
tions.
• Factory and launch site checkout procedures
and associated software must be similar if not
"Copyright © Amencan Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 1995.
identical. This is imperative in adopting the
Integrated Factory/Launch Site Proqessing
Concept.
Vehicle design reflect maintainability influ
ence including selective operation of redun
dant systems during the mission.
Implementation of this processing concept is
reduced LCC associated with vehicle testing
which equates to reduced costs per pound of
payload to orbit. In order to financially compete
in the international aerospace marketplace this
concept must be achieved.
APPROACH
Our initial studies into the Integrated Factory/
Launch Site Processing Concept began in 1990
with the selection ofavehicle configuration. The
most applicable data which was currently avail-
able at the time was STS related. This reason,
coupled with the fact that Shuttle-C was the
current NASA concept for a heavy lift launch
vehicle (HLLV) resulted in the selection of a side
mount shuttle derived vehicle (SDV). The SDV
(FIG 4) is made up of the following elements :
• Side Mount Unmanned Cargo Carrier (new
element)
• STS boattail
• STSbasedMPS
• STSbasedAPS
• Single fault tolerant avionics system
• External Tank (STS specifications)
• Solid Rocket Boosters (STS specifications)
For the purposes of this study we felt the SDV
would make maximum use of STS resources &
technologies and effective comparisons could
easily be made between the two. In addition the
SDV would be capable of: a) utilizing existing
KSC facilities with little to no modifications, b)
STS ground processing procedures with minor
revisions, c) STS databases and d) accommodate
orbiter payloads. While this study focused on a
All rights reserved."
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sidemountSDV, theconceptis directly appli-
cableto thecurrentRLV concepts.
Figure4. SDVConfiguration
After configurationselection,theSTSOMRSD
wasanalyzedfor multiple systemswhich were
commonto both STSand SDV. The selected
systemswere:
• Auxiliary PowerUnit (APU)
• Communications& Tracking(C&T)
• DataProcessing
• ElectricalPowerDistribution& Control
(EPD&C)
• Flight Controls
• Guidance,Navigation& Control (GN&C)
• Hydraulics
• Main PropulsionSystem(MPS)
• OperationalInstrumentation(OI)
• PurgeVent & Drain (PV&D)
• ReactionControlSystem(RCS)
For eachof thesesystemsan analysisof the
OMRSD and the Operational& Maintenance
Plan(OMP),which tracksOMRSD status,was
conducted. The OMRS and OMP were used
becausethesedocumentsare a) current,b)
readilyavailableandc) applicableto SDV.
At thispointit shouldbenotedthatOMRSDand
OMPrequirementswith aneffectivityotherthan
"Copyright © American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 1995.
those for first vehicle flow or all vehicle flows
were not considered since they are not applicable
to SDV. From this analysis, it was also deter-
mined where the OMRSD/OMP requirement was
satisfied (factory, launch site or both). For each
requirement satisfied at the launch site the Opera-
tional Maintenance Instruction (OMI) was noted
and documented. The OMI is the detailed plan-
ning/work document for test and maintenance
activities used at the launch site. Matrices were
developed cataloging data for each of the systems
listed:
• OMRSD requirement number
• Title
• OMI number and sequence
An analysis of the Test Requirements Specifica-
tion Document (TRSD) was initiated. The TRSD
defines the work required at the manufacturing
facility in the construction of a new vehicle.
Using data acquired from the manufacture of
OV-105 (Space Shuttle Endeavour), we were
able to determine the TRSD equivalent to the
OMRSD where applicable. For each TRSD
equivalent requirement the implementing Test
Checkout Procedure (TCP) was identified. TCP's
are used at the manufacturing facility to direct
manufacturing test procedures - TCP's & OMI's
are similar in nature with the major difference
being the location at which they are performed.
Once all this data was collected the OMRSD/
OMP matrices were expanded to include the
following information :
• TRSD requirement number
• TCP number and sequence
• Remarks
From these matrices a master matrix which docu-
mented the total test requirements to be satisfied
for a ground processing flow was developed. An
analysis of this matrix substantiated our belief
that a high degree of redundancy existed in the
All rights reserved."
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testingperformedat both themanufacturingfa-
cility andthelaunchsite.
Following this analysisof the OMRSDfI'RSD
data,thenextstepwastodeterminetheamountof
timespentontestproceduresutilizedatboththe
manufacturingfacility andthelaunchsite. Once
thiswasdeterminedthenextstepwastohighlight
thenon-equivalentitemsandtheduplicativetest-
ing which occurred.From thiswe wereableto
calculatetimelinesfor eachof theseitemsaswell
asthetimerequiredtorunacompletecheckoutat
themanufacturingfacility.
Timeline developmentfor eachof the systems
previously discussedwas achievedin one of
threemethods:
• Useof timelinescontainedwithin the indi-
vidual OMI's whereavailable
• Useof as-runtimelineswhereavailable
• Useof manufacturingtimelinesfrom Space
ShuttleEndeavour
Timelineswhicharecontainedwithin theOMI's
are an estimateof the time required to run a
completeprocedure.OMI as-runtimelinescan
eitherbefor acompleteprocedureoranynumber
of sequencesfrom theprocedure;however,as-
run datagives a morerealistic insight into the
actualtime requiredto completethe procedure
and allows for more representativeschedule
forecasts.Timelinesacquiredfrom themanufac-
ture of the SpaceShuttleEndeavourusedboth
estimatedandas-rundata.
For this effort it was necessaryto determine
which sequence(s)of theOMI wererequiredto
satisfytheOMRSDrequirements.Whenthishad
beendetermined,timelineswereredlinedto en-
surethatonly therequiredsequencesof theOMI
were incorporatedinto the revised timelines.
Throughouthisareaofourstudieswefocusedon
reducinglaunchsiteactivitieswithoutjeopardiz-
ing the integrity of the launch vehicle. One
reasonfor this iswhenthevehicleis testedatthe
manufacturingfacility asmallcontingentof per-
sonnelsupportsthistesting.At thelaunchsitethe
infrastructurerequiredto supportvehicletesting
isbroaderin scopeandthereforeis morecostly.
Also, manufacturingoperationsare run on a 2
shiftperdayworkschedulewhile thelaunchsite
utilizesboth2 & 3 shiftsperday. These reasons
alone support the transfer of test activities from
the launch site to the manufacturing facility.
Based on our analysis of the OMI/TRSD data and
the timelines which were developed we were able
to look at the Integrated Factory Timeline and
determine which redundant testing could be trans-
ferred from the launch site to the manufacturing
facility. This resulted in a longer test program at
the factory; however, the horizontal turnaround
activities at the launch site were reduced from
approximately seventy days to nine days. Figure
5 shows the manufacturing test timeline for the
recently completed Space Shuttle Endeavour and
projected timelines for the manufacture of the
SDV which includes testing transfered from the
launch site to the manufacturing facility. The
difference is neglible while the savings at the
launch site is significant. It should be noted that
these savings can only be realized if the guide-
lines listed earlier are adhered to,
GROUND CHECKOUT SYSTEM CONCEPT
A launch processing system concept that en-
hances the inter- and intra- operability between
launch site and manufacturing processing was
developed. The launch processing requirements
were based on specifications from LPS upgrades
at KSC. To achieve the goal of reducing launch
site activities by enhancing the commonality with
the manufacturing process, the following items
were assessed in the determination of the system
architecture requirements :
Common checkout philosophy (factory/
launch site)
"Copyright _DAmerican Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc.. 1995. All rights reserved."
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• Commoncheckoutequipment
• Commongroundsoftware
• Launchsite inputto factorycheckout
• Launchsitereal-timemonitoring/control
thevehicleidiosyncrasies,failureflagsandfail-
uretrendanalysistobeeasilyaccessiblebyeither
manufacturingor launchsitepersonnel.
A systemenvironmentthatallows for anend-
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Figure 5. Integrated Factory Checkout Timeline
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This architecture incorporates the concept of a
ground infrastruc-
ture data/communications link in which manu-
facturing and launch site personnel can be elec-
tronically linked as illustrated in Figure 6.
With this architecture, factory and launch site
personnel are able to have access/input capability
to test databases, real-time test support, post-test
anomaly resolution and verification testing.
Multiple databases and their access will be im-
plemented in a way that allows for manufactur-
ing and launch site personnel to share data with
each having their own "viewpoint". This allows
"Copyright © American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 1995.
user configuration that is linked with multiple lo-
cations was a prime criteria. This is necessary to
allow for the incorporation and redistribution of
equipment necessary to execute test sessions by
multiple factions. This environment has to be
capable of accommodating application software
that can be executed in multiple locations based
on system throughput or the time critical nature
of the data that is being generated and recorded.
To incorporate these diverse criteria a distributed
environment is needed that is transparent at the
application, user and network level.
A user environment needs to be able to operate in
All rights reserved."
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
3/w,
Manufacturing Fa(:illt' _ _ Launch Sit_,
Shuttle Derived Vehicl ]// _N _- - - -Shuttl'e [)e_ived Vehicl- - ,.-__
t _ . t * / / _ X-_ ......... '---_
Da.aRe!r_ji,e_al_ I_j Data Aquisition Data Aqu sition L_ Eala Retrieval I
_ecQra,ng | v I I ._,,,t*,,, / & Hecording I
:_ystem _._] S.stem ] ........ _ System I
I l , I l
I Real Time Networ[ I Real Time Networl I
Database
Subsystem
I
T
Archive &
Retrieval
Subsystem
Display networl
Application
Processor
Subsystem
I Display ProcessorSubsystem
&
T
Software Production Facility
T
Application
Processor
Subsystem
V
Archive &
Retrieval
Subsystem
Database
Subsystem
Display Networl I
Display Processor
Subsystem
Software Production Facilit
Figure 6. Ground Checkout System Concept
a consistent fashion over multiple platforms to
allow for high resolution graphical display and
characterbasedconsoles where appropriate. This
will keep costs in proportion to task utilization.
Training costs and associated overhead will be
reduced especially in high turnover positions or
with a vast number of users. In addition, person
nel will become more productive and confident
in the production of their tasks. One way to
enhance this criteria is to provide a consistent
user interface that provides help checks for po-
tentially disastrous commands, resolves conflicts,
brings conflicts to the user's attention and auto-
mates tedious lengthy commands. This interface
must also be capable of execution on multiple
platforms without multiple user interfaces.
SUMMARY
Ground processing costs can be significantly
reduced by adopting this concept. It should be
noted that a paradigm shift must occur within the
aerospace community (private sector & govern-
ment) in order to implement this concept. Use of
the concept will reduce the number of induced
failures which have occurred at the launch site
during STS testing. Using data from testing at the
manufacturing facility, launch site personnel can
develop a knowledge base for each vehicle which
can be used at the launch site during acceptance
testing to verify that the thresholds levels which
were recorded during manufacturing tests have
not changed during transportation and handling.
_opyright © American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 1995. All rights reserved."
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Test personnel at both sites are able to interface
with the system and display data in recognizable
formats which reduces training requirements.
Precedence for this concept exists in the form of
the planned STS launches from the Vandenberg
Launch Site. In addition to reduced LCC associ-
ated with ground testing, there is a savings to be
gained from reduced facility complexity. The
goal is to adapt this concept to the RLV program.
A maj or criteria of the RLV program is to provide
a launch vehicle which is both operable and
dependable while minimizing program LCC. Pre-
liminary results indicate that the application of
the Integrated Factory/Launch Site Processing
Concept can be readily applied to the RLV pro-
gram and be instrumental in achieving NSTD
goals.
"Copynght © American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 1995. All rights reserved."
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HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE - FIRST SERVICING MISSION
"Down to Earth Logistics - From GSFC to KSC and Back"
Richard M. Kubicko, CPL, & Robert Herrick, TMO
Logistics Management Division/Code 230
Goddard Space Flight Center
Greenbelt, Maryland 20771
Abstract
t_ •
The Hubble Space Telescope First Servicing Mission is a major accomplishment for NASA and has drawn world-wide
attention and interest. The extravehicular servicing and repair activities performed by the STS-61 crew were the most
ambitious ever undertaken. Their unprecedented success in performing on-orbit repair and maintenance, particularly
in correcting the aberration in the primary mirror, has enabled the HST to provide sensational images and the
anticipation of exciting scientific discoveries. Although the whole world watched the televised logistics activities (on-
orbit maintenance) that took place in space, few are aware of the time and effort that went into planning and executing
the space logistics that takes place with our feet on the ground. This paper addresses a major part of that effort - the
Packaging, Handling, and Transportation (PH&T) activities required to ship the GSFC HST space flight hardware and
ground support equipment to KSC for launch and the post launch return to GSFC. It addresses the logistics and
transportation planning for the containers for the Solar Array Carrier, the Orbital Replacement Unit Carrier, and the
Flight Support System and their transporters, and the over land and water portions of the shipments.
Introduction
In December 1993, millions of people around the world
watched their television sets as astronauts of Space
Shuttle Endeavour, STS-61, carried out NASA's most
ambitious and longest duration servicing mission, the
repair of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST). The
success of this mission is now history. The solor arrays
and miscellaneous Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs)
were replaced. The Hubble's most notorious problem,
blurred images caused by aflawed mirror, was corrected
by installation of the Corrective Optics Axial
Replacement (COSTAR) and a modified Wide Field/
Planetary Camera (WF/PC). Scientists now delight in
the knowledge of the clear images and data being
provided by the refurbished and repaired HST.
Logisticians can take great pride in the success of the
on-orbit maintenance and servicing of HST and the
engineering, planning, and execution by the
"logisticians" of the HST team. As any Iogistician can
tell you, Maintenance Planning is a primary element of
logistics. The HST was designed and built to be
maintainable, serviceable, and refurbishable on orbit.
It was designed for supportability - a goal for which
Iogisticiains continuously strive. The success of the
HST First Servicing Mission focused attention on "space
logistics" or the logistics of supporting systems in
space. However, contributing to the HST success
were other logistics efforts that were not nearly as
glamorous, nor attention getting, as the activities in
space. These efforts were the logistics activities that
took place in support of the mission with our feet on the
ground - the Packaging, Handling & Transportation
(PH&T) of the HST flight hardware and support
equipment prior to and post launch. The "logistics in
space" has received the attention and recognition it
rightly deserves. This article will focus on the "earthy"
logistics of the planning and effort required to safely
deliver the flight hardware and support equipment
required for the mission from the HST project test and
integration site at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC),
Maryland, to the launch site at Kennedy Space Center
(KSC), Florida.
i
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The Team
Responsibility for mission planning, engineering, and
test and integration of flight hardware and support
equipment resides with the HST Project Office/Code
442 which is located at GSFC in Greenbelt, Maryland.
The Logistics Management Division/Code 230 at GSFC
provides the HST Project with logistics expertise and
resources required to support the HST servicing
missions.
The Hardware
The First Servicing Mission called for various activities
as replacement of components and ORUs such as the
Gyro Electronic Control Units, Magnetometers, and
Solar Array (SA) Drive Electronics (SADE). Other
major activities were the replacement of the SA and
installation of the WF/PC II and COSTAR. As well as
the flight hardware to be replaced or installed, the First
Servicing Mission (FSM) required various items of
flight support equipment to transport the flight hardware
in
the Endeavour bay to the FIST and to assist in the
servicing operations. The principal pieces of Flight
Support Equipment (FSE) were the:
a) Flight Support System (FSS)
b) Orbital Replacement Unit Carrier
(ORUC)
c) Solar Array Carrier (SAC)
The FSS is the approximately fifteen foot diameter ring
mounted in the rear of the shuttle bay. The astronauts
capture the HSTwith the Remote Manipulating System
(RMS) robot arm and secure it to the FSS and shuttle,
providing a stable platform for HST servicing activities.
The ORUS is a cradle housing the ORUs and tools for
the mission and is positioned in the shuttle bay in front
of the FSS. The astronauts remove the "new" ORUs
from the ORUC for installation into the HST and place
the "old" ORUs into the ORUC for return to earth.
The SAC is a platform positioned forward of the ORUC
in the shuttle bay and is used in a similar fashion for the
solar arrays as the ORUC for ORUs. Because of
difficulties during the actual mission, one of the solar
arrays was cast off into space instead of being fastened
to the SAC for return to earth.
In addition to the Flight Hardware and FSE, Ground
Support Equipment (GSE) was required to be shipped
from GSFC to KSC in support of the mission. Although
THE FIRST HST
SERVICING MISSION
CONFIGURA_ON
Fig. 1 Endeavour's carg, o bay showin_ the Solar Array and Orbital Replacen3ent Carriers and the FliF, ht Support SvMem,
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the GSE required over twenty tractor trailers for 
shipment, it was the transportation of the Flight 
FIR. 2 The LDEF, Tube Truck, PS GRO Transporters o n  ET Barge. 
Hardware and FSE that provided the greatest logistics 
challenge and required the most planning and effort by 
the engineers and logisticians. 
The Challenge 
Logisticians from the Logistics Management Division/ 
Code 230 worked with the HST Project OfficeICode 
442 engineers to conduct transportability analyses, 
identify and evaluate alternatives, conduct feasibility 
studies, evaluate container designs, prepare cost 
analyses, recommend modifications, identify potential 
contractor capabilities, prepare transportation plans, 
and coordinate logistics activities. A Space Support 
Equipment Logistics Working Group (SSELWG) was 
created and chaired by the HST Project Carrier Manager 
to foster communications, maintain schedules, 
interchange information, and manage the myriad of 
details and activities required to plan and execute the 
movement of the flight hardwareto KSC. Thechallenge 
facing the SSELWG was to identify and satisfy the 
requirements for economically and safely transporting 
program critical space flight hardware and FSE from 
GSFC to the launch site. 
The Requirements 
The major pieces of FSE, the FSS, ORUC, and SAC, 
require environmentally controlled containers for 
shipment. These pieces of FSE are also relatively 
large, about fifteen feet across the trunion supports, 
and consistent with the inside dimensions of the shuttle 
bay. Therefore, relatively large containers had to be 
sought that could be environmentally controlled and 
capable of being transported over the road, since 
GSFC has neitheran airfield norwaterfront. Two major 
alternatives for container/transporters were considered. 
Existing container/transporters were sought that could 
be modified to satisfy HST's requirements and the 
feasibility and cost of building new container/ 
transporters were assessed. Looking for existing 
containers was the first choice. Standardization, multi- 
purpose, reutilization, recycling, cost avoidance, least 
life-cycle cost, etc. are all buzz words the logistician is 
familiar with and using an existing container would 
appear to provide the most benefit. 
The Solutions 
GSFC had a container that was built for another of its 
spacecraft, the Compton Gamma Ray Observer (GRO), 
that appeared to have potential for reuse. The GRO 
container/transporter was stored in the vicinity of KSC 
awaiting disposition decision. Since GRO was a shuttle 
payload, the internal dimensions of thecontainerwould 
be suitable for HST hardware. The GRO was 
transported by C-5 aircraft so it was obviously air 
transportable. However, the GRO was shipped from 
one airfield in California to another at KSC and over 
public road transport was not a consideration. The 
roller flatbed that was part of the GRO container/ 
transporter was about five feet high and was used as 
a loading platform for the C-5 aircraft. Its transport 
purposewasforshort run, slowspeed, surface transport 
from manufacturer's plant to aircraft and from aircraft to 
launch processing facility. It was not intended to be an 
over road transport trailer for the GRO. The 5 ft. added 
to the 13 ft. height of the GRO container made the 
container/transporter over 18 ft. tall and much too high 
to pass underthe overpasses in the GSFC area and get 
from or to Andrews AFB, Maryland, the nearest C-5 
airfield. The height problem was readily overcome by 
being able to use a double-drop low-boy trailer that 
Code 230 had procured for transporting other GSFC 
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payloadcontainers.Thenewtrailerwasonly2ft.high
andloadedwiththe13 ft.GROwouldmakea total
heightof 15ft, whichcouldpassundermostof the
overpassesintheGSFCvicinity.Theheightproblem
wassolved,but thentherewasanotherformidable
problemwiththewidth.TheGROcontainerwas18ft.
wide. Sixteenfeetis themaximumwidthFloridawill
allowwithawaivertotheirrestrictionsforuseontheir
roads.Someoftheothereastcoaststateswon'teven
allow 16 ft. The width of the GRO,being an
insurmountableproblem,meanthatif used,itwould
havetoberestrictedtotransportbyairorbywater.The
StateofMarylandwouldallowovertheroadmovement
ofthe18ft.wideGROfromtheairfieldatAndrewsAFB,
ortheBaltimore/ChesapeakeBaywaterfront,toGSFC.
AtthispointHSTknewithadacontainerthatcouldbe
usedforairorwatertransportofatleastoneofitsthree
piecesofflighthardware.Allthathadto bedonewas
get it fromKSCto GSFC.A USAFC-5missionto
transportheGROfromKSCto AndrewsAFBwould
cost about$100,000,not includingthe $3,000for
riggingtogettheGROofftherollerbedandontothe
low-boyand then the escortedconvoyover road
movementto GSFC.Thesetransportationcostsnow
addednewfactorstothecontainer/transporterd cision
process.WhenthecostoftransportoftheGROstarts
toapproachwhatitmightcosttobuildanewcontainer
forperhapsmorethanoneitem,maybeit is notmore
costeffective,northewisedecision,to reusetheold.
WhiletheIogisticiansandengineerswerepondering
the pros and cons of usingthe GROcontainer/
transporterforonepieceofflighthardware,theywere
alsotryingtodeterminewhatodoaboutheothertwo
pieces. Estimatesto buildnewcontainersranfrom
$150,000toover$1million,withvaryingscheduleand
technicalriskfactorsto beconsideredandevaluated.
The searchfor container/transportersalreadyin
existencecontinuedwithmostbeingeliminatedasnot
largeenoughtosuittheHSTneeds.AswellasGRO,
therewasanotherlargecontainer/transporteratKSC.
ThisonebelongedtoLangleyResearchCenter(LaRC)
andwasusedtotransporttheLongDurationExposure
Facility(LDEF)fromLaRCto KSC.TheLDEFwasto
berecoveredfromorbitbytheshuttleandreturnedto
earth. The LDEFcontainer/transporterwouldbe
requiredtoreturntheLDEFtoLaRC.TheGSFCteam
contactedLaRCanddeterminedthattheLDEFhad
potentialandmightbemadeavailabletoGSFC.After
numeroustechnical interchanges,engineering
analyses,anddrawingreviews,it wasconcludedthat
the GROcontainerwouldcarrythe SACwithonly
minormodificationstothetrunionsupports.Itwasalso
determinedthat the LDEFcontainer,with more
extensivemodification,couldcarryboththeORUCand
FSS.Technically,HSThada handleonresolvingits
container/transporterproblems. The Iogisticians
attachedthe logisticsproblemsassociatedwiththe
economicalmovementof such large container/
transporters.
The Modifications
The LDEF was designed to be transported by barge
and because of the inadequacy of its running gear and
like GRO, its size was not suited to over road travel.
The LD EF was towed slowly from LaRC to the waterfront
at Langley AFB where it was loaded on a barge for
shipment to KSC. Neither at LaRC, nor KSC, did the
LDEF have to travel on public roads or pass under any
overpasses, so its height and size presented no problem.
Unlike GRO, the LDEF container could not be removed
from its transporter/trailer. The container was
structurally an integral part of the trailer and could not
be removed and placed on a low-boy trailer. The
LDEF, with its domed roof was about 18 ft. high and at
that height, even with waivers from Maryland for over
road movement, would not be able to pass under the
overpasses between the Chesapeake waterfront and
GSFC. To be able to get the LDEF container to GSFC,
it was decided to have it modified at LaRC. Codes 442
and 234 worked with LaRC to identify, select, and
award a contract to a fabricator in the LaRC area to
modify the LDEF container/transporter for the HST
ORUC and FSS.
The LDEF was returned to LaRC and the selected
contractor by the same mode that it was brought to
KSC, by barge. The NASA External Tank (ET) barge
ferried the LDEF from KSC to LaRC. Code 230
negotiated with LaRC and Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC), the owner/operators of the ET barge, to
transport the GRO along with LDEF. This got GRO to
Virginia, avoiding the expense of a C-5 flight. LaRC
stored the GRO container/transporter until the
modifications to the LDEF were completed and then
both LDEF and GRO were shipped by barge to GSFC.
LaRC worked with GSFC to oversee the contractor's
completion of the modifications. The running gear of
the trailer was replaced with one that would satisfy
Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements for
over the road use. Air bags were installed to provide
air-ride shock absorption for the payloads and the
capability to raise or lower the height of the container to
pass under overpasses. The domed roof was replaced
by a flat one which reduced the height of the LDEF to
between approximately 15 and 16 ft., depending on the
inflation of the air bags. Trunion support structures
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were constructed for the FSS and ORUC and new 
external containerwalls were built. The Environmental 
Control System (ECS) was also modified and adjusted 
for HST requirements. When the modifications were 
complete, Code 230 executed their transportation plan 
for shipping both LDEF and GRO by barge from LaRC 
to GSFC. 
Transportation of Container/lransporters to 
GSFC 
At LaRC the GRO container was removed from the 
roller bed trailer upon which it had been shipped from 
KSC and positioned on the double-drop low-boy 
provided by Coce 230 for over road transport. The 
LDEF and GRO container/transporters were towed 
from LaRC across the Langley AFB runway to the 
waterfront where a commercial shallow water barge 
and tug awaited. Since a prepared pieddock was not 
available, Code 230 arranged for a commercial rigger 
to construct a loading areahamp from the shore to 
barge, enabling the transporters to be backed onto the 
barge by the tractors. The tug captain held the barge 
in place with the use of the tug's engines until loading 
was complete. The barge was then towed up the 
Chesapeake to the Defense Logistics Agency Depot 
waterfront area at Curtis Bay, just south of Baltimore. 
After off loading at Curtis Bay, a convoy of the 
transporters, commercial tractors, support equipment 
trucks, government, commercial, and DOT escort 
vehicles, and local and state police, was formed for the 
over road trip to GSFC. The convoy could not depart 
until after midnight to comply with the Maryland permit 
restrictions for the movement. Upon arrival at GSFC, 
the container/transporters were positioned in the vicinity 
of the space flight hardware for Environmental Control 
System (ECS) testing and future loading of the flight 
hardware for shipment to KSC. The movement of 
container/transporters by barge and over the road from 
LaRC to GSFC served to provide logistics planners 
with a "dry run" of the transportation concepts they 
planned to utilize for the HST First Servicing Mission. 
All went successfully as planned. 
Transportation of Mission Hardware to KSC 
ET Barae. Code 230 arranged with MSFC for the HST 
flight hardware container/transporters to be transported 
from Curtis Bay, Maryland, to KSC by the NASA ET 
barge. The shipment dates were coordinated with 
MSFC to coincide with the shipment of an ET to KSC 
from Michaud, Mississippi. This coordination enabled 
the HST project to pay for bringing the barge to Curtis 
Bayonlyfrom KSCand notthelegfrom Michaud. Code 
Fig. 3 The ET Barge leaving Curtis Bay, Maryland 
234 also coordinated with the U.S. Coast Guard to be 
sure that the Chesapeake bridges could be opened 
and that there would be no impediments to the travel of 
the barge up the Chesapeake. Even with this prior 
coordination and Coast Guard assurances, acontractor 
I7iK 4 1 IIC (;RO Transportvr  bcwy, o f f  loaded at KSC 
painting a draw bridge left one of his barges tied on one 
side of the span, leaving insufficient room for the ET 
barge to pass safely. The ET barge, being 40 feet high 
and 200 feet long, acts as a sail in the wind and can be 
difficult to control in the narrow channels of the bay. 
Fortunately, the construction paint barge was removed 
without causing mishap to the ET barge and only 
minimally effecting the schedule. The positive aspect 
of the incident was that the U.S. Coast Guard was sure 
to have the way cleared for the actual shipment of the 
flight hardware. An assist tug also met the ET tug to 
help control and navigate the channels in the narrow 
confines of the upper Chesapeake and Curtis Bay. 
Curtis Bay. The Army Reserve (USAR) waterfront 
area at the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Depot at 
Curtis Bay, Maryland was the closest and most 
convenient harbor area to GSFC. Code 234 interfaced 
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with both the DLA and USAR to use their facilities.
Unfortunately, the pier area at the bay was too old and
weak to risk the weight of the container/transporter.
Code 234 improvised by removing a section of the
waterfront fencing and clearing an area of solid ground
next to a sea wall to which the ET barge could tie up.
Convoy from GSFC to Curtis Bay. Twenty-four
hours prior to the scheduled departure, a last minute
route survey was conducted to assure there were no
new unknown hazards to the convoy. With only inches
to spare in clearing some of the overpasses, a last
minute road resurfacing raising the road level could
have been disastrous. The survey vehicle, with its
measuring pole, would act as the scout vehicle of the
convoy leading it safely under the overpasses. On the
evening before scheduled departure, the commercial
tractors were inspected by Code 230 and hooked up to
the transporters. The commercial and government
escorts, support equipment truck, and porject vehicles
formed up to await the arrival of the Maryland State
Police escorts and the midnight departure time. At a
little after midnight, the thirteen vehicle parade with
amber hazard lights flashing departed for the 30 mile
carefully routed trip to Curtis Bay - the beginning of the
trip into space.
Convoy Arrival at Curtis Bay & Barge Departure.
The convoy arrived at Curtis Bay a little after the
scheduled time of 0300, and the transporters were
positiioned in the loading area for loading on the ET
barge. The ET barge, having arrived the night before,
was in position and ready to load. The loading of the
transporters was accomplished as scheduled, the HST
project passengers accompanying the shipment settled
on board, and the barge crew cast off just after first light
as planned, and headed out to the bay to begin the
ocean journey to KSC. This time, as expected, the
Coast Guard assured the way was clear with no
obstacles.
Arrival at Cape Canaveral. The ET barge arrived at
Port Canaveral where the ocean-going deep water tug
was replaced by a river pilot and two shallow water tugs
that were capable of navigating the shallow waters of
the Banana River to the ET dock at KSC. Code 234
coordinated with KSC logistics personnel to assure the
appropriate support vehicles and equipment was on
hand to accomplish the off loading. The transporters
were delivered to the appropriate processing facilities
for their final preparation and integration and test
before launch.
The Mission
The success of the HST First Servicing Mission made
history and was witnessed by millions around the
world. Every newspaper reported, in great detail, the
servicing activities of the astronauts of the STS-61
Space Shuttle Endeavour. All major "space logistics"
objectives were accomplished; optics were installed
that corrected the mirror's blurred images, ORU's were
installed to enhance the HST's reliability, and the
feasibility and concepts of on-orbit servicing and repair
in space were demonstrated and proven. And on
earth, Iogisticians got the space flight hardware and the
flight and ground support equipment to the launch pad
- and then back home again.
Post Mission Return of Mission Hardware to
GSFC
The logistics plan for the return of the hardware from
KSC to G SFC was essentially the reverse of that for the
trip to KSC, but, there were a few additional challenges.
Original planning envisioned the return of the hardware
to occur in the spring when the weather along the
Atlantic Coast is more conducive to ocean travel.
However, after the mission, the HST Project made the
decision, based on cost and project requirements, to
return the hardware to GSFC before the end of January
1994. The Iogisticians of Code 230 scurried about to
make it happen. Their coordination efforts were
hampered by the Christmas holidays that fell between
the time that the Endeavour and HST landed and the
date the HST was requied at GSFC. A large number of
government and contractor personnel involved and
knowledgeable with the pre-launch shipment were on
well deserved leave, basking in the success of the
mission and enjoying the holidays. Many a phone call
was answered with "sorry, they are on leave until the
middle of January". Nonetheless, this "back-up" team
coordinated and executed the effort to bring the
hardware "back-up" to GSFC. Once again, the use of
the ET barge was coordinated and scheduled to coincide
with the delivery of an ET from Michaud to KSC.
Everything went according to the plan except that
which was beyond anyone's control, the weather. The
barge was loaded to capacity with the HST container/
transporters, support equipment, an ACTS container
destined for GSFC, and an ET cradle to be returned to
Michaud. It departed the ET dock at KSC on schedule
only to be delayed for a day at Port Canaveral by high
seas and swells outside the port. After the barge left
the port, the trip north was hampered by more of the
bad weather for which the Atlantic winters are famous.
After travelling north for a day, no headway was made
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because high winds out of the north forced the barge to
retrace its tracks. Off Cape Hatteras, swells over 20
feet high buffeted the barge and cargo and caused
discomfort to the passengers and crew, causing
complexions to become pale and green. Meanwhile,
the GSFC Washington DC/Baltimore area was
experiencing one of its worst winters in decades - ice,
sleet, snow, freezing temperatures. When the barge
finally reached the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay, the
water was calm - calmed by a covering of as much as
4 inches of ice. The ice further slowed the progress of
the barge. In the Curtis Bay where the channels are
narrow, the water calm, the ice thickest, and the barge
would be traveling its slowest, Code 230 called on the
U.S. Coast Guard to break ice to enable the tugs to
maneuver the barge to the dock more easily. Once at
Curtis Bay, the awaiting escort vehicles, tractors, and
support vehicles formed up with the transporters for
their after-midnight convoy to GSFC and the final leg of
the journey.
Summary
The on-orbit servicing of HSTwas a memorable logistics
feat. Getting the hardware to the orbiting HST was a
logistics feat in itself. The logistics journey of the HST
hardware was over land, over water, and through air &
space by truck, by barge, and by shuttle launch vehicle.
The "earthy" logistics effort to support the HST First
Servicing Mission involved the coordination and
cooperation of government and contractor personnel
from almost all the NASA Centers, HQ, GSFC, KSC &
CCAFS, MSFC, LaRC; the GSFC Project Offices,
HST/Code 442, Logistics Management Division/Code
230; the U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, Defense
Logistics Agency, and U.S. Air Force. The Hubble
Space Telescope Logistics Team, proud of their
contributions to the success of the HST First Servicing
Mission, is looking forward to and have begun planning
the logistics support for the HST Second Servicing
Mission scheduled for early 1997.
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LAUNCH SITE COMPUTER
SIMULATION AND ITS
APPLICATION TO PROCESSES
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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an overview of computer
simulation, the Lockheed developed STS Pro-
cessing Model, and the application of computer
simulation to a wide range of processes. The
STS Processing Model is an icon driven model
that uses commercial off the shelf software and
a Macintosh personal computer. While it usu-
ally takes one year to process and launch 8 space
shuttles, with the STS Processing Model this
process is computer simulated in about 5 min-
utes. Facilities, orbiters, or ground support
equipment can be added or deleted and the im-
pact on launch rate, facility utilization, or other
factors measured as desired.
This same computer simulation technology can
be used to simulate manufacturing, engineering,
commercial, or business processes. The tech-
nology does not require an "army" of software
engineers to develop and operate, but instead
can be used by the layman with only a minimal
amount of training. Instead of making changes
to a process and realizing the results after the
fact, with computer simulation, changes can be
made and processes perfected before they are
implemented.
Copyright © 1994 by Lockheed Space Operations Company.
Published by the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronauatics, Inc. with permission.
COMPUTER SIMULATION OVERVIEW
Computer simulation has traditionally been of-
fered in two very different types of formats.
Language-based simulation packages, such as
SLAM and SIMAN, require the use of special-
ized software languages and experts in simula-
tion and coding in order to operate. The simu-
lations performed by these language-based soft-
ware packages tend to be very general in na-
ture. On the other hand, data-driven simulators
use pre-built graphical blocks to simulate com-
mon processes found in areas such as manufac-
turing. While effective for the domain for which
they were intended, the pre-built graphical
blocks are inflexible and cannot be used to simu-
late other processes.
With the advent of the Macintosh computer, and
now Windows, and with the greatly increased
power and affordability of these platforms, a
third type of simulation software package has
been developed. The hybrid simulation software
package combines the power of the language-
based packages with the ease of use of the
graphical packages. The result is an easy to use,
powerful, and flexible simulation package that
can be used by the beginner, but also provides
the means to develop customized blocks in or-
der to produce very complex and intricate simu-
lations by the experienced modeler.
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STS PROCESSING MODEL
The processing of the Space Shuttle at Kennedy
Space Center is performed mainly in three types
of facilities. The Orbiter Processing Facility
(OPF) is used to de-service and remove payload-
unique equipment from the orbiter after a mis-
sion, perform repairs and modifications, and
install equipment and supplies in preparation for
the next mission. The Vehicle Assembly Build-
ing (VAB) is where the huge external tank (ET)
is attached to the solid rocket boosters after they
are stacked and is also where the orbiter is at-
tached to the ET. The launch pad is used to pre-
pare the vehicle for launch, including payload
installation, fueling, and final checkout. Each
of these facilities are limited in numbers; there
are three OPF bays, two VAB bays, and two
launch pads. The purpose of developing a STS
Processing Model is to determine the impact
upon the launch rate and facility utilization of
events such as changes in the number of orbit-
ers to process, facility shutdown, major flight
part unavailability, or GSE disruptions. Other
changes, such as the processing impact of a new
launch vehicle upon the facilities and the ability
of the launch site to effectively process both
vehicles can also be modeled. Figure 1 presents
an overview of the current STS processing re-
quirements.
The STS Processing Model was developed
through the use of the simulation software Ex-
tend + Manufacturing TM available from Imag-
ine That, Inc., San Jose, Ca. Extend is hybrid,
library based, iconic-block (graphical element)
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) simulation
software package. The Model describes the be-
havior of vehicles moving through the major
processing facilities, to launch, mission and
landing, and then back for processing. The
Model operates in a discrete event mode, where
events are orbiter movements or other status
changes. Event times are driven by orbiter pro-
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Figure 1. STS Processing Flow
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Figure 2. STS Processing Model-Overview
cess durations and the resolution of resource
conflicts. An orbiter's process duration is se-
lected from a statistical distribution of achieved
processing durations or a default constant. As
can be seen in Figure 2, the simulation model of
the launch site is very intuitive as the OPF, VAB,
and launch pad footprints are used as part of the
Model. The process flow on the screen is the
same as the orbiter movement toward the launch
pad. Additionally, icons of the shuttle, solid
rocket boosters, and external tank provide vi-
sual clues as to the status of the integrated flow.
Through the use of an input screen, called the
Notebook, assets such as orbiters or mobile
launcher platforms (MLPs) can be added or de-
leted in order to perform a "what-if" analysis.
These type of changes take about 10 seconds to
make, and it takes about 5 minutes to model a
years worth of processing to determine the ef-
fects on the launch site. Processing times that
the Model pulls from the statistical database,
such as for the OPF, VAB, or pads, are also
shown in the notebook input screen (Figure 3)
as the model is running.
The output of the Model is shown in Figure 4.
The output, which is a continuation of the Note-
book, shows the achieved launch rate, yearly
launch rate, facility utilization for each of the
INPUT PARAMETERS / PROCESSING
SNAPSHOTS
Number of MLPs: W
OPF Processing Times
Bay 1"
Bay 2*
Bay 3*
Number of 1-_Orbiters
VAB Processing Times (days)
ReadyMLP _ _I_-_,t I
RSRM Stacking _
ET/SRB Mate 111.431
,.,'dO,. .   iii   iiiiiiiiiiii:iii:
Pad Processing Shuttle Minimum
Times (days) Launch Interval (days)
Pad 39B *
_ moddfy di_wibulion m Input Random NImber block found m e4_h /
AD OPERATIONS block. •
Orbital Mission Time (days)
* Uniform Real from ['_ to_ I
MLP Refurbishing
Processing Time (days)
Max # at a time
Figure 3. STS Processing Model Notebooklnput Screen
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facility processingbaysand launchpads,and
MLP and orbiter availability. A spreadsheet
within the Notebook also captures the as-run data
for each processing flow so that comparisons
and statistical analyses can be made to deter-
mine the results of each "what-if" run. Addi-
tional data elements can be added to the Note-
book as desired.
Each of the facilities represented consist of a
hierarchical block. A hierarchical block is com-
posed of a series of logic blocks that represent
the logic and events that occur within the facil-
ity. For instance, as shown in Figure 5, the pro-
cessing flow within the VAB consists of a series
of library blocks that detail the logic of activi-
ties that occur in the VAB. The stacking of the
solid rocket boosters, mating of the external tank,
and the integration of the shuttle with the stack
are represented by a series of logic blocks. The
statistics used to represent the durations of each
event are taken directly from the actual times
achieved from each of the processing flows since
5 l-L, with the exception of the first flows for
Back to Flight and unique flows due to hydro-
gen leaks.
MODEL OUTPUT
Launch Results
Show plot
Total Launches _ 1--'] during
Yearly Launch Rate 15.82 I simulation
Orbiter Processing Facility, (OPF)
Orbiters Processed Utilization
Bayl 3 10.70 I
Bay2 3 I 0.56 I
Bay3 3 I 0.68 I
VAB Operations
Vehicles Complete Utilization
Bay3 5 10.90 I
Pad Operations
Launches Utilization
10.30I39B I I
RPSF Operations
Utilization
Resource Availability (Average)
MLP's I 0.47 [Orbiters
Figure 4. STS Processing Model Notebook Output
Through the use of hierarchical blocks, it is very
easy to add or delete facilities to determine the
effect on the processing flow, launch rate, or
facility utilization. After a hierarchical block is
created, it can be added to a library, such as the
STS Processing Library, and used to add the fa-
cility in the processing flow as desired. It is
also easy to delete a facility, simply by select-
ing and deleting it, to determine the subsequent
effect on the processing flow. Either change,
whether adding or deleting a facility, takes less
than 15 seconds to implement.
Another type of "what-if" analysis that can be
done is to determine the effects upon facility
utilization and launch rate if an OPF bay is shut-
down for one year in order to perform extended
duration modifications on an orbiter. As each
of the bays and orbiters are the same as far as
the model is concerned, OPF bay 3 is selected
to have a one year period of downtime. The
downtime is selected at a time when the orbiter
is in the bay, in order to capture the orbiter for
the downtime. A scheduled downtime block is
added to the facility block in the OPF hierarchi-
cal block and a downtime of one year is selected.
After running the Model, it is determined that
the launch rate decreases from 7 to 6 while the
facility utilization of the remaining OPF facili-
ties increases. A synopsis of the changes in-
curred due to the addition of one year of OPF
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 2 3
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Figure 5. VAB Hierarchical Block
downtime is shown in Figure 6.
Due to its nature as a hybrid simulation pack-
age/language, Extend enables people with a wide
range of ability to change the Model at many
levels of detail. The user can double-click on
block icons and change dialog parameters. From
libraries supplied, the user can get new blocks,
connect them, and enter parameters. For more
flexibility, the user can enter formulae or equa-
tions directly into an Equation block (Figure 7).
The simpler groundrules are represented in
Equation blocks, so the user can change these
or add new blocks to modify groundrules. For
the most flexibility, the user can create new
primitive blocks by using Extend's built-in C
compiler and dialog/icon editors to either modify
a pre-existing block or build one from scratch.
Most blocks needed are already pre-built. In
fact, all but one of the blocks used to build the
Model are pre-built.
MODELING PROCESSES
The simulation software and techniques used to
develop the STS Processing Model can also be
applied to a wide range of processes, such as
manufacturing, engineering, and business pro-
cess reengineering. Specific models may in-
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Figure 6. Effect of OPF Bay 3 Downtime for One Year
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86.6% 93.9%
66.0% 74.1%
85.9%
clude logistics inventory analyses, electronic
circuit development, or paperwork flow im-
provement. The software is designed to be used
by the layman, and therefore does not require
the services of software or modeling experts in
order to use.
By modeling processes, a manager shifts the
focus from dealing with outcomes to managing
the means for achieving customer and business
value. Aspects a manager often deals with, such
as excess inventory, overtime, expediting, safety
problems, worker morale, or delivery perfor-
mance, are often the cause of the nature of the
overall system. However, when identifying a
:_: ---::::_:":_:::::_":"';:!:'_"_":-_";"i! I 15 - !! I 0"Z! !:!'t q u a t !0 n i::-="_!:::::t":"_:::'::_!:':;_?:_::::::_:_:_i_ /
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lDor.e-somT-sumllo; ; i
[TLn,t-OP_dor-rOono; I •
[letBump-not (mend or TDone<l 4 or TLeft<l 4 or Post); [ ]]]'1
Comments : i
Don't allow bump if: A) processed L.T. 14 (Joys or If L.T. , 4 days [ I
lunCH complete, or B)mondntorg mission or post-orbit process. I _ i
........................................:.........._ •
i
Figure 7. Equation Block Dialog
specific item to change in the system, it is diffi-
cult to perceive the overall effect due to the syn-
ergy which occurs when all relationships act
together. Flow charts can help identify the sys-
tem parts and process sequence, and spread-
sheets can help calculate some mathematical
relationships, but the overall cause-and-effect
relationships are hard to capture with such tools.
A simulation model effectively mimics the dy-
namic behavior of a flow system, where real-
world elements interact when specific events
occur, and where behavior may be driven by
probabilistic processes and feedback.
Another benefit of simulation is the ability to
build or change a process on a computer before
it is actually implemented. The building of a
simulation model requires that a consensus be
developed among the interested parties on what
is actually required, which often changes and
aligns the perceptions of the parties involved.
Based upon up-front understanding of the pro-
cess and mutually agreed to changes, this "con-
sensual reality" often leads to an improved pro-
cess when implemented.
CONCLUSION
With the introduction of ever more powerful
personal computers and easy to use simulation
software such as Extend, computer simulation
is a now a readily available tool. The STS Pro-
cessing Model is an example of a fast and flex-
ible tool for the evaluation of shuttle processing
scenarios by personnel not familiar with simu-
lation modeling or techniques. In addition, simu-
lation can be used on a wide range of processes
to model new developments or changes to ex-
isting systems to determine the effectiveness of
the processes before they are implemented.
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Abstract
The process to predict the vahles of tile
maintenance time dependent variable parameters
such as MTBF over lime must be one that will not (2)
in turn introduce uncontrolled deviation in the
results of the II_S analysis such as Life Cycle Cost,
spares calculalion, etc. A minor deviation in tile (3)
values of the maintenance time dependent variable
parameters such as MTBF over time will have a
significant impact on the logistics resources
demands, International Space Station Availability
and maintenance support costs. It is the objective (4)
of lhis report to identify the magnitude of the
expected enhancement in the acctJracy of tile
reslllls for the International Space Station Reliability
and Maintainability data packages by providing 1.
examples. These examples partially portray the
necessary information by evaluating the impact of
II=e said enhancements on the Life Cycle Cost and
the Availability of the International Space Slation.
Tile examples are as follows:
(1) Tile Non Electronic reliability data hand
book (NPRD) usage by the program
RAM data packages (i.e. a vag=le
approximation of parts count) vs. tile actual
stress method of prediction;
Constant faihlre rate prediction vs. what
distribution it should be;
Percentage of the parts on the International
Space Station with constant failtlre rates in
relation to the overall International Space
Station configuralion;
Miscellaneous enhancements that can
benefit tile overall program RAM data
packages.
REFERENCES
A. CSA SOW dated December 1993;
a. Space Station Freedom External
Maintenance Task Team, July
1990, final report;
C. External Maintenance Solution
Team, January 1991, final report.
D. SPAR-SS-SASD-0265, Back up
Cupyrighl c 1995 by the American Irlstilute ol Aeronautics and
A=,t=o_J_ltlc_, h_c. All _yht_ lu_=_vctd.
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drive unit MTBF prediction, March
03 1993;
E. SPAR-SS-R-0482, Limited Life
Ilems Lisl for MSS, May 1993;
F. SPAR-SS-SASD-0260, Joint
backup relay unitpreliminary MTBF
prediction, March 03 1993;
Go SPAR-SS-SASD-0259, LEE
backup relay unit preliminary
MTBF prediction, March 03 1993;
No SPAR-SS-SASD-0115, Joint
electronic unit MTBF prediction,
Oct 27 1993;
SPAR-SS-R-0613, Orbit
replaceable unit (ORU) list for
MSS, May 1993;
J. Applications of Space Logistics
Engineering in Quantitative Risks
assessment and management of
Space Station Freedom, AIAA
1991, Cocoa Beach, Florida, F.
Sepehry-Fard.
K, Reliability worksheet on the
SSRMS joints, dated May, 28,
1993.
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this report is to note the
factors (environmental, pre-operational,
others) which must be taken into account
during the process of accurately predicting
the maintenance time dependent variables
in a space environment; to indicate the
potential delta if the real failure rate
parameters are not used for such models
as life cycle costs and availability; and to
recommend actions to enhance Ihe
program RAM packages by achieving a
more thorough accounting for all
anticipated factors.
.
3.1
3.2
3.3
INTRODUCTION
In response to Reference A task, a series
of three (3) reports which describes the
initial approach to conduct refinement
processes for the maintenance time
dependent parameters such as MTBF in
order to accurately forecast the Logistics
Support requirements shall be submitted.
This is the third report of the three reports.
The paramount and complex problem
relative to the time dependent
maintenance variable parameters became
apparent as a result of the investigations
performed on the program's RAM
packages. Find attached as Annex A, a
description of the cost delta between Ihe
Weibull and exponential failure density
distribution on the SSRMS joint.
This report includes examples to indicate
the potential delta if the real failure rate
parameters are not used in subsequent
resource modelling activities. These
examples partially portray the necessary
information by evaluating the impact of the
said deficiencies on the Life Cycle Cost
and the Availability of the MSS. The
examples are as follows:
3.2.1 The Non Electronic reliability data
hand book (NPRD) usage by the
RAM data packages (i.e. a vague
approximation of parts count) vs.
the actual stress method of
prediction;
3.2.2 Constant failure rate prediclion vs
what distribtltion it should be;
3.2.3 Percentage of the parts on the
MSS with constant failure rate in
relation to the overall MSS
configuration;
3.2.4 Miscellaneous deviations inherent
in the RAM data packages.
The NPRD reliability assessment of the
ORUs vs. actual stress method prediction
3.3.1 Ref. E states that the failure rates
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3.4
wereobtained using the NPRD.
Let us examine this way of
assessment and evaluate the
impact on Ihe logistics sllpport
requirements. Examination of
reliability worksheets performed by
Ref. K dated 28, May 1993,
ehlcidates explicitly that all the
joints are treated the same generic
way. In other words, all the joints
are assumed to have the same
MTBF figlire and the assessment
of the failure rate utilizes the
NPRD-91. In view of the fact thai
different joints on the MSS go
through different stress levels and
furthermore there is not any layout
and/or schemalics in the NPRD-91
in order to jllslify this analysis and
similiarization. This universal
treatment of the joints can be
extremely off with respect to the
prediction of the time dependent
maintenance paramelers such as
MTBF, MDT, etc which directly
affect and are lhe key drivers for
the accurate forecast of
operational and steady state
availability, spares and sttpport
equipment requirements. The
following examples illustrate these
deviations.
Percentages of Electronic/Electrical,
Electromechanical, Mechanical, Structllral
Mechanical and Structt|ral parts on the
MSS.
3.4.1 The following ilhlstrale the
percentages of Electronic/
Electrical, Electromechanical,
Mechanical, Structural Mechanical
and Slructural parts on the MSS.
According to Ref. I and B, there
are 83 and 213 CSA ORUs,
respectively. Our analysis utilizes
the number provided in Ref. I and
categorizes the ORLIs in 5 different
classes. -(his analysis is based on
engineering ju(lgement and
approximalion on the percentages
of the paris count elnbodied in
3.4 2
each ORU. This assessment
assumes that the failure and repair
distributions allocated for different
family of products (i.e. Electrical,
Mechanical, etc.) will not be
changed as a result of exposures
to Solar Flares, Atomic Oxygen,
Micrometeorite, etc.
The different family of products
percentages on the MSS are as
follows:
27% of faillares related to
Electromechanical pads, 19% of
failures related to mechanical
parts, 3% of failures related to
Structural mechanical pads, 27%
of failures related to Structural
parts belong to other dislributions
than exponential slJch as Normal,
Lognormal, Gamma, Weibutl, etc.
which should be assessed
according to the methodologies
explained in this report.
Report 2 states that exponential
failure distribution to predict MTBF
is almost exclusively used for
electronic eqHipment. Exponential
faihlre distribulion describes the
situation wherein the hazard rate is
constant which can be shown to
be generated by a Poisson
process. Some particular
applications of this model inchJde:
A. Items whose failure rates
do not change significantly
with age;
B. Complex and repairable
equipment without
excessive amounts of
redundancy;
C, Equipment for which the
early failures or "infanl
mortalities" have been
eliminated by "burning in"
the equipment for some
reasonable lime period.
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3A.3 Only about 24% (i.e. Electronic/
Electrical family of prodllcls on the
MSS) of these assessments
belong to exponential faihJre
distribution. Depending on the
value of I_, the weibull distribution
hmction can take the form of the
following dislribnlions as follows:
< 1 Gamma
! = 1 Exponential
= 2 Lognormal
= 3.5 Normal
(approximately)
Thus, it may be used to help
identify other distributions from the
life test data or other data from the
previous spacecraft anomalies
(backed up by goodness of fit
tests, see recommendation) as
well as being a distribution in its
own right. In order to determine
the distribulion densities for the
different family of products, we
have to look at the reliahilily and
life tests data backed _Jp by other
actual data which best represent
the real life scenario of the
products in question. These
assignments of faih_re density
distributions can, as
recommendation suggests, be
verified and validated by means of
goodness of fitness lesls.
3.5 The following calculation
demonstrates the potenlial delta in
what is being proposed vs what it
should be as far the cost of the
impact on the Life Cycle Cost and
Availability of the MSS are
concerned. The assumptions for
calculating these figures and the
subsequent items A F are
provided accordingly:
It is intended to benefit the MSS program
by $5 Billion over 30 years (Ref. J);
Initial Acquisition cost t 1.2 Billion
C. CSA's predicted MTBF 2 242,752 Hours
g. Recalculated MTBF using NPR[33 329.47
Hours
E. Total down time 4 25 Hours
F. Total corrective maintenance time s 5 Hours
1 See Ref. J.
2 See Ref. K.
This calculation utilizes NPRD-gl. NPRD
uses a constant failure rate model for
generic failure rate predictions. This
calculation does not in any way represent
the real case scenario rather it is intended
to show the possible swing in NPRD values
using different justifications and
approximations (MSS Reliability
Worksheels, Ref. K, uses the Ground fixed
as llle environment. Based on the same
kind of justifications and approximations,
utilization of Ground Mobile environment
can also be substantiated). Please also
see Annex A.
4 MTTR = 5 hours (Ref. J), Assume
overhead of 500% therefore:
Total Down Time 5 Hours x 5 = 25 Hours
5 MTTR of Joint Drive Module = 5 Hours
(Ref. J)
Total Corrective Maintenance Time = 5 Hours
3.5.1 It is quile clear, from the above,
that the sleady stale Availability
will be affected as a result of
tremendous inaccuracy inherent in
the method of calculation and the
results of the CSA's time
dependent maintenance parameter
prediction such as MTBF, MDT,
etc.
MTBF
A(I) = A. = MTBF , MTTR
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A. It is evident from the above, that
uncontrolled deviation in tile MT[3F
an(I MDT values would mean
totally inaccurate results for the
Availability. This means that
effective planning related to the
assembly, operation and utilization
of the SSRMS, MSS and/or the
International Space Station can not
be performed;
B, Furthermore, the opportunity costs,
needless delay in schedule, costs
due to unavailability or surplus of
the support equipment, as result of
the above, are expected;
C, As an example, the cost of launch
per Ibs is $5000. Each joint is 252
Ibs and the price of each joint is
more than $4 Million. The
inaccuracy of the time dependent
maintenance parameters (i.e.
MTBF, MDT, etc.) values means
inability to accurately predicl the
occurrence of the failures (random
and wear out) as a function of
time. This means that adequate
logistics resources may not be
available at the right time. This
fulthermore means Ihat there may
be an operational impact due to
insufficient support resources.
The Miscellaneous deviations inherent in
the RAM dala packages inchtde but are not
limited to Ihe following:
3.6.1 Ref. H, in section 4.0, refers to
microcircuit failure rates based on
junction temperatures of 55 C.
Examination of the parts
breakdown of the same document
in its IC section clearly indicates
that a good portion of the IC s
used are CMOS. CMOS
technology utilizes the channel not
junction. Junction lerminology is
merely used for bipolar products
which are, in view of their high
power consumption vs the CMOS,
3.6.2
3.6.3
not looked at very favourably.
Furthermore, it is understood that
the Russians are capable of repair
and removal of Iheir ORUs at the
component level, and that the
ISSA program may be pursuing
methods of increasing in-situ
maintenance and intermediate
maintenance on-orbit. It is
therefore necessary for us to
understand the physics of the
components used on the MSS to
preclude unnecessary delay and
support costs from an effective
logistics support requirements
program plan for the MSS.
Examination of Ref. F. elucidates
explicitly that the MTBF obtained,
based on parts count prediction,
for the Joint Backup Relay Unit
(I_BRU) is 37,907,506 hours this
translates to over 4000 years. It
has been the author's experience,
during the FMECA on the
SARSAT, that based on some
failure modes (such as shorting the
DC capacitors) the following
failures may occur on the MSS:
a, Drainage of the solar
power system without the
ability to detect the failure
mentioned above (the
redundant fuses rating, if
any, may be between the
threshold value and its
blowing value based on
this failure mode) and/or;
b, Relay contacts sticking
due to continuous over
current flow.
Examination of Ref. E. shows that
the criteria for life Limiting Items
are based on linear relationships
(i.e. Table 2-1-1-1, 13 years
mentioned for SSRMS joints based
on initial 3.5 years of Space
Station operation). As it has
clearly been slated in report 1, 2
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,and backed Lip an by example in
this report, this assumption and/or
observation is nol valid. Each of
the ORUs and Iheir si}bsystems
should be assigned a failure and
repair density function. The
predictions for LLI (Life Limited
Items) should only then performed
from the above-mentioned
distribulions.
RECOMMENDATION
In view of the aforementioned deviations, it
is highly recommended that the following
tasks be performed:
4.1 Case studies in relation to Ihe
different failure and repair
distribution density functions in
order to determine, quantify and
timeline the Logistics Suppod and
spares requirements for the MSS,
etc;
4.2 Verification and validation on the
maintenance time dependent
parameters such as MTBF and
MDT using statistical tests such as
D test, chi square tesl, goodness
o! fitness tests in order to validate
and verify lhe distribiltions
assigned to different family of
products, etc;
4.3 The following areas need also be
addressed in order to incur an
accurate logistics support
reqllirements:
a. Common mode faihlres;
b. Common cause failures;
c. Maintenance/Operations
induced failures;
d. Life limited items;
e. Duty cycle (i.e. duty cycle
does not necessarily
increase failure rates)
f. Construction induced
faihlres;
g. Advances in technology;
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.9
4.10
h. Mid Life Update (MLU) of
the MSS.
MSS and SSRMS Probability of
survival, operational and steady
slate availability assessment based
on different mission criticality
scenarios;
Research in frequency of
occurrence of cosrnic rays,
Micrometeorite, flares, atomic
oxygen, magnetic storms, etc. in
order to q_lantify and substantiate
their impact on the Life Cycle cost
and Logistics support requirements
of the MSS;
Determination of time truncated
and failure truncated events for
planning the required logistics
resources;
Determination and level of space
insurance based on quantitative
risks assessmenl and
management of the MSS and
SSRMS;
Research in order to determine the
effects of the combined
environments, i.e. cosmic rays and
micrometeorite, in order to
accurately delermine and quantify
the Logistics Support and spares
requirements, etc;
Spacecraft anomalies data base
set up in order to exploit the space
industry failure and repair historical
data (i.e. MIR) to be able to
baseline the time
dependentmaintenance parameters
accordingly;
In order to accurately .forecast the
resource demands as a function of
time during the operation phase, it
is vital to accurately assess the
following with the amalgamation of
the space stringent requirements
such as flares, cosmic rays,
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micmmeteorite, etc. These
amalgamation should quantify the
impact of the said parameters,
either by themselves or combined,
on the following areas of
investigations:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
Fo
FMECA;
Parts Application Review;
Single Point fail=Ires
Life Limited Items List;
Safety and Hazard
analysis; and
Reliability Predictions.
These assessments are in part due to the
possible marriage overtones among the
different ORU functionalities, etc.
ANNEX A: The cost delta between the weibLdl
and exponential failure density
distribution on the SSRMS joint
1. The usefulness of the models based on
constant failure rates is limited because they do not
adequately account for the fact most mechanical
products have a failure rate which is not constanl
with time as shown in figure 1.
hMIcal ]
--,.-xy//-...=-;:
\ I I
Figure 1: Typical Hazard plots for Electronic
and Mechanical components
The problem that we face in trying to use the
exponential (i.e. MiI_HDBK-217, etc.) prediction
model for mechanical components is that there is
no "useful life" period in which the failure rate is
approximately constant with time. We have a
situation as shown in figure 2. The constant faihJre
rate only corresponds to the actual failure rate at a
specific time which is unknown.
Fig==re 2: Comparison of Prediction and Actual
Failllre Rate.
By L,sing the WeiDull distribution to represent the
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RAMdatafor tile mechanical parts such as tile a.
joints on the SSRMS, the non constant failure rate
can be dealt with. The equations for the reliability
funclion and failure-rate function for the Weibull b.
distribution are shown in report 2. The Reliability (t
= n) = e 1 = 0.368, the failed population = 63.2%
and _. (t = n) = I]/n. It can be seen from the last
equation that at a lime equal to the Weibull
characteristics life, the failure rate function
simplifies to being equal to the Weibull slope
divided by the characteristics life. If we modify the
"MIL-HDBK-217 Type" prediction model to predict
the failure rate at a time equal to the Weibull
characteristics Life we have the condition shown in
figure 3. This modification can be accomplished by
adjusting the base failure rate in order to obtain
agreement between the proposed prediction model c.
and the more accurate model based on Weibull
failure densily function. In order to accomplish this
modification, it is necessary to accurately determine
the Weibldl probability parameters from different
sources of data (i.e. reliability and space
q_aalification testing, field experience, etc). By
plotting the failures based on Weibull faih_re density
distribution on a Weibull probability paper, we
should see the indication of a convex shape which
is very likely due to lhe effect of infant mortality
failures. The shape of the these kinds of plot
suggests that it could reasonably be filled by the
mixlure of two distributions. The RMAT defaull
value for the I_ is 5. Based on the current situation,
we assign two sets of I] values namely 3 and 5.
We will evaluate the delta of what is being
proposed based on constant failure rates and its
impact on the overall logistics support cost for the d.
joiabts of the SSRMS. The following assumption
have been made:
p
i..,_== _z ._w,e ,J.J _1=" II
•nu.a- q
e.
SPAR MTBF for the joint is accurate and is
242,752 hours;
All the parts in the joint resemble a Weibull
failure density dislribution (i.e. even though
there are some electrical/electronic
components on the joint, they are also
assumed to follow a Weibull failure density
functions). In real life, it is customary to
categorize the different family of products
according to their respective failure and
repair density functions and obtain the
cumLdative probability of survival and
failure in order to come Lapwith much more
accurate results);
For Weibull distribution:
_. (t=n) = I:_/n
_. = 3/242,752
7_= 12.35 faillJres E-6 Hours
or:
for _ = 5
_. = 5/242752
_. = 20.6 failures E -6 Hours
For exponential distribution:
= 4.2 failures E -6 Hours
The delta (ratio) for the two Weibull failure
density distribution cases (i.e. I] = 3 and I_
= 5) and the exponential failure density
distribution with constant failure rate are
290% and 490%, respectively.
The following table illustrates the
unnecessary cost due to these types of
inaccurate maintenance time dependent
parameters prediction:
Figure 3: Prediction Equals Actual Failure
Rate At Weibull Characteristics Life
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_.(SPAR) :L([_=3) X(1_:5) P,RATIORATIOPs
(I]=3/e)(_=5/e)
4.12 12.35 20.6
F/IOE6HRS F/IOE6HRS F/IOE6HRS
290% 490% 36.8% 63.2%
Thesevaluesrepresentlhe best case
scenario. In other words, they only
represent the delta between the
assessmentofconstantfailureratevs.non
constantfailuredensitydistribution(i.e.the
Weibulldistribution).In realily,if wewere
to include all the other RAM data
deviations(i.e. Orbital debris, Cosmic
Rays,etc.),thelevelofthe ineffecliveness
of the current Logistics Support
Reqldrementswould have been much
morepronounced.
34
AIAA-95-0909-CP
INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION ALPHA,
BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF MATHEMATICAL MODELLING & FAILURE DENSITY
DISTRIBUTIONS PERTAINING TO MAINTENANCE TIME DEPENDENT PARAMETERS
Dr. F. Sepehry-Fard
President . ..... " c-' _ '
F.S.F RESEARCH TECHNOLOGIES INC.
89 Lindsay
Dorval, Que
Canada, H9P 2S6
Tel: (514) 633-8880
Fax: (514) 633-8763
Mr. Maurice H. Coulthard
Integrated Logistics Support Contractor
Abstract
Canadian Space Agency
Tel: (514) 926-4510
Fax: (514) 926-4447
The process to predict the values of the
maintenance time dependent variable parameters
such as MTBF over time must be one that will
not in turn introduce uncontrolled deviation in the
results of the ILS analysis such as Life Cycle
Cost, spares calculation, etc. A minor deviation
in the values of the maintenance time dependent
variable parameters such as MTBF over time will
have a significant impact on the logistics
resources demands, International Space Station
Availability and maintenance support costs.
There are two types of parameters in the logistics
and maintenance world:
a. Fixed;
b. Variable
Fixed parameters, such as cost per man hour, is
relatively easy to predict and forecast. These
parameters normally follow a linear path and they
do not change randomly. As an example, if the
cost per man hour in 1993 is $76, this rate will
amount to $78.28 per hour for 1994 considering
the inflation rate of 3% per annum. However,
the variable parameters subject to the study in
this report such as
MTBF do not follow a linear path and they
i:G
normally fall within the distribution curves which
are discussed in this publication. The very
challenging task then becomes the utilization of
statistical techniques, as illustrated in this report,
to be able to accurately forecast the future non
linear time dependent variable arisings and
events with a high confidence level. This, in turn,
shall translate in tremendous cost savings and
improved availability all around.
1. REFERENCES
A. Space Station Freedom External
Maintenance Task Team, July
1990, final report;
B, External Maintenance Solution
Team, January 1991, final
report.
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 A series of three (3) reports which
describes the initial approach to conduct
refinement processes for the maintenance time
dependent parameters such as MTBF in order to
accurately forecast the Logistics Support
Copylight c 1995 by 1he Amelican tnst_ute ol AeTonautcs and
Astfun,:=uhcs, Inc, All r_ghts lesetved.
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requirementswere completed. This is the
secondofthethreereports.The paramount and
complex problem relative to the time dependent
maintenance variable parameters became
apparent as a result of the investigations on the
programs's RAM packages.
2.2 The process to predict the values of the
maintenance time dependent variable parameters
such as MTBF over time,as report 1 (this report
is labelled as "INTEGRATED LOGISTICS
SUPPORT ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SPACE STATION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE
MAINTENANCE TIME DEPENDENT
PARAMETER PREDICTION METHODS
ENHANCEMENT" and is published in this
symposium) and annex A of this report elucidate,
can not be treated by the same process as the
program's data packages suggest as this will
introduce uncontrolled deviation in the results of
the ILS analysis such as Life Cycle Cost, spares
calculation, etc. Furthermore, the very acute
problems ofmicrometeroites, Cosmic rays, flares,
atomicoxygen, ionization effects, orbital plumes
and all the other factors that differentiate
maintainable space operations from non
maintainable space operations and/or ground
operations must be accounted for by the
program's RAM data packages. Therefore, these
parameters need be subjected to a special and
complex process.
2.3 FSF, per the direction of CSA
management, elected to investigate these
parameters due to the complexity of the process
involved and because these parameters' values
and data packages have shown not to have a
common denominator as far as the method of
assessment and calculation are concerned; a
minor deviation in their values will have a
significant impact on the logistics resources
demands, MSS availability and maintenance
support costs.
2.4 There are two types of parameters in the
logistics and maintenance world:
2.5
A. Fixed;
B. Variable
Fixed parameters, such as cost per man
hour, is relatively easy to predict and forecast.
These parameters normally follow a linear path
and they do not change randomly. As an
example, if the cost per man hour in 1993 is $76,
this rate will amount to $78.28 per hour
considering the inflation rate of 3% per annum.
However, the variable parameters subject to the
study in this report such as MTBF do not follow
a linear path that they normally fall within the
distribution curves discussed in annex A.
2.6 The very challenging task then becomes
the utilization of statistical techniques, as
illustrated in this report, to be able to accurately
forecast the future non linear time dependent
variable arisings and events with a high
confidence level. This, in turn, shall translate in
tremendous cost savings and improved
availability all around.
2.7 The objectives of this report are two fold:
A. To explain the requirements for
accurate prediction of different
structural, mechanical and
electrical ORU's time dependent
maintenance parameters such
as MTBF; and
B. Describe, in general terms, the
steps required (including a
mathematical background) to
predict the MTBF values over
time in order to increase
accuracy of the results pertaining
to the MSS spares modelling &
calculation, availability, Life
Cycle Cost, etc.
3. REQUIREMENTS FOR PREDICTING
MTBF VALUE AS FUNCTION OF TIME
3.1 The random predicted value and the
actual value fluctuations for time dependent
maintenance parameters such as mean time
between failures (MTBF) and mean down time
(MDT) which are the key drivers for effective
logistics support planning, proved to be stumbling
blocks in providing the accurate and necessary
logistics support requirements. This deficiency is
due to the fact (Ref. annex A) that structural,
mechanical and electrical family of products
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belongtodifferentdistributionfunctions.Thereis
at present no single method available to
accuratelypredicthesefuturearisingsandtheir
frequencyand effectivelyestimate logistics
supportrequirementsfortheMSS.
3.2 Thenecessarymathematicalbackground
that the readerhas to becomefamiliar
withisprovidedinannexA.
3.3 Figure3.3.1 showsthe flow diagram
explainingthetoplevelstepsnecessary
to refine the time dependent
maintenanceparametersuchasMTBF.
3?
OBTAIN DATA I
CATEGORIZE DATA PER THEIR TYPE
(STRUCTURAL,MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL) I
ESTABLISH THEIR FAILURE AND
REPAIR DISTRIBUTIONS
, , ,a
J ii
ESTABLISH LOGISTICS SUPPORT
REQUIREMENTS CORRECTIONAL
FACTORS
i I
I_C_L_-LC_,_,_L__ I
RECOlvlMENDATION
FIGURE 3.3.1 REF!NE:_ENT PROC__SS FOR THE TI'._E
DEPENDE_IT M.AZ._ITE-I___IC_ pA____ETE._2
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ANNEX A
STATISTICAL DISTRIBUTION TYPES
1. There are many standard statistical
distributions which may be used to model the
various maintenance time dependent variable
parameters such as MTBF (Mean Time Between
Failures) and MDT (Mean Down Time). The
particular distribution used depends upon the
nature of the data, in each case. Following is a
short summary of some of the distributions most
commonly used in statistical analysis and the
criteria for their use. The distributions can be
categorized in two criteria:
A. Continuous distributions; and
B. Discrete distributions.
CONTINUOUS DISTRIBUTIONS
analysis of manufactured items and their ability to
meet specifications. No two parts made to the
same specification are exactly alike. The
variability of parts leads to a variability in systems
composed of those pads. The design must take
this part variability into account, otherwise the
system may not meet the specifications
requirement due to the combined effect of part
variability. Another aspect of this application is in
quality control procedures. The basis for the use
of normal distribution in this application is the
cenlral limit theorem which states that the sum of
a large number of identically distributed random
variables, each with finite mean and variance, is
normally distributed. Thus, the variations in value
of electronic component pads, for example, due
to manufacturing are considered normally
distributed.
1.1 Continuous distributions, as the name
implies, are distributions with continuous shape
and form. They primarily consist of the following
distributions:
Normal distribution
1.1.1 There are two principal
applications of the normal distribution to statistical
analysis. One application deals with the analysis
of items which exhibit failure due to wear, such
as mechanical devices. Frequently the wear out
failure distribution is sufficiently close to normal
and that the use of this distribution for predicting
or assessing maintenance time dependent
variable parameters, after preliminary
assessments, can be shown to be valid.
1.1.3 The failure density function for the normal
distribution is
o (2_) 2
Where:
U = The population mean
= The population standard
deviation, which is the _/of the variance.
1.1.2 The other application deals with the
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Lognormal distribution
1.1.4 The Iognormal distribution is the distribution of a random variable whose natural logarithm is
distributed normally; in olher words, it is the normal distribution with In t as the variable. The density
function is:
f(t) - 1 _I exp [-I_ (int-u)2IO
ot (2_) 2
for t _>0
Where the mean =
exp ( .2)U + ----2
the standard deviation = 3.
[exp (2u + 202 ) - exp(2u + 02)]2
and where u and a are the mean and the standard deviation of In t.
1.1.5 The Iognorrnal distribution is used in
statistical analysis of semiconductors and fatigue
life of certain types of mechanical components.
Its main application is really in maintainability
analysis of time to repair data.
Exponential distribution
1.1.6 This is probably one of the most
important distributions in statistical analysis and
is almost exclusively for statistical analysis of
electronic equipment. It describes the situation
wherein the hazard rate is constant which can be
shown to be generated by a Poisson process.
This distribution is valuable if properly used. It
has tile advantages of:
A. Single, easily estimated
parameter (;_);
1.1.7
include:
1.1.8
g.
C.
D.
Mathematically very tractable;
fairly wide applicability;
is additive - that is, the sum of a
number of independent;
exponentially distributed
variables is exponentially
distributed.
Some particular application of this model
A.
B.
C.
Items whose failure rates do not
change significantly with age;
Complex and repairable
equipment without excessive
amounts of redundancy;
Equipment for which the early
failures or "infant mortalities"
have been eliminated by
"burning in" the equipment for
some reasonable time period.
The failure density function is
4O
f(:) = le-_t F(a) = x"-le-Xdx ,
for t>O, where Z is the hazard (failure) rate and
the reliability function is:
which can be evaluated by means of standard
tables. Where (_-1) is a positive integer,
r(co=(_-l)!, which is usually the case for most
statistical analysis, e.g, partial failure situation.
For this case the failure density function is:
R( t) = e -*t
f(t) - _" Clt) "-1 e -_'c
(co-l) !
the mean life (0)= l/k, and, for repairable
equipment, the MTBF = (e) = 1/;L.
Gamma distribution
1.1.9 The gamma distribution is used in
statistical analysis for cases where partial failures
can exist, i.e., when a given number of partial
failures must occur before an item fails (e.g,
redundant systems) or the time to second failure
when the time to failure is exponentially
distributed. The failure density function is:
which, for the case of a=l becomes the
exponential density function, previously
described. The gamma distribution can also be
used to describe an increasing or decreasing
hazard (failure) rate. When oc>l, h(t)increases;
when cz<l, h(t) decreases.
f(_) _ l (lt),__ e_,t
P(a)
for t > 0
where u -
l
1
SD-
Where X is the failure rate (complete failure) and
(z the number of partial failures for complete
failure or events to,generate a failure, r(e 0 is the
gamma function
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Weibull distribution
1.1.10 The Weibull distribution is particularly useful in statistical analysis since it is a general distribution
which by adjustment of the distribution parameters, can be made to model a wide range of life distribution
characteristics of different classes of engineered items. One of the versions of the failure density function
is:
Where: _ is the shape parameter n is the scale parameter or characteristic life (life at which 63.2% of the
population will have failed)_, is the minimum life
1.1.11 In most practical statistical analysis
situations, _,is often zero (failure assumed to start
at t = 0) and the failure density function becomes
and the reliability and hazard functions become
1.2.1 The Binomial distribution is used for
those situations in which there are only two
outcomes, such as success or failure, and the
probability remains the same for all trials. It is
very useful in statistical analysis and quality
assurance work. The probability density function
(PDF) of the binomial distribution is:
/_(n-x)txl
and q = 1 -p
DISCRETE DISTRIBUTIONS
1.2 Discrete distributions, as the name
implies, are distributions with non-continuous
shape and form. They primarily consist of the
following distributions:
Binomial distribution
f(x) is the probability of obtaining exactly x good
items and (n-x) bad items in a sample of n items
where p is the probability of obtaining a good
item (success) and q (or l-p) is the probability of
obtaining a bad item (failure).
1.2.2 The cumulative distribution function
(CDF), i.e., the probability of obtaining r or fewer
successes in n trials, is given by
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R(t) : ' : 8-"
O!
POISSON DISTRIBUTION
1.2.3 This distribution is used quite frequently
in statistical analysis. It can be considered an
extension of the binomial distribution when n > 20
and p <_0.05.
If events are Poisson distributed, they occur at a
constant average rate and the number of events
occurring in any time interval are independent of
the number of events occurring in any other time
interval. For example, the number of failures in
a given time would be given by:
where x is the number of failures and a is the
expected number of a failures. For the purpose
of statistical analysis, this becomes:
xl
or our old friend the exponential distribution.
1.2.4 In the case of redundant equipments, the
R(t) might be desired in terms of the probability
of r or fewer failures in time t. For that case:
R(t)-- T.
X=O "_
1.2.5 Figure 1.1 illustrate the density function,
reliability function and hazard rate for the normal,
Exponential, Gamma, Weibull and Lognormal
distributions.
1.2.6 Figure 1.2 shows the shapes of failure
density and reliability functions of commonly
used discrete distributions.
Where:
;_= failure rate
t = length of time being considered
x = number of failures
The reliability function, R(t), or the probability of
zero failures in time t is given by:
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A PROBABILISTIC TOOL THAT AIDS LOGISTICS ENGINEERS IN THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF HIGH CONFIDENCE REPAIR NEED-DATES
,.%AT THE NASA SHU'I-rLE LOGISTICS DEPOT _ _ ,:_ _
• ,,k
By J. V. Bullington*, J. C. Wlnkler, D. G. Linton PhD. t , S. Khajenoori PhD.*
Abstract significantly increasing the risk of unsatisfied
demand.
The NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD) is
tasked with the responsibility for repair and
manufacture of Line Replaceable Unit (LRU)
hardware and components to support the Space
Shuttle Orbiter• Due to shrinking budgets, cost
effective repair of LRUs becomes a primary
objective. To achieve this objective, it is
imperative that resources can be assigned to
those LRUs which have the greatest expectation of
being needed as a spare. Forecasting the times at
which spares are needed requires consideration of
many significant factors including, for example,
failure rate, flight rate, spares availability, and
desired level of support, among others. This paper
summarizes the results of the research and
development work that has been accomplished in
producing an automated tool that assists in the
assignment of effective repair start-times for LRUs
at the NSLD. This system, called the Repair Start-
time Assignment System (RSAS), uses
probabilistic modeling technology to calculate a
need date for a repair that considers the current
repair pipeline status, as well as, serviceable
spares and projections of future demands. The
output from the system is a date for beginning the
repair that has significantly greater confidence (in
the sense that a desired probability of support is
ensured) than times produced using other
techniques. Since an important output of RSAS is
the longest repair turn-around time that will ensure
a desired probability of support, RSAS has the
potential for being applied to operations at any
repair depot where spares are on-hand and repair
start-times are of interest. In addition, RSAS
incorporates tenants of Just-In-Time (JIT)
techniques in the connotation that the latest repair
start-time (i.e., the latest time at which repair
resources must be committed) may be calculated
for every failed unit. This could aid in reducing the
spares inventory for certain items, without
Introduction
The problem addressed by this research project
was to produce a tool that could aid in reducing
logistics operations costs while maintaining timely
hardware availability to the Orbiter program, as
well as, future space programs. Increasingly tight
budget restrictions are continually putting greater
pressure on the entire space program to reduce
operations costs -- or price itself out of business.
Reductions in labor-intensive processes, coupled
with novel approaches for providing the spare and
repair aspects of logistics, are desperately needed.
The broad objective of this project was to develop
an advanced technology application that is capable
of reducing labor intensity and production time for
selected tasks currently performed in the logistics
process.
The research team investigated several possible
areas within current Orbiter Logistics operations
for application of advanced technology before
finally deciding to focus on a new repair review
board task. This area satisfied the criteria we felt
necessary for a successful project of this nature.
Those criteria were as follows:
1. Experts performing the specific task must
be available in-house, and willing to
cooperate with the project.
2. The potential for cost savings as compared
to similar analyses performed manually
must be clearly evident.
"Advanced Programs Engineer, Rockwell International Corp., Space Systems Division, Florida Operations
Associate Professor, Electrical & Computer Engineering Department, University of Central Florida
* Associate Professor, Aviation Computer Science Department, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
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3. The required input data must be accessible
to the research team.
The intent of the repair review board was that a
group of management level personnel from several
Orbiter hardware support areas would meet at
regular intervals throughout the year to assess the
criticality of need of various items in for repair at
the depot. Those items that have a sufficient level
of support remaining for extended periods into the
future represent situations where the repair could
potentially be deferred indefinitely. This
postponement of repair time has the potential for
saving money by not expending valuable
resources on non-critical items. Due to the
complexity of Orbiter systems, the aging of the
fleet, and relatively low flight rates corresponding
to small sample sizes, a math model alone is
recognized as insufficient for adequately
determining need. Due to this shortcoming, the
specific objective of this research grew into an
investigation of the feasibility of combining expert
system technology and probabilistic modeling to
assist in assigning repair start times at the NASA
Shuttle Logistic Depot (NSLD). The initial
assessment of the benefits of the technology
insertion indicated the potential for: 1) reduced
labor intensity in the logistics product support
area, 2) more uniform and consistent assignment
of repair start times at the NSLD, 3) better
planning and management control of capacity at
the logistics depot, and 4) possibly assisting in
the depot scheduling process.
The concept for the selected system was to
combine algorithmic models for computing
Supportability Turn Around Time (STAT),
discussed later in this paper, and heuristic
knowledge of Logistics Engineering Experts into a
decision support tool called the Repair Start-time
Assignment System (RSAS). As it turns out, the
process of selecting candidate repairs for deferral
has an analogous, and complimentary process for
determining priority of need. Since the logistics
engineers at the depot are deeply familiar with the
prioritization end of the problem (as opposed to
seeking deferrals), and since selecting units with
priority leaves a large quantity of items to be
deferred by default, it was decided to make use of
the available prioritization domain expertise. The
tool's refined purpose is to aid logistics engineers
at the NSLD in assessing Line Replaceable Unit
(LRU) part items for priority of repair need.
Those parts that rank low in the resulting priority
can then be more intelligently, and safely
examined for potential repair deferral.
System Architecture
The following requirements were established for
the development of the RSAS system. As an
initial approach, the prototype would be
concerned with providing analysis for only those
LRUs that are reparable at the NSLD. The
prototype system was to be a stand-alone
environment developed on a DOS/PC running
under the MS/Windows 3.x operating system.
The system input would be provided through a
semi-automated data capture procedure, that could
eventually be expanded to full on-line database
access. System output would, at a minimum,
consist of a probabilistic estimate of the likeliest
number of days before the LRU repair operation
should start, and a repair start-date that has been
determined by backing out the number of days
required (on average) to repair units of this type.
This probabilistically determined need-date could
then be adjusted heuristically by application of
rules via an expert system knowledge base if
appropriate. Figure 1 represents the architectural
view of the RSAS prototype. The RSAS is
modularly constructed from three distinct
components: 1) Data Capture component, 2)
Algorithmic component, and 3) Expert System
component. The following sections provide a
more detailed discussion of these components.
Data Capture Component
At the start of the project, the data items used by
the logistics engineers in their decision making
process was located in many different databases
and report sources. Examples of some of these
were the LE's Desk Report, Generalized System I1
(GSII) Repair File, Logistics Inventory
Management System (LIMS), Material Inventory
Control & Information System (MICIS), and many
custom reports dynamically pulled down from
various mainframe databases as necessary. A set
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Fig 1. The Prototype Configuration of RSAS
of templates were developed which identified the
required data items used for an analysis and the
data source. Using the templates, reports
containing the data items for a selected group of
parts in repair were generated and stored on a
floppy diskette. The report files were then
convened into individual dBase III files consisting
of only the data items of interest from each source
using a software application called Monarch Data
Translator.
Finally, the separate files were merged through
appropriate use of the Structured Query Language
(SQL) outer-join operation to form a
comprehensive data input file for the RSAS.
Space limitations prevent displaying a full row of
typical input data elements; however, Table 1 is
an example of a partial input file for the prototype
RSAS. A complete table could have in excess of
one hundred columns for each item in for repair.
The information contained in the input file
allowed the system to answer questions
concerning, for example: Flight Power On Time
(FPOT), Ground Power On Time (GPOT),
whether the part's use is hourly or flight cycle
based (HOUR), the expected Repair Turn Around
Time (RTAT), both individual and group Vehicle
Maintenance Demand Rate (IND_VMDR and
GRP_VMDR), Quantity Per Vehicle for each
Orbiter (QPV102, QPV103, QPV104, QPV105),
and the serviceable spares available on the shelf
(SPARES). There were a number of advantages to
the data capture procedure just described. For
example, it helped to automate the data capture
process by providing a set of templates that
identified the source of each required data item.
The defined templates resulted in an efficient
procedure for capturing decision data for many
parts during a single batch run. System validation
was also enhanced since, in most cases, we
employed the same sources of data as the experts
in performing their analysis. Finally, It was easy
to modify the templates when new data items were
incorporated into the analysis process and hence,
maintenance of the data capture component was
enhanced. By using a modular system design
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Table 1. Example of Partial RSAS Data Input File
F TIHooRITATIO TICoN
260 HRS 96.66 60 0.9
260 HRS 96.66 60 0.9
260 HRS 96.66 60 0.9
260 HRS 34.86 60 0.9
8 HRS 113.51 8 0.5
I IND VMDR GRP VMDR I
0.72 0.72
0.72 0.72
0.72 0.72
0.29 0.29
16.75 16.75
QPVI02 I 0PV103 [ QPVI04
7 7 7
7 7 7
7 7 7
2 2 2
3 3 3
OPVI06 SPARES
7 5
7 5
7 5
2 2
5
approach that separates the data capture
component from the core processing element of
the system, we increased the opportunities for
using the RSAS system at various locations
throughout the logistics program (e.g., HDA,
management, the LE's desktop machine, etc.).
This also limited and localized the modifications
required to the RSAS in the event that the
mainframe LRU data repositories were
substantially changed, which, as it turns out, is
exactly what began to occur. After testing the
system with the LEs for a short time, it was
learned that many of the data systems we had been
using were to be consolidated onto a local
mainframe in Oracle 7 formats. With the modular
approach, the data capture component is
completely interchangeable. The prototype
configuration shown in Figure 1 allowed the use,
testing, and verification of RSAS based solely on
data obtained from specific data query pulls. By
replacing only the semi-automated front end with
one capable of Oracle access, a fully automated
system for assigning repair start-times to an entire
inventory of repair items is possible.
Alternatively, a desktop tool can be implemented
where data input is provided interactively by a
Logistics Engineer, or a member of management.
This provides a what-if type of calculator never
before available to the logistics engineering
community. Such an implementation is shown in
the screen capture image of Figure 2.
The Algorithmic Component
The principal feature of the Repair Start-Time
Assignment System (RSAS) is the calculation of
STAT values based on a desired level of
probability-of-sufficiency (POS). POS is the
probability of the event: "a spare is available to
replace a failed unit." NASA defines the level of
support that must be maintained for Orbiter
systems. Thus, if POS = 0.90 = 90%, this means
that when a unit fails, the inventory/repair system
must be positioned such that 90% of the time a
spare is immediately available for replacement.
The term STAT is related to POS and indicates
the maximum repair turn-around time permitted
for a failed part that would still ensure a desired
POS- value. In particular, for a failed Line-
Replaceable Unit (LRU) not yet under repair at
time t, STAT is the longest repair turn-around
time from t that would ensure that the probability
of no under-support during the interval t to
t+STAT is POS (i.e., the probability is POS that a
spare will be available for any unit that fails
during t to t+STAT).
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Fig 2. Screen Capture Image of RSAS Implemented as Desktop Tool 
In order to calculate STAT values based on a 
given POS level for an LRU, modifications of 
equations conceptualized in notes from Dear were 
employed'. The Poisson process, and its 
associated probability law, is the fundamental 
building block used to obtain the equations from 
which STAT-values are found. Currently, the 
modifications and mathematical proofs of these 
equations are the subject of ongoing research 
whose findings and results will be reported in 
related papers2. Briefly, a STAT value is 
determined mathematically as the root of a 
particularly configured exponential equation that 
considers demand rate, available spares, and the 
quantity and respective completion date of like 
items in repair. It represents a reasonable starting 
point in the assignment of repair need-dates that is 
founded on accepted failure modeling practices3. 
As of this writing, various automated root-finding 
techniques are under investigation. In any case, 
once a STAT-value has been found, subtracting 
the expected repair time (say E{R}) from the 
computed STAT-value will yield the latest time 
that repairs on this failed LRU may start. This 
idea is pictured in Figure 3 following. 
The Expert System Component 
The expert system component of the RSAS 
prototype was implemented using the Level5 
Object expert system shell4. The system 
knowledge base consisted of a set of rules elicited 
from the experts. The system level control of 
program flow for the prototype was also encoded 
into the rule base. Upon activation, the program 
evaluated and interpreted the input data file. 
Using data analysis logic encoded in the 
knowledge base, the program extracted and 
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Fig 3. Graphical Representation of Latest Repair Start Time Based on STAT,
POS, and Expected LRU Repair Time E{R}
formulated the necessary input for the algorithmic
component. It then activated the algorithmic
processing which returned a value of STAT for a
failed part that would ensure a given value of
POS. Various additional pieces of data from the
input file were then used by the expert system to
adjust the algorithmically calculated STAT values
by applying heuristic knowledge in a manner
similar to the way the human experts would
respond. The expert system component produced
two forms of output. The first form was a
graphical display utilizing MS-Windows interface
controls to present processing results, to list the
reasoning path taken in the derivation of those
results, and to indicate any special exceptions
encountered that would require additional human
expertise. Second, the system could produce a
hard copy report that presented the results of a
complete analysis for a large quantity of repairs.
Table 2 provides an example of a partial output
file generated by the system. In the table, entries
were made for every part number analyzed
(PART_NUMBER, PART_NAME), the minimum
(DMIN), maximum (DMAX), and best value
(STAT) of days before this item is needed
(calculated using the algorithm), the expert system
adjusted repair start time (ARST), and notification
of any rules fired due to unusual circumstances
that still require human expert intervention
(CONDITION, REASON).
Although the Level5 Object expert system shell
proved invaluable for prototype development, it
was decided against using it in the final system
due to the cost of licensing the distributable
product. Instead, an embeddable form of the C
Language Integrated Production System (CLIPS)
expert system shell was developed 5. Since CLIPS
is a NASA developed package, it has no additional
per seat licensing cost. Also, because of its highly
procedural nature, the program control portion of
the system was removed from the knowledge base
and implemented in event driven code associated
with the user interface. This greatly simplified the
knowledge base, and made the final system
tremendously more flexible and maintainable.
Finally, since the expert system portion of RSAS
is highly dependent on large amounts of data to
make viable adjustments to the need-dates, and
due to the major platform transition for data
sources mentioned previously, it was decided to
generate a version of the RSAS without the expert
system module. The user interface for this
version, shown previously in Figure 2, is currently
in use by the LEs as of this writing. It provides
for manual data entry only, and relies on the
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Table2. ExampleofPartial RSASOutputReport
I
PART NUMBER PART NAME [
MC409-0005-0045 UNIT, HDSET
MC409-0014-0006 TACAN
MC409-0015-0006
MC409-0017-0006
RADAR ALTIME
DECODER
DMIN ISTAT
31 48
8 5
3,810 4,098
2O 0
I DMAX
69
238
4,098
325
I ARST
-48
-109
4,064
0
CONDITION REASON
EXCEPTION Failure Analysis Required
human expert to amend the need-date as
necessary. A comment feature has been added so
that the LE can annotate his reasoning for making
adjustments to algorithmically calculated need-
dates. This aids in refinement of the expert
system knowledge base.
Significance of Results
The development of a working RSAS
system through the combination of the three
modules just discussed is the most
significant result of this research. It
demonstrates the feasibility of combining
expert system technology and probabilistic
models to produce repair start times having
higher confidences than could be expected
from an algorithm alone. This concept has
the potential for being merged with a fully
integrated repair scheduling system.
The data capture component is significant in
that it is a semi-automated process for
obtaining large amounts of decision-specific
data from multiple data sources through
standard reports. It draws from the most
recent sources available to provide high
integrity decision data. Due to the
modularity of the system, it can be modified
or exchanged as required by changing data
requirements or improvements in the data
repositories.
The expert system component is significant
in that it attempts to make decisions by
applying a set of heuristics captured from
logistics engineering experts, similar to the
way the experts would make decisions.
Since the knowledge base contains a set of
rules that represent the combined domain
expertise of many logistics engineers, the
results and decisions of the expert system
component can be more uniform and
consistent than those produced by the
individual human experts. This feature
leads to decisions that are inherently more
programmatic.
The algorithmic component is significant in
that it calculates STAT values that take into
consideration not only the number of spares
on the shelf, but also the expected
completion of units currently undergoing
repair to provide a more accurate projection
of the expected time of need for the unit
under analysis. The use of this data is
recognized as an important feature in the
performance of local spares analysis. Also,
it has led to an understanding of better ways
of displaying data such as POS, repairs in
process, and so on, that are more meaningful
to the logistics engineers than a purely
tabular format.
Conclusions
A prototype system combining expert system
technology and probabilistic modeling was
developed. This prototype demonstrated the
feasibility of producing potential repair start-times
for LRUs entering the repair process at the NSLD
in an automated fashion. The system was
designed with modularity and maintainability as
central features. The need-dates produced by the
RSAS were immediately recognized by the
Logistics Engineers at the NSLD for their
accuracy, and the overall system was quickly
accepted for use due to its user friendly interface.
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The system was easily extended into other types
of hardware maintained at the depot, for example,
Government Supplied Equipment (GSE). New
areas for the system's use continue to be pursued.
It is expected that this application will eventually
be integrated into a general repair scheduling
system.
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Abstract
Accurate selection of the quantity of logistic
support resources has a strong influence on
mission success, system availability and the
cost of ownership. At the same time the ac-
curate prediction of these resources depends
on the accurate prediction of the reliability
measures of the items involved. This paper
presents the method for the advanced and
accurate calculation of the reliability mea-
sures of complex space systems which are
the basis for the determination of the de-
mands for logistics resources needed during
the operational life or mission of space sys-
tems. The applicability of the method pre-
sented is demonstrated through several il-
lustrative examples.
1. Introduction
Practice shows that, in a majority of cases,
the shortage of logistic support resources
causes a much higher delay in performing
a maintenance task than the delays caused
by any other reason [2]. Consequently, the
users select, control and manage resources,
the quantity of which has a strong influence
on system availability and the cost of owner-
ship. An over-estimated quantity of results
in a higher support cost with a great deal of
capital tied up, whereas an under-estimated
quantity results in a reduction of availabil-
ity/profit. Therefore, the accurate predic-
tion of the quantity and content of logistic
support resources required is imperative for
cost effective support of the operation and
maintenance process. At the same time
the accurate prediction of these resources
depends on the accurate prediction of the
reliability measures of the items involved.
One of the most frequently used reliability
measure, in engineering practice, is the haz-
ard function, z(t), defined as:
z(t)-/(t)R(t) (1)
where: f(t) is a probability density func-
tion of the random variable which represents
time to failure, TTF, and R(t) is a corre-
sponding reliability function Which quanti-
tatively expresses the probability that the
failure will not occur up to time t, P(TTF >
t). Generally speaking, the hazard function,
could be an increasing, decreasing or con-
stant function of time, which depends on
the real process of the change in the physical
condition of the item analysed. In the case
that the time to failure is modelled by the
exponential distribution, the above function
becomes:
z(t) = f(t) Aexp(-At)
R(t---) = exp(-At) - A (2)
The above expression has a constant value,
and it is known as a failure rate. It is neces-
sary to stress that Eq. 2 is applicable only
in the cases where the time to failure can
be modelled by the exponential probability
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distribution, which is applicable to a time
independent processes.
Analyses of models which deal with the de-
termination of the quantity of the logistic
support resources needed [1],[4],[7],[8], shows
that all of them are based on the failure
rate. However, this assumption is not al-
ways correct, because there are many items
whose failures are influenced by the time de-
pendent processes, like corrosion, thermal
deformation, fatigue, bedding-in, and sim-
ilar. In these cases the failure rate, which
reflects a time independent process has to
be replaced with a hazard function which
represents a time dependent process. There-
fore, the application of models based on the
constant failure rate to the determination
of number of spares needed and other re-
sources for items whose hazard function is
decreasing or increasing during operational
life, could generate results far from optimal
[5].
Thus, the main aim of this paper is to demon-
strate the approach to the reliability mod-
elling of the complex systems which would
provide correct results relative to the predic-
tion of the demands for the logistic support
resources.
2. Present Practice
In order to set up the scenario for this pa-
per the very simple example related to the
evaluation of the mean time to failure of the
complex system, MTTFs, will be used.
This very simple problem could be easily
solved by applying the following technique
which is commonly used by ma_y reliability
practitioners. Thus, the failure rate of each
module is hA = AS = ,kc = 1/1000 = 0.001,
and as the items are connected in series the
sum of their failure rates will give the failure
rate of the system. Thus. the failure rate of
the system is _ = 0.003, which means that
the mean time to failure of the system will
be MTTF_ --- 333.3 hours.
Many reliability engineers would finish the
analysis at this point and use the obtained
value for the MTTFs of the system in all
further calculations related to the provision
of the logistic support resources.
Regarding this paper the above example is
only the starting point. First of all, it is
necessax 3, to stress that the result obtained
is valid only under the assumption of the
constant failure rate. In cases where the
items considered demonstrate increasing or
decreasing failure rates during operational
life this approach would provide an incor-
rect solution.
In order to illustrate the point made above,
let us use the same example, but this time
we shall fully defined the problem, which
practically means that the process of the
change in the condition of the items con-
sidered will be defined. Instead of assuming
the constant failure rate we shall specify the
probability distributions of the time to fail-
ures of the corresponding items, as shown in
the table below:
Thus. let as look at a system which consists
of three items, say A, B, and C, connected
in series from the point of view of reliabil-
ity. The task is to calculate the MTTFs of
the system, if the MTTFA = MTTFB =
MTTFc = 1000 hours.
Now, we have fully specified the problem,
but we do not have the fully defined algo-
rithm for its solution, because the "classi-
cal" reliability theory and available national
and international standards do not address
this problem in spite of the fact that it exists
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Table 1. Reliability data for the items considered.
Item
A
B
C
Distrbtn.
of TTF
Expntl.
Normal
Weibull
Parameters
A = 0.001 /
#= 1000 a=375
= 790 fl = 0.7
MTTF hazard
]function
1000 const.
1000 incrsn.
1000 decrsn.
in every day engineering practice.
Hence, this paper Will present the algorithm
for solving this and any other problem of
forecasting and calculating the reliability mea-
sures of complex engineering systems using
the "bottom up" approach.
3. Reliability measures of a Single
Engineering Item
In every day practice the occurrence of an
uncertain event is described by the probabil-
ity distribution of the chosen random vari-
able through one of the well-known theo-
retical probability distributions. The most
frequently used distributions for continuing
random variables, in the area of reliability,
maintainability and supportability engineer-
ing, are: exponential, normal, lognormal and
Weibull [5]. Each of them represents a fam-
ily of distributions where every member of
the family is defined by some parameters,
like: scale, shape and minimum value. Hence,
if those parameters are specified the char-
acteristics of probability distribution of the
random variable like: expected value, E(X);
variance, V(X); cumulative distribution func-
tion, F(x); probability density function, f(x)
and others, are fully known.
It is necessary to say that the expected value,
E(X), defined by mathematicians means ex-
actly the same as the mean time to failure
used by the reliability practitioners. Thus,
X = TTF, and E(X)= E(TTF)= MTTF.
Table 2 Illustrative example, input
and out _ut data in hours
Distrbtn.
Expntl. 1000 0.00 1000 105 693 2303
Normal 1000 150 I000 810 1000 1195
1000 300 1000 620 1000 1385
1000 450 1000 455 1000 1615
Weibull 1000 1.00 1000 105 695 2303
1115 1.59 1000 270 885 1884
1126 2.67 1000 484 981 1539
1100 4.22 1000 645 1008 1340
As the expected value is the subject of dis-
cussion generated by this paper, let us re-
member its general expression for the con-
tinuous random variable, say X:
oo
E(X) = f x x f(x)dx
o
(3)
where f(x) is the probability density func-
tion of a random variable X. Applied to the
time to failure, as a random variable, the
above equation could be rewritten as [5]:
oo
E(TTF) = MTTF = f n(t)dt
o
(4)
From the point of view of mathematics, MTTF
defined as above is fully known characteris-
tic, but what does it mean to logistics engi-
neers? Not a lot, because it only defines a
single point of the probability distribution.
In order to illustrate this statement, several
examples are given and in Table 2, each of
which exhibits identical mean time to failure
of 1000 hours.
where; TTFp represents the length of oper-
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ation up to which 10, 50 and 90 percent of
population will fail. The understanding of
the behaviour of the random variable cannot
be based on the information related to the
expected value only. The last three columns
in the above table clearly illustrates this state-
ment.
The impact of the type of the distribution
and values of scale and shape parameters
on the reliability measures is illustrated by
Fig. 1. Clearly, the differences are signifi-
cant. For example, the values of the relia-
bility function at 500 hours for all of them
are scattered within a wide range of values
(0.63 to 0.995). Certainly, there are an in-
finite number of reliability functions mean
value (MTTF) of which is equal to 1000
hours, and each of them will have different
values of reliability at different instances of
operating time.
The main objective of the example used was
to show that it is absolutely crucial to un-
derstand the process of change in the condi-
tion of the item in order to get a full picture
about its reliability measures.
4. Reliability of Complex
Engineering Systems
In the cases where the random variable anal-
ysed represents the complex event, its prob-
ability distribution depends on the probabil-
ity of occurrence of consisting events. From
the point of view of mathematics, the com-
plex event is any event which consists of
two or more related events. The probabil-
ity of occurrence of the complex event de-
pends on the relationship between consist-
ing events. For example, if the complex
event is defined as the intersection of two
or more events then the probability of its
I.CO00
0.7500
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Figure 1. Reliability functions for several
items with MTTF = 1000 hours
occurrence is equal to the product of prob-
abilities of occurrence of consisting events.
Making use of equation 2, the expression for
the mean time to failure of the complex sys-
tem which is defined by the complex random
variable, TTFs, will be:
E(TTFs) = MTTFs = f Rs(t)dt
0
(5)
where Rs(t) is the reliability function of the
complex system.
Clearly, the main problem facing the ana-
lyst is the determination of the reliability
function of the complex system, Rs(t).
In the case that the consisting items (items,
units, components) are independent and con-
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nected in series, from the point of view of
reliability, the reliability function of the sys-
tem is defined as:
nci
R4t) = H Ri(t)
i=1
(6)
where: nci is the number of consisting items,
Ri(t), reliability function of each consisting
item representing the probability that the
time to its failure is greater than t. Thus,
the expression for the MTTFs of the com-
plex system could be obtained by combining
equations 5 and 6, thus:
nci
MTTFs -" E(TTFs)= f H
0 i=l
ni(t)dt (7)
The above expression can be used for the
calculation of the mean time to failure of
the system, MTTFs, which consists of any
number of items, which are connected in se-
ries from the point of view of reliability, and
whose failure rate could exhibit any pattern
of the failure rate, i.e. any mixture of in-
creasing, constant and decreasing.
Figure 2. Possible configurations of the system
represents an increase of 10% in comparison
with the corresponding value of 333.3 hours
obtained by the "constant failure rate
proach". The differences between these
approaches to the determination of the re-
liability measures are even more significant
when they are used as a basis for the predic-
tion of the demands for the logistic support
resources.
In the cases where the analytical integration
of the above expression is complicated, the
required value could be obtained by using
the graphical method.
5.IllustrativeExample
In order to illustrate the approach presented
let as calculate the mean time to failure of
the system whose consisting items axe de-
fined in Table 1.
Making use of equation 7, the mean time to
failure of the system of 363 hours, was ob-
tained by applying graphical method. This
Based on the practical experience and the
illustrative example used it is extremely dif-
ficult to justify the use of the constant fail-
ure rate approach to the calculation of the
reliability measures for the complex systems
which consist of the mechanical, hydraulic,
pneumatic, and similar items.
To illustrate further advantages of the method
proposed, the situation where the increase
of the reliability of the system is intended
to be achieved by use of parallel configura-
tion of two items of the same kind will be
used, as shown in Figure 2:
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Table 3. Reliability Analysis of Complex System
Config. A B C MTTFs TTF_o TTF_o TTF_o
1 - 1 1 1 333 35 231 767
2 1 1 1 363 25 246 849
3 2 1 1 435 35 346 978
4 1 2 1 375 25 256 949
5 1 1 2 472 75 407 989
6 2 2 2 678 165 648 1241
In the case of the constant failure rate ap-
proach it is irrelevant which item, A, B or
C, should be connected in parallel, because
the MTTFs will have identical. However,
in all cases where the constant failure rate
cannot be used as a model for the process
of change in the condition of the consisting
items, the above statement will be incorrect,
as the Table 3 shows for the example used.
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The usefulness of the reliability analysis to
the design regarding the selection of the op-
timal configuration is obvious, especially in
cases where due to weight, cost and space
restrictions using a parallel configuration is
very limited. The graphical representation
of the pattern of the hazard function for
each analysed configuration is given in Fig-
ure 3.
Figure 3. Hazard function of the system caused
for different configurations of its items.
crease and in consequence the credibility of
the profession should increase among other
engineering disciplines.
Based on several simple examples and brief
theoretical analysis it is possible to learn the
following lessons, from this paper:
6. Conclusion
The main objective of the paper was to initi-
ate a discussion on the accuracy of the deter-
mination of the estimated values of the mea-
sures of reliability and maintainability. The
accurate way for calculating the expected
value of the probability distribution of the
random variable which represents the com-
plex event has been demonstrated here. As
a result of that, the accuracy of the mathe-
matical.models used by reliability, maintain-
ability, and supportability engineers will in-
a) The calculation of the expected value
of the complex random variable cannot
be based on the information related to
the expected values of consisting events
only. The type and parameters of the
probability distributions of the consist-
ing events are of crucial importance for
the accurate results, as demonstrated;
b) The accuracy of the calculation of the
expected values for the measures like:
Mean Time To Failure, (MTTF), Mean
Time Between Failure, (MTBF), and
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similar, could have crucial effects to the
final results of the reliability analyses,
especially in the cases of engineering
systems which consist of several thou-
sand components.
It is important to underline that the
same conclusion is applicable to the calcu-
lation of the expected values of the random
variables which describe other types of con-
figurations of the system (parallel, mixed,
m out on n) as well as measures of main-
tainability and supportability [2].
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Mission Success Driven Space System Sparing Analysis
  <737
Among the maintenance resources, the spare
parts are the most difficult to predict. Items
in the space systems are very different from
the point of view of reliability, cost, weight,
volume, etc. The different combinations of
spares make different contribution to the:
mission success, spare investment, volume
occupied and weight. Hence, the selection of
spares for a mission planned must take into
account all of these features. This paper
presents the generic mission success driven
sparing model developed, for the complex
space systems. The mathematical analysis
used in the model enables the user to se-
lect the most suitable selection of the spare
package for the mission planned. The illus-
trative examples presented clearly demon-
strate the applicability and usefulness of the
model introduced.
1. Introduction
The main objective of any space system is to
fulfil required mission. In majority of cases
during the operational mission of repairable
space systems the lead times for obtaining
the replenishment are very long and often
impossible. Thus, to ensure the accomplish-
ment of the space mission, all the logistic
Copyright C)American Institute of Acroaautics and
Astronautics. Inc., 1976. All rights reserved.
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support resources necessary for the comple-
tion of maintenance tasks required must be
carried with the space vehicles along their
missions. Due to the limitations on the load
and space, it is impossible to carry as much
resources as one would like to 'double' en-
sure the provision of these resources. Clearly,
the accurate estimation of resources needed
is of the great importance for the successful
completion of space missions.
The sparing problem related to the spares
stocked at the base has been well addressed
by the models in literature and the com-
mercial software. However,. the sparing for
the successful completion of an space mis-
sion has not yet been analysed as a specific
problem. Furthermore, the methods for the
determination of the quantity of spares used
by the existing sparing models are based
on constant failure rate. In reality, the be-
haviour of items can be modelled by any
type of well-known probability distributions,
which means that the failure rate could be
increasing or decreasing function of the lengtt
of operational time. Consequently, the ap-
plication of the constant failure rate behaviou
to all items could lead to significant error.
The aim of the paper is to present the model
for the determination of the number of spare,s
required for the successful completion of the
mission planned, based on the criteria like,
the required availability, costs, weight and
similar, which is also able to cope with the
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cases where the behaviour of the items dur-
ing the operation could not be modelled by
the constant failure rate approach.
From logistic point of view, all consisting
items of a repairable system could be dis-
carded or repaired, after their failures. This
paper, for the sake of simplicity, focuses on
the sparing for discard items. The simi-
lar analysis method can be applied to re-
pairable items.
In order to address the sparing problem fully,
it is assumed in this paper that all the other
resources needed are available as called. Con-
sequently, the spares are the only factor that
has primary effect on the mission comple-
tion.
2. Measures of Space Mission Success
During a mission of the system, the fail-
ure/restoration cycle is repeated until the
accomplishment of the mission, given that
the resources needed for the maintenance
are sufficient enough. Otherwise, the ter-
mination of the mission could be required
before its completion.
Due to the randomness of the occurrence of
failures, the successful completion of a space
mission is a probabilistic event. Hence, the
mission success, MS can only be quanti-
fied through the probability. In the case
that n spares are stocked on the board, the
space mission will be accomplished if less
than or equal to n failures occurred. Hence,
the probability of mission success is just the
probability that the cumulative number of
failures during the mission is less than n + 1.
Thus, the criterion for the determination
of tile quantity of spares for this type of
missions could be defined as the probabil-
ity that the total number of failures is less
than n + 1.
3. Sparing Model for a Single Item
Considering a single item the following
sumptions are made:
1) the time to failure of the item is mod-
elled by pdf f(t), whose CDF is r(t),
which can be represented by any type
of probability distribution;
2) the length of the mission is Tin;
3) at the beginning of the mission the total
amount of n spares are supplied;
4) no replenishment spares will be obtained
during the mission;
5) the time to replace the failed item is
much less than the length of the mission so
that the replacement can be viewed as in-
stant.
The main question is how many spares are
needed for the successful completion of
mission planned?.
The probability of the mission success, in
this case, is equal to the probability that
the Number of Failures during the mission,
NF(Tm), is less than or equal to the number
of spares, n. This is, of course, the function
of the length of mission, T,,, and the num-
ber of spares, n, and denoted as MS(T,,, n),
thus :
MS(TIn,n) = P(NF(Tm) <_ n). (1)
According to renewal theory [1], the proba-
bility that the number of failures in time T,n
is less than or equal to n can be expressed
as following:
P(NF(Tm) <_ n) = 1 - F"+I(Tm), (2)
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where Fn+l(t) is the (n + 1) fold convolu-
tion, defined as:
t
F"+l(t) =/F"(t- u)
0
dF(u) (3)
and F'(t) is F1 (t) defined in (2). Thus,
MS(TIn,n) = 1 - Fn+l(Tm). (4)
For the required Mission Success, MS", the
number of spares required, n', to be carried
along with the mission can be determined
as follows:
n" = min{n[MS(Tm,n) > MS'}. (5)
n
Item
Distribution
1
Exponential
2
Normal
3
Weibull
A 500 500 54
B 15o 0.3
MTTF 500 500 500
MTTR 50 50 5o
Tm 1000 1000 1000
n MS(n) IMS(n) MS(n)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0.0005
0.3135
0.6264
0.8349
0.9392
0.9809
0.9948
0.9987
0.9997
0.9999
1.O000
0.00000
0.4971
0.9702
0.9994
0.9999
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.0000
0.4122
0.6641
0.8132
0.8988
0.9466
0.9725
0.9862
0.9932
0.9967
0.9985
For the hypothetical three items the mission
success have been calculated and the results
obtained is presented in the following table.
where: n, represents the nm, nber of spares
at the beginning of the mission, MS(n) is
the Probability of mission success, given n
spares at t = 0. The above data clearly
show that the spare requirements satisfying
the same MS are of significant difference
resulting from the different failure time dis-
tributions, and that, in particular, the con-
stant failure rate assumption, i.e. exponen-
tial distribution, adopted by conventionally
used method for sparing causes remarkable
error due to ignoring the true distribution of
the item's failure time distribution, govern
by the mechanism of failure.
4. Optimal Sparing Model for a System
The objective of sparing for a space mis-
sion is to optimally determine the quanti-
ties of spares for each reliability critical item
in the system to ensure the accomplishment
of the mission, whilst the specified optimi-
o,_,_,,._*:^-target, such as cost and weight, im-
posed upon spares can be achieved. This
problem is usually known as optimal spare
allocation.
The optimal spare allocation problem is solved
in existing commercial model by using con-
stant failure rate method [3][4]. However,
this method is not really optimal. In [5]
a dynamic programming model to minimise
the total spare cost subject to the required
availability has been presented in [5]. For
the space mission, in some cases, the total
weight or the total volume is the major con-
cern in sparing analysis. In this section, the
dynamic programming technique has been
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used in order to solve the optimal spare al-
location problem, which is: to minimise the
total weight of spares subject to the required
probability of space mission success.
4.1 Dynamic Programming Model
Suppose that the system under considera-
tion consists of n items, all items are mu- 1)
tually independent and connected in series
from the reliability point of view. Let Wi de-
note the total weight of spares for item i, Pi
the achieved probability of mission success 2)
of item i, andP_ the required probability of
mission success of the system. The opti-
misation problem indentified above can be 3)
formulated as follows :
r_
minZ W, (6)
i=1
Woi : unit spare weight
Ri(.) : return function
Fi(.) : optimal return function
The parameters in the D.P. model are spec-
ified as below:
Stage i : each item of the system is defined
as a stage. There are n stages altogether in
the model;
Decision variable di : the number of spares
allocated to the ith item at stage i, i = 1,..., n;
State Variable, si: the probability of mis-
sion success of the part of the system from
item n up to item i + 1; Note that .sn , the
state variable at stage n, is equal to one.
The transfer function can be expressed as
below:
subject to Si_ 1 = Si X P(di), i = 1,..., n, (8)
rt
ri P, >_P, . (7)
i=1
where P(.) is equation (7). Thus, state vari-
able so is just the mission success probabil-
ity of entire system.
Equations 6 and 7 represent the target func-
tion, and constraint of the problem, respec-
tively.
This problem is converted to a dynamic pro-
gramming model, where the following no-
tations are adopted, for each item i,(i =
1,...,n), and the system:
di : decision variable
Di : decision space
si: state variable
Si : state space
Pi(k) : mission success probability with re-
spect to k spares available
Wi : total spare weight
4) Return function, Ri(di): Each value of deci-
sion variable indicates possible spare num-
ber allocated to an item. The return from
decision is defined as the total spare weight
of the item:
Ri(di) = Woi x di,i = 1,...,n. (9)
5) Optimal Return Function of Stage i, Fi(si) •
the optimal value of cumulative spare weight
from stage 1 up to stage i, which can be de-
fined as follows :
Fi(si) = n_in[Ri(si)+ Fi- l(si- 1)]. (10)
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
64
n3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Item
Unit Weight
Item-I
MS W
0.9809 7.5
0.9948 9
0.9987 l 10.5
0.9997 12
0.9999 13.5
1.0000 15
I
1.5
Item-2
MS W
0.9895 3
0.9998 4
1.0000 5
I
12 3
1 2
Item-3
MS W
0.9803 12
0.9906 14
0.9956 16
0.9980 18
0.9991 20
0.9996 22
0.9998 24
Due to the limitation of the size of the pa-
per, the algorithm of implementing the model
is left out. Readers who are interested in it
can refer to [5].
The following example demonstrates the ap-
plication of the above D.P. model for opti-
mal allocation of the mission spare.
Considering the hypothetical items defined
in Table 1, the unit weight of each is given
below:
Item 1 2 3 System
rt 6 4 7
MS 0.9948 0.9998 0.9906 0.9853
W 9 4 14 27
ing analysis driven by the mission success.
Firstly, the measure of mission success, namely
the probability of mission success was de-
fined, which forms the criteria for sparing
optimisation. Secondly, the mission spar-
ing model for a single item was developed
in terms of failure time distribution instead
of constant failure, which is conventionally
applied, by using renewal theory. Finally,
the dynamic programming model for the op-
timal spare allocation to the entire system
was developed, where the weight of spares
was used as the decision criterion.
The model developed and the examples cited
shown that the type of the failure time dis-
tribution and its parameters have strong in-
fluence on the solution of sparing analysis,
which constant failure rate method ignores.
Consequently, the calculation of spare re-
quirement by the model developed is signif-
icantly improved.
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A Simple Space Station Rescue Vehicle
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ABSTRACT
Early in the development of the Space Station it
was determined that there is a need to have a
vehicle which could be used in the event that the
Station crew needed to quickly depart and return
to Earth when the Space Shuttle is not available.
Unplanned retum missions might occur because
of a medical emergency, a major Station failure,
or if there is a long-term interruption in the
delivery of logistics to the Station. The rescue
vehicle was envisioned as a simple capsule-type
spacecraft which could be maintained in a
dormant state at the Station for several years
and be quickly activated by the crew when
needed.
OsoOQo
PURPOSE OFTHE RESCUE VEHICLE ///_"
The International Space Station has a multi-year
mission during which many astronaut and
research crew members will occupy the Station.
The crew members will reach the Station in the
Space Shuttle, Soyuz spacecraft, or other crew
transport vehicles. The Station and its crews will
be dependent on the regular delivery of supplies
by the Shuttle and other transport vehicles. The
transport vehicles will arrive and depart on pre-
determined schedules. It will be difficult in the
case of the Soyuz and even more difficult in the
case of the Shuttle, to launch a mission with
crew or supplies ahead of schedule.
During the assembly phase for the International
Space Station, unplanned retum missions will be
performed by the Russian Soyuz vehicle, which
can retum up to three people. When the Station
assembly is complete there will be a need for
rescue capability for up to six people. This need
might be met by an additional Soyuz vehicle or
by a new vehicle which might come from a
variety of sources. This paper describes one
candidate concept for a Space Station rescue
vehicle. This concept was developed by
engineers at the Johnson Space Center.
The proposed rescue vehicle design has the
blunt-cone shape of the Apollo command
module but with a larger diameter. The rescue
vehicle would be delivered to the Station in the
payload bay of the Space Shuttle. The
spacecraft design can accommodate six to eight
people for a one-day return mission. All of the
systems for the mission including deorbit
propulsion are contained within the conical
spacecraft and so there is no separate service
module. The use of the proven Apollo re-entry
shape would greatly reduce the time and cost for
development and testing. Other aspects of the
design are also intended to minimize
development cost and simplify operations. This
paper will summarize the evolution of rescue
vehicle concepts, the functional requirements for
a rescue vehicle, and describe the proposed
design.
This paper Is declared a work of the U.S. Government and
Is not subject to copydgl_ protedion In the United States.
It was recognized early in the Space Station
development program that a situation might
develop in which a crew member might need to
be transported to the ground ahead of schedule
because of a serious illness or injury. Also, a
serious system failure aboard the Station might
make an immediate evacuation and return to
Earth necessary. Finally, if a launch vehicle
failure occurred, the interruption of supply
deliveries might require the eventual evacuation
of the Station crew in a vehicle other than the
one which failed. These three scenarios
correspond to the three missions for a Space
Station rescue vehicle:
• medical evacuation
• immediate return in case of a Space Station
failure
• return in case crew rotation and re-supply are
interrupted by a launch system failure
A variety of means for providing emergency
crew return were considered by the Space
Station Program. The option of keeping a Space
Shuttle Orbiter docked at the Station for the
entire crew rotation period has many advantages
but requires that the Orbiter be modified for long
duration flight. The option of maintaining a
Space Shuttle on standby for immediate launch
to the Station in an emergency was deemed to
be impractical. Co-orbiting vehicles and safe-
haven concepts were considered too
complicated and costly. It was concluded that a
separate vehicle, docked to the Station at all
6?
times, was the most effective means of providing
emergency crew returncapability.
It should be noted that in the operation of the
Salyut and Skylab space stations, the transport
vehicle for the crew always remained docked to
the Station so it was available for use by the
crew at any time. The current Mir station is also
operated in this manner. In the case of the
International Space Station, the Space Shuttle
will remain docked for short times but leave
crews onboard when it departs. The Soyuz
spacecraft, with three seats, will be used by the
Russians for crew transport and will remain
docked as long as the crew is present. The
Soyuz therefore provides immediate return
capability which is sufficientduring the assembly
phase when the number of crew will not exceed
three unless the Shuttle is present.
Following the assembly phase, the normal
Station crew number is expected to be six.
Assuming that three people can be returned in
the Soyuz that is always present for Russian
crew rotation, there is still a need for rescue
capability for three more people. The additional
rescue capability could be provided by having
two Soyuz present or by adding another rescue
vehicle.
The use of two Soyuz vehicles to provide
complete rescue capability remains a viable
option for the Space Station. Other approaches
continue to be considered because of some
limitations in Soyuz capability. The Soyuz is
designed for a service life of six months and
would require replacement at a rate that
exceeds that required for Russian crew rotation.
This implies that an extra Soyuz spacecraft
would have to be manufactured and flown to the
Station every six months for the purpose of
providing rescue capability.
Another limitation is that the American astronaut
population currently includes many members
who exceed the Soyuz height limit of 182
centimeters. For descent in the Soyuz, all
occupants wear pressure suits which could
restrict the ability to return a seriously illor
injured crew member. The very limited internal
volume and compact seating arrangement in the
Soyuz also limit its effectiveness for medical
evacuations.
Some modificationsto make the Soyuz more
compliant with rescue vehicle requirements have
been under consideration and these changes, if
implemented, would increase the possibility of
using Soyuz spacecraft as rescue vehicles
throughout the lifetime of the Space Station.
However, because of the uncertainties about the
potential modifications and long-term availability
of the Soyuz, other options have continued to be
considered.
CONCEPT EVOLUTION
During the period of Space Station development,
a number of rescue vehicle concepts have been
developed. Several design studies that
influenced the design in this paper should be
noted. One of the first Station rescue vehicle
concepts which was developed in 1986 by an
engineering team at the Johnson Space Center
was a six-person Apollo-shaped spacecraft with
a 4.4-meter diameter and a separate service
module (Reference 1). Soon after that another
team developed a concept which came to be
known as the SCRAM. The SCRAM design has
a cylindrical pressure vessel for six people sitting
on a conical heatshield (Reference 2). Later the
SCRAM concept was modified to accommodate
eight people (Reference 3).
In 1992, in response to a request from NASA
management, a concept was developed for a
two-way crew transport with the groundrule that
the development would be done by civil service
employees using government facilities as much
as possible. This "in-house" approach was
emphasized in an effort to minimize the eventual
cost of the spacecraft. The concept developed
in this study was a four-person Apollo-shaped
vehicle with a separate service module. As a
crew transport, the spacecraft would be
launched on an expendable launch vehicle and it
carried an Apollo-type launch escape rocket
(Reference 4). In 1994, the two-way transport
design was adapted to the requirements of a
one-way Station rescue vehicle which resulted in
the design described in Reference 5 and in this
paper. As part of the design studies for the "in-
house" crew transport and rescue vehicles, the
team defined a detailed development plan
including all engineering activities from concept
definition to delivery of the flight units. This
development plan was the basis for a
comprehensive schedule and cost estimate
including all labor and materials.
STUDY GROUNDRULES
The specific design concept described here was
intended to meet all the basic requirements for a
Space Station rescue vehicle and was also
developed with some unique groundrules:
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• Developmentworkwouldbeperformedbycivil
servicepersonnelusinggovernmentfacilities
as much as possible
• The spacecraft would be delivered to orbit in
the payload bay of the Space Shuttle
• Ocean recovery would be acceptable
• Reusability would not be required
• The conceptual design would include the
definition of the complete development and
fabrication process and a detailed costestimate
• Two operational spacecraft would be built
• There would be an orbital flight test
FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Missions: The purpose of the rescue vehicle is
to return Space Station crew members in case of
a medical emergency, a Space Station failure
which requires immediate evacuation, or the lack
of availability of the Space Shuttle for a normal
return. The spacecraft must separate from the
Station, loiter in-orbit for up to 24 hours, perform
a deorbit maneuver, descend through the
atmosphere, and land safely.
Capacity.: Six to eight people with minimal
provisions.
Duratioq: 36 hours in an active mode (24 hours
for loiter, deorbit and landing plus 12 hour
margin) 5 years docked to the Station in a
quiescent mode, using power from the Station
(continuous Station power requirement should
not exceed 300 watts.)
Operations: Automatic operation for all functions
with manual intervention possible for some
critical functions
_: The spacecraft will be
delivered to the Space Station in the payload
bay of the Space Shuttle Orbiter. A support
structure for this purpose must be defined.
Berthing: The spacecraft must accommodate
berthing by a remote manipulator to a berthing
port on the Space Station and therefore must
have a grapple fixture and a berthing
mechanism. Active rendezvous and docking is
not required.
Cabin Atmosphere: Standard oxygen and
nitrogen mixture at I atmosphere. Pressure
suits will not be worn by personnel for descent.
Extra-vehicular activities are not required.
Communications: Two-way communication for
voice, telemetry, and commands with the Space
Station and the ground control center is
required.
Recovery: The primary mode is water recovery
at a coastal site near the Kennedy Space
Center. There should be backup water sites.
Emergency land impact must be survivable.
Safebj_: All systems are fail-safe for crew return
or designed with adequate safety margins where
redundancy is not practical.
Mission Timeline: The mission is planned for
normal recovery at a coastal water site near the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC). A typical mission
timeline is provided below.
Hrs:min
00:00 Separation from Space Station
01:45 Deorbit for first landing opportunity to
KSC site
02:30 Landing and recovery
02:45 Decrbit for second landing opportunity to
KSC site (contingency)
24:45 Deorbit for third landing opportunity to
KSC site (contingency)
Velocity Increment:
Separation 1.0 meter/second
Deorbit 119.0 meters/second
Total 120.0 meters/second
CONCEPT CONFIGURATION
The rescue vehicle concept is shown in Figure
1 and described below. A dimensioned
drawing of the crew module segment is shown
in Figure 2.
Structure and Thermal Protection: The
exterior shell of the crew module is the same
shape as the Apollo command module.
However, its base diameter is increased to
4.42 meters (14.5 ft) to provide greater
volume. This diameter will still allow the crew
module to fit within the payload bay of the
Space Shuttle.
The primary structure is an aluminum-2219,
skin-stringer construction. The pressure vessel
is a separate structural assembly of welded
aluminum-2219 located inside the exterior shell
of the crew module. For thermal protection, the
base of the crew module is covered with ceramic
tiles which are similar to the tiles on the Space
Shuttle Orbiter. The conical section is covered
with flexible blanket insulation which is similar to
the material on the Shuttle Orbiter upper
surfaces.
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The crew module has windows and a side hatch
which are similar to the Apollo command
module. The transfer tunnel at the apex is a
scaled-up version of the Apollo design. In order
to be compatible with the docking port on the
Space Station, a separate docking adapter is
attached to the transfer tunnel. In this design
the docking mechanism is the Androgynous
Peripheral Attachment System (APAS). In an
emergency mission, the spacecraft would
separate from the docking adapter when
departing and the adapter would remain
attached to the Station.
The spacecraft structure must include a grapple
fixture so that a remote manipulator can remove
the spacecraft from the Shuttle payload bay and
attach it to the docking port on the Space
Station.
Propulsion: The crew module propulsion system
provides attitude control and is used for the
deorbit maneuver. It is a unique feature of this
design, compared to other capsule concepts, to
include the deorbit propulsion capability in the
crew module rather than adding a separate
service module. The relatively large volume of
the crew module makes this possible. The
benefits of this feature are a major reduction in
vehicle interfaces, the opportunity to recover and
reuse the propulsion system components, and
the elimination of service module impact
concerns which greatly expands landing zone
options.
The propulsion system is based on the Apollo
command module design with two additional
thrusters. There are fourteen pressure-fed bi-
propellant thrusters with scarfed nozzles. Each
thruster develops a vacuum thrust of 445
Newtons (100 pounds-force). The propellants
are monomethyl-hydrazine and nitrogen
tetroxide stored in eight tanks.
Power: Since the vehicle is delivered as a
payload by the Space Shuttle and may remain
attached to the Station in a dormant state for
several years, reserve batteries are used.
These batteries are not activated until needed at
the time of an emergency mission. External
power from the Space Station would be used
for thermal control, status monitoring, and
periodic checkout but that power requirement is
not expected to exceed 300 watts. The
maximum power level for the rescue vehicle,
when activated, is estimated to be a little more
than 3 kilowatts. The design has 16 battery
modules packaged in two units. The power
distribution system includes control units and
conversion units to provide alternating current as
well as direct current at 28 volts. There are two
main direct current buses and two alternating
current buses.
Avionics: The rescue vehicle must provide its
own capability for navigation and
communications. The design includes an
integrated inertial navigation system and star
trackers. There are also global
positioning system (GPS) receivers and
antennas. The avionics sensors are linked to
general purpose
computers which communicate to other
components, including the attitude control jet
drivers, through multiplexer-demultiplexer units.
Displays and Controls: There is a caution and
warning system to monitor the major crew
module systems and alert the crew through
audio tones and warning lights if there are
problems. All spacecraft functions are
automated but there are provisions for crew
intervention in critical functions. There is a
limited set of approximately 20 circuit breakers
and 20 switches, but most of the crew interaction
with systems is through multi-function electronic
display screens and programmable pushbutton
panels. There is also a rotational hand controller
and a translational hand controller for manual
maneuvers.
Communications: The crew module has UHF
and S-band radio systems for communication
with the ground. There is a search and rescue
communication system (SARSAT) for use after
landing and a set of personal handheld radios
for emergency use after landing. An audio
system in the crew module provides for voice
communication through individual headsets and
speakers.
Life Support and Active Thermal Control:
Oxygen for breathing is provided from storage
tanks and nitrogen is available for re-
pressurization if needed. Carbon dioxide is
removed from the cabin air with lithium
hydroxide (LiOH) canisters. A fan circulates
cabin air and provides for air flow through the
lithium hydroxide canisters.
There is a cabin air heat exchanger which also
controls cabin humidity. All system components
which generate heat are mounted on cold plates
which are cooled by circulating water. Waste
heat is rejected by a water flash evaporator
system.
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_: The crew module is decelerated during
descent by a drogue parachute and then a
cluster of three large ring-sail parachutes. The
diameter of each parachute is 26 meters. The
expected velocity at impact is 7.6
meters/second. After landing in the water,
flotation bags, similar to those used on the
Apollo command module, will be inflated to
ensure that the crew module is turned upright
and remains upright during the recovery phase.
A diagram of the main parachute cluster is
shown in Figure 3.
Land recovery using a deceleration system
might be achieved with a moderate increase in
development cost. Compared to water recovery,
land recovery is in some ways safer, recovery
operations are less costly, and reuse of
hardware is more practical.
Pyrotechnic Devices: There are pyrotechnic
devices associated with the following systems
and interfaces:
- propellant isolation valves
- docking mechanism emergency separation
- parachute system cover and parachute
deployment
- flotation system.
Crew Accommodations: The crew module can
have up to eight couches to accommodate the
crew members during descent. The couches
are supported by attenuating struts which reduce
the impact acceleration at landing. The crew
members will not wear pressure suits.
Additional provisions include drinking water,
food, equipment for food preparation, personal
hygiene, waste management, and emergency
survival.
Accommodation in Space Shuttle Payload Bay:
The rescue vehicle will be delivered to space
station in the Space Shuttle and may need to
return in the Shuttle in the case of a launch abort
or for refurbishment after its operational life is
exceeded. In either case, it requires support
structure to secure it in the payload bay during
launch and landing.
The attach structure concept involves two
Iongeron trunnions and one keel trunnion
attached directly to the spacecraft just forward of
the heat shield to support the mass of the crew
module. The trunnions will be attached to
standard payload bay latches and bridges. The
docking adapter at the forward end of the
spacecraft would be "docked" to a simulated
docking mechanism on its own support structure
in the payload bay as shown in Figure 4.
The forward support structure, along with the
simulated docking mechanism, would remain in
the payload bay following deployment. It could
be used on future refurbishment missions to
bring back the rescue vehicle. Because of its
relatively compact volume, there will be enough
room in the payload bay to return other payloads
from the station after the rescue vehicle is
removed.
It was assumed that the Space Shuttle remote
manipulator will be used to unlatch and remove
the vehicle from the payload bay. The grapple
fixture will be located on the docking adapter
assembly.
Mass Properties: A three-dimensional computer
solid model was used to investigate various crew
module configurations and to estimate center of
gravity and moments of inertia. Eight people
can be located inside the crew module, although
6 or 7 people could be accommodated more
comfortably. The vehicle center of gravity and
moments of inertia were calculated from the
masses of individual components modeled in the
computer solid model. The mass estimate for
each major subsystem is shown in Table 1.
DEFINITION OF DEVELOPMENT PLAN
The cost estimates for labor and materials and
the detailed development schedule produced in
this study are considered sensitive information
and are not included in this paper. However, the
process followed in preparing the estimates is
summarized below.
The first step in preparing the cost estimate is to
define all of the development activities. In the
original two-way personnel transport vehicle
study (Reference 4), technical specialists in
each area defined all of the activities which must
be done, how long each activity would take, how
many people would be required to perform the
activity, and what materials, equipment, special
skills, and facilities would be required. For the
rescue vehicle study, these technical specialists
were contacted again to determine changes to
their former estimates to reflect the difference in
the mission and vehicle. The work breakdown
structure includes all of the spacecraft technical
disciplines as well as systems engineering and
integration functions for all phases of the
program.
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Allphasesofthedevelopmentprogramwere
consideredfromrequirementsdefinitionand
conceptualdesignthroughfabrication and
testing of the qualification and flight units.
Approximately 900 activities were defined.
Requirements for material and personnel travel
were also identified. All of the development
activities were integrated into a master schedule.
Resource estimates were based on vendor
information, previous experience, and other
programs.
All activities were arranged in a logical sequence
and some optimization was done to control the
duration of the schedule. The critical path
includes those activities which drive the overall
length of the schedule. Structural design,
fabrication, and assembly are the most
significant activities on the critical path, however
activities related to propulsion, avionics,
electrical power, and thermal protection systems
also appear on the criticalpath. The experience
gained at the Johnson Space Center in the in-
house fabrication of a structural article for the
Aero-assist Right Experiment project provided
the analogy for schedule estimates for structure
and thermal protection system fabrication and
assembly.
The following tests were included in the
schedule and cost estimates:
• Subsystem and qualification tests for all
components
• Static structural tests
• Vibro-acoustic tests
• Thermal-vacuum tests
• Electro-magnetic interference tests
• Landing impact tests (drops from test stand)
• Air-drop tests for the landing system (from
aircraft)
• Water stability tests
• Water recovery tests
• Crew operations evaluations
• Docking mechanism tests
• Integrated crew module tests
• Shuttle cargo integration
• Orbital flight test
The following hardware for the development and
test program was included in the estimate
(including spares):
• At least two equivalent units for each
subsystem
• 6 crew module structural prototypes
("boilerplates")
• 1 crew module mockup for operations
evaluations
gQ.U.GLUELO 
A conceptual design was developed for a
spacecraft which could provide rescue capability
for the International Space Station. The features
of this vehicle which make it attractive as a
simple rescue vehicle are:
• use of the proven Apollo re-entry vehicle shape
which reduces the need for extensive
aerodynamic analysis and testing
• increased volume with the capacity for up to
eight people while also accommodating all
support systems within the crew module
• elimination of a separate, expendable service
module which greatly reduces the number and
complexity of interfaces and permits the
selection of landing sites without concern about
service module debris impact
• separate docking adapter which allows for
flexibility in the allocation of docking ports for
the rescue vehicle without forcing a vehicle or
Station design change and also allows for
return and reuse of the expensive docking
mechanism
• payload bay support system which allows for
delivery and return of the rescue vehicle with
minimal impact on other Shuttle cargo
operations
Based on the engineering plan completed as
part of the design study, development and
fabrication of the vehicle as an in-house project
at the Johnson Space Center appears feasible.
The skills required have been identified and are
available within the existing workforce at the
Center. The fabrication techniques required are
within the capabilities of the Center and the
facilities and equipment are generally available.
The actual availability of personnel for such a
future project is difficult to predict since it
depends on the level of support required for
other on-going programs. However, the in-
house approach should minimize the overall
manpower required to complete this project. In
comparison to the traditional NASA contracting
approach, significant cost savings are expected
with the in-house approach proposed in this
study since much of the labor for procurement,
contract management, and technical oversight is
eliminated. Alternatively, the design concept
would also be compatible with a fixed-price
procurement approach.
In addition to serving as a Space Station rescue
vehicle, the spacecraft concept described in this
paper could be evolved for other applications
such as a two-way Earth-to-orbit crew transport,
an unmanned logistics carrier, or a re-entry
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capsule for lunar and planetary spacecraft. The
design was based on the use of current
technology systems and so there is great
potential for improving the design by introducing
more advanced systems in the future.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The design study described in this report is the
result of a coordinated effort by a team,
representing most of the organizations at the
Johnson Space Center and the author would like
to acknowledge their contributions. The
development plan, schedule and cost estimates
for this design were compiled and integrated by
Brent Scheffer. Jim Masciarelli is responsible for
much of the design integration. The team also
included: Mary Cerimele, Ann Bufkin, Joe
Riccio, Chris Madden, John Ruppert, David
Pruett, Marybeth Edeen, Mike Hoy, Steve
Munday, Richard Hill, John Trainor, Randy Rust,
John Zipay, Lawrence Turner, Chris Brown,
June Hoang, James Keiser, Laurie Weaver,
Kevin Templin, Barbara Dubcek, Jerry Borrer,
Carl Meade, MicheUe Munk, Nancy Tengler,
George Ladrach, and George Sandars. Charles
Teixeira provided management oversight of the
design study.
REFERENCES
° Contingency Retum Vehicle for Space
Station; A Design Study, JSC-32025, Komel
Nagy, Johnson Space Center, Houston,
Texas, January, 1987.
. A Conceptual Design Study of a Crew
Emergency Return Vehicle (SCRAM), JSC-
23103, C. Cerimele, W. Peterson, B. Ross,
and M. Stagnaro, Johnson Space Center,
Houston, Texas, August, 1988.
° Assured Crew Retum Vehicle: Eight-Person
SCRAM Desigq, JSC-34017, Shelby Lawson,
Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas,
October, 1992.
. Personnel Spacecraft Concept for In-House
J_ (1992 study), JSC-26569,
Andrew Petro and Brent Scheffer, Johnson
Space Center, Houston, Texas, March 4,
1994.
5. In-House Developed Spac_ Station Rescue
Vehicle (1994 study), JSC-26755, Mary
Cerimele, Johnson Space Center, Houston,
Texas, July, 1994.
73
APASdocking
mechanism 0 Docking adapter
structure
Main
parachutes
Drogue chute mortar
Electrical power
equipment
Life support
components
S-Band
components
Rash
evaporator
Displays &
Controls
Folding seats
RCS
engines
Batteries
Water storage
tank
Propellant
Tanks
Helium Tank
Crew Systems
storage
Figure 1" Cutaway View of Rescue Vehicle
"74
Dimensions in meters
2.30
Figure 2:
I
I
I
I
I
147.39
Rescue Vehicle with Dimensions (Docking Adapter not included)
75
f
26 metereffective
diameter
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Figure 4: Payload Bay Support Structure
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Table 1: Rescue Vehicle Concept Mass
Functional Area
'Structure
crew
Module
488
Docking
Adapter
Shuttle
Support
.... 91 591
Thermal Protection 861 .............
Propulsion 136
Power 884 .........................
Control
AYionics
Environment
91
t = ...................
475
339 23
Landing & Pyros ,, 449 ...... 365 ,, 523_
C.r.ew._Agcq_mmodations...... _,..3_6...............
iWeight Growth
DRY MASS (kg)
Cargo
624
4783 456 1137
,,,,,,, ,
0
Crew & Provisions 1240
6023 456 1137INERT MASS (kg)
02, N2, Water v LiOH
Propellant
i
105
308
GROSS MASS (kg) 6436 456 1137
8O29 kgTotal mass to launch in St_uttie
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INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION ALPHA (ISSA)
INTEGRATED TRAFFIC MODEL
R. E. GATES
Booz.Allen & Hamilton Inc.,
Houston, Texas
Abstract
The paper discusses the
development process of the
International Space Station Alpha
(ISSA) Integrated Traffic Model
which is a subsystem analyses tool
utilized in the ISSA design analysis
cycles. Fast-track prototyping of the
detailed relationships between daily
crew and station consumables,
propellant needs, maintenance
requirements and crew rotation via
spread sheets provide adequate bench
marks to assess cargo vehicle design
and performance characteristics.
Nomenclature
APCU Auxiliary Power Control
Unit
ATV Automated Transfer
Vehicle
CAP Capability
CV Cargo Vehicle
OCIIS Commercial off-the-
shelf software
ECLSS Environmental Control
and Life Support System
ESA European Space Agency
EXT_AL Weight of external
airlock
FSE Flight Support
Equipment
JSC Johnson Space Center
H20 Water
IPT Integrated Product Team
ISSA International Space
Station Alpha
k g Kilogram
Max Maximum
micro-g Micro Gravity
MPLM Mini Pressurized
Logistics Carrier
nmi nautical miles
O1U Orbiter Interface Unit
ORU Orbital Replacement
Unit
Copyrightc 1994by the AmericanInstituteof
Aeronauticsand Astronautics,Inc. All Rights
reserved.
PRLAs
Prop
ROEU
RSA
TIM
SRCK_LD
STS_BASE
STS RES
STWRCK
SUM
UIJ2
ULC_ATI"
USOS
AIAA-95-0915-CP
/
Payload Retention Latch
Assembly
Propellant
Remotely Operated
Electrical Umbilical
Russian Space Agency
Technical Interchange
Meeting
Stowage Rack Load
Factor
Upmass capability of
Shuttle at 230 nmi
rendezvous altitude
Space Station Program
Office estimated
management reserve
for post assembly phase
Stowage Rack
Summation
Unpressurized Logistic
Carriers
Weight of ORU interface
attachment hardware
United States On-orbit
Segment
I. Background
The approach discussed in this
paper presents the development
process and resultant relationships
employed in the ISSA Integrated
Traffic Model*.
The Traffic Model identifies all
vehicles docking to and departing
from the ISSA. It characterizes
traffic density patterns, upmass
requirements for the ISSA,
capabilities of cargo vehicles (CV)
delivering those requirements, and
propellant usage.
The initial development of the
Traffic Model capitalized on the
Integrated Product Team (IPT)
processes put in place at the Johnson
Space Center. Continual
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enhancements to the Traffic Model is
streamlined by the very same
processes.
This paper will first discuss the
development process followed by a
detailed discussion of the key
relationships that are required to
work together to allow a traffic model
to be successfully constructed.
The traffic model considers: the
Russian Space Agency (RSA)
provided Progress-M, Progress-M2 t
and Soyuz-TM; the European Space
Agency (ESA) provided Automated
Transfer Vehicle (ATV) ¥; and, the
Space Shuttle as Cargo Vehicle
candidates *
Input data used by the ISSA
Traffic Model is still under
development. Results shown in this
paper should be considered
preliminary and subject to change.
The initial tooling of the ISSA
planning base for the traffic model
by defining their requirements in
areas such as logistics, Flight Crew
System resupply, and Environmental
Control and Life Support System
(ECLSS) resupply. Other items which
include altitude and propellant
strategies provide necessary inputs to
the traffic model.
The altitude and propellant
requirements like the logistics and
maintenance requirements are
derived from ISSA subsystem and
analysis tools that take into
consideration all required technical
aspects of the ISSA design. The data
these tools provide are the key
drivers to the Traffic Model. The
altitude and propellant numbers
become highly interactive with the
maturity of the model development,
as vehicle launch dates change so do
the rendezvous altitudes and ISSA
propellant requirements. The
analytical processes and tools used to
derive these data are not discussed in
this paper.
19.
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Figure I. 1999 Assembly Year Traffic Density for ISSA
t
Traffic Model was done on Micro Soft
Excel in the Macintosh format *
lI. Traffic Model Development
Each IPT, as part of their on-
going design work, established the
Figure I shows the assembly
phase traffic patterns / density
profile for the year 1999 # . As can be
seen by Figure I traffic to the station
is evenly spread throughout the year.
February shows the most amount of
traffic with a Russian assembly flight
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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(6R), a US Utilization Flight (UF-1)
delivering the first set of science
experiments, and a Russian Soyuz
flight rotating up to three (3) station
crew memberst t.
RSA data used in the ISSA Traffic
Model is derived from Russian
technical reports and information
documented in protocols from US and
RSA Technical Interchange Meetings
t.
A primary object of the ISSA
Traffic model is to project total station
consumable rates. This is required in
order to identify loading effects on
cargo vehicles and to set up the
initial architecture of the model.
Loading of any cargo vehicle (CV) is
selected areas on-board must meet a .2
micro gravity perpendicular
component to orbital average quasi-
static acceleration vector. This
environment must be not be
disturbed for at least 180 days per
year in no less than 30 day
increments. The micro-gravity
requirement profiles the docking
windows for all vehicles going to and
returning from ISSA, opportunities
for reboosting the station to maintain
its operational orbit, and
maintenance periods that would
impact the stations micro gravity
environment.
A micro gravity mission profile
was identified for planning
guidelines which allows for eight (8)
determined by examining the 30 day micro-g periods per year,
duration of stay on orbit and when refer to Figure II, Concept of
the next CV is scheduled to arrive. Operations and Utilization increment
Consumables are identified as
propellant, gases, water, and crew
supplies ¶ ¥
Another primary objective of
the traffic model was the ability to
maintain a status of cargo vehicle
propellant loading over time. A CVs
ability to meet ISSA propellant
requirements are paramount to the
success of the ISSA. In that light the
ISSA Traffic Model must maintain a
profile of on-board propellant
storage of not only the CV but also the
ISSA storage tanks plus keeping track
of propellant requirements status.
This requires keeping track of the
total on-board propellant load while
continually comparing it to the
contingency propellant storage
requirements for the ISSA.
The science requirement for
micro gravity constitutes the third
objective of the traffic model.
The ISSA must be flown such
that once fully assembled some
definition profile ¶¥.
II. RSA Key Traffic Model
l_elationships
Since the ISSA crew members
will be using the cargo vehicle as a
storage location for the supplies they
carry, the loading of water, gases,
propellant and crew supplies must be
based on how long the vehicle will be
attached to the station.
The traffic model considers the
use rate of each of the consumables,
while the vehicle is attached to the
station, in determining the correct
CV load factors.
To establish the relationships
between the consumables and the
loading factors of CVs simple
equations have been developed. For
these relationships "if/then"
expressions are used.
8o
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An "if/then" statement is
defined as a calculation or expression
that is dependent on a binary
condition or conditions. The storage
of water considers:
IF(SUM(H20) > CV Capability, CV CAP,
SUM (H20))
Where as: if the sum of the water
required during the stay time of the
cargo vehicle is greater than the CVs
water tanks then the amount of water
assigned to that CV is full water tanks.
if not, then the amount of water the
CV is to carry is the amount required.
The SUM(H20) is determined by
calculating the consumable rate of
water from the date that cargo
vehicle docked to the date the next
cargo vehicle docks. This expression
not only allows a comparison of
requirements and cargo vehicle
capabilities, but also the ability to
assess different cargo vehicles and
changes in capacity designs. This
same relationship applies to the CVs
ability to carry gases (Nitrogen,
Oxygen or a combination of both).
In modeling the operational
phase of the ISSA the Traffic Model
assigns the highest priority to crew
supplies, then water and gases,
followed by maintenance logistics.
Any remaining upmass capability is
assigned to transport propellant and
then to the Experiments. The
optimization of CV loading is
currently adjusted manually, but this
task is a candidate for automation on
future ISSA Traffic Model upgrades.
Propellant loading for the CV is
determined by the following
expression:
IF (CV Max Cap - (CV Base + (230-
docking altitude) * CV Orbit
penalties) - SUM (CV Load) > = CV Prop
Cap), CV Prop Cap, CV Max Cap - ( CV
Base + (230-docking altitude) * CV
Orbit penalties) - SUM (CV Load))
This expression considers the CV
type as a variable, the payload
capability of the CV, what has already
been loaded, the maximum capacity
for propellant, and upmass penalties
associated with docking altitudes.
Since the basic load of the CV is
calculated from consumption rates
and duration on-orbit the massaging
of docking and departure dates
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preserve the necessary loading
relationships.
One of the key factors in CV
propellant loading is the relationship
between propellant available on orbit
in both the CV and the station
elements to the propellant required
during the period the CV will be at
the station.
This relationship is continually
maintained by first keeping track of
the propellant within the Service
Module, Storage Tank Module (FGB
Module), and the attached cargo
vehicle. Then comparing it to on-
board propellant requirements at
specified events (vehicle docking /
departures, reboosts, etc.). The
traffic model alerts the user when
any event results in a negative
propellant margin.
Another aspect of the ISSA
Traffic Model is the volumetric
loading assessment. An average of
200 kg l Cubic Meter is used for all
RSA pressurized cargo *,t,¥. When
this loading results in exceeding the
capability of the CV an indicator
alerts the user of the violation.
For the Space Shuttle rack
loading coefficients are used that
identify total rack weight, carrying
load and volume capability.
III. Space Shuttle Key
Relationships
The ISSA Traffic Model
investigates two (2) types of Space
Shuttle mission scenarios.
The first scenario is a dedicated
pressurized cargo mission where a 16
rack, 20,000 lbs (9072 kg's) capacity
mini pressurized logistics carrier
(MPLM) is used. The MPLM is
transported to the ISSA in the Space
Shuttle payload bay, upon arriving it
is removed and attached to a common
berthing mechanism where it will
remain as the crew removes and
replaces cargo.
Scenario number two is a
dedicated unpressurized Space Shuttle
mission where up to approximately
26,000 Ibs (1 1,794 kg's) of
unpressurized cargo is transported
on two (2) Unpressurized Logistic
Carriers (ULC) to and from the space
station. The ULC is structure that can
allow multiple and various sized
unpressurized elements to be
delivered and returned in the payload
bay of the Space Shuttle.
Space Shuttle Scenario #1 -
Pressurized Cargo Flight:
In the first scenario the traffic
model algorithms calculate the
capability of the MPLM to carry
cargo to the station by the following
expression:
(STS_BASE + ( 230 nmi - docking
altitude) * 100 lbs) - STS_RES - EXT_AL
- MPLM_A'Iq' - APCU - ROEU - MPLM -
20 * locker_wt - OIU - 2 Shuttle crew)
Where:
STS_BASE Upmass capability of
Shuttle at 230 nmi
rendezvous altitude
STS_RES Space Station Program
Office estimated
management reserve
for post assembly phase
EXT_AL Weight of external
airlock
MPLM_ATT Weight of MPLM
attachment hardware
(PRLAs)
APCU Weight of APCU
ROEU Weight of ROEU
MPLM Weight of MPLM
locker_wt Weight of 20 middeck
lockers
OIU Weight of OIU
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The result of this equation is
used as a basis for the cargo loading
estimates. After assembly of the
space station (post assembly phase)
the traffic model assumes 40 % of the
available upmass is reserved for
science and 60% is reserved for crew
supplies and space station
maintenance logistics.
upmass capability of the Space
Shuttle at the assigned docking
altitude.
The spacing of Shuttle launches
has been driven by the micro-g
profile (Figure II) and the Space
Station Freedom retained design
features.
The space station design teams
are interested in tracking the mass
and volume of the maintenance
Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs)
that can be delivered. Therefor the
model takes into consideration the
average amount of mass and volume
that can be placed in a space station
stowage rack and deducts the rack
weight from the logistics allocation
of upmass. This can be seen in the
following calculation:
IF (Shuttle upmass capability > 20000,
IF((20000 * 0.6 - unpressurized cargo
- crew supplies) - ((20000 * 0.6 -
unpressurized cargo crew supplies)
/ SRCK_LD) * STWRCK < = logistic
upmass requirement, (20000 * 0.6
unpressurized cargo crew supplies)
((20000 * 0.6 - unpressurized cargo -
crew supplies) / SRCK_LD) * STWRCK,
logistic upmass requirement),
IF((Shuttle upmass capability * 0.6 -
unpressurized cargo crew supplies)
- ((Shuttle upmass capability * 0.6 -
unpressurized cargo crew supplies)
/ SRCK_LD) * STWRCK < = logistic
upmass requirement, (Shuttle upmass
capability * 0.6 unpressurized cargo
crew supplies) - ((Shuttle npmass
capability * 0.6 unpressurized cargo
- crew supplies) / SRCK_LD) *
STWRCK, logistic upmass
requirement)))
Where:
SRCK_LD
STWRCK
Average load for a
storage rack
Weight of storage rack
The above calculation also takes
into consideration the maximum
capability of the MPLM and the
These design features include
the allocation of 40 % of the upmass
to science, the number of stowage
and refrigeration racks in the
Habitation Module and the capacity of
the MPLM all contribute to a 90 day
crew supply replenishment cycle.
Therefore as a basic scheduling
template four (4) pressurized Shuttle
mission launches are scheduled on 90
day centers. A 5th Shuttle mission,
that carries unpressurized cargo, is
scheduled within one (1) of the 90
day cycles.
Space Shuttle Scenario #2 -
Unpressurized Cargo Flight:
The unpressurized Shuttle
mission scenario is handled in the
same manner as the pressurized
scenario. Volumetric assessments are
handled as secondary checks once
the loading of each vehicle is
determined. The traffic model
calculates the Shuttle upmass
capability with the following
expression:
STS_BASE + (230 nmi - docking
altitude) * 100) - STS_RES - ULC * 2 -
ULC_ATT*2 - PRLA * 2 - APCU -
EXT_AL - 20 * Iocker_wt - OIU
Where:
STS BASE
STS_RES
ULC
Upmass capability of
Shuttle at 230 nmi
rendezvous attitude
Space Station Program
Office estimated
management reserve
for post assembly phase
Base weight of ULC
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Figure III. USOS Comparison Between Pressurized Logistics
requirements and Resupply Capabilities
ULC_ATr
PRLA
EXT_AL
APCU
locker_wt
OIU
Weight of ORU interface
attachment hardware
Weight of ULC
attachment hardware
Weight of external
airlock
Weight of APCU
Weight of 20 middeck
lockers
Weight of OIU
For the Unpressurized Shuttle
flight load capability the traffic
model uses the following expression:
IF (Science unpressurized upmass +
Logistic Maintenance requirements >
Shuttle upmass capability , Shuttle
upmass capability, Science
unpressurized upmass + Logistic
Maintenance requirements)
IV. Traffic Model Results
Several outputs of the traffic
model are used by the ISSA Program.
The docking and undocking of
the visiting vehicles set the basis for
determining quiet zones from which
micro gravity periods can be
planned.
The annual summaries provide
comparisons of requirements versus
capabilities for both the United States
On-orbit Segment (USOS) and the
Russian Segment. At the time of this
paper the ISSA Traffic Model
indicates a backlog of USOS
pressurized logistics (refer to Figure
III).
The annual average mass of
cargo delivered to the station is
approximately 1O0 metric tons per
year (includes carrier weights). 20 to
25 metric tons are delivered to the
Russian Segment ¶ and is comprised
of approximately eight (8) to 11
metric tons of propellant, 6800 kg of
crew supplies, 3.3 metric tons of
experiment hardware, 2-3 metric tons
of water, two (2) metric tons of
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
maintenance logistics, and 500 kg of
gases. The USOS annual average mass
is approximately 75 to 80 metric tons
and is comprised of 18 to 23 metric
tons of science, 8 metric tons of crew
supplies, 8 to 12 metric tons of
maintenance logistics, and 37 metric
tons of Flight Support Equipment
(FSE).
V. Summary
All the crew rotation logistics,
propellant, and other supply
requirements have been aggregates
as the basis for defining a traffic
model to the ISSA.
Numerous expressions have
been developed which allow
definition of the various
consumption rates and their
relationship to each other. This has
all been integrated in commercial off
the shelf (COTS) software and has set
up base rules for enhanced modeling
through higher order expressions.
Rapid prototyping of certain key
design characteristics of cargo
vehicles and ISSA capabilities allow
for in-depth design assessments in a
rapid changing design environment.
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Abstract
This paper provides an overview of what the
primary contractors at Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
are doing in the field of predictive engineering. The
technologies employed by each of the contractors and
the cost savings associated with the implementation of
these predictive engineering methods are discussed.
The sources include predictive engineering
implementation plans, published by each of the
contractors and interviews with the authors of these
implementation plans.
Introduction
The primary mission of Kennedy Space
Center is to launch Space Shuttles. Shuttle launch
costs are comprised of manpower, material, and
equipment. There are billions of dollars invested in
equipment located on the Kennedy Space Center which
is essential to launching Shuttles. This equipment
must be in a safe and operable condition upon demand.
However, electrical and mechanical
equipment will gradually deteriorate over time and this
will eventually cause the equipment to fail. The harsh
environment that is present at KSC due to the high
humidity, salt air and hazardous chemicals increases
the number of equipment problems. Preventive
maintenance is used to slow this deterioration and
thereby extend the useful life of the equipment.
Traditional preventive maintenance provides for
planned shutdowns during periods of inactivity or low
usage for major overhauls.
Predictive engineering, a branch of preventive
maintenance, is a method to systematically monitor
equipment and perform operational trend analysis on a
regularly scheduled basis to determine the condition of
the equipment. On-line detection, trending and
diagnostics provide an early warning of potential
equipment failure and reduce the need for traditional
preventive maintenance. Predictive engineering also
"Copyright _ 1994 by the American lluaitute of Aeronanrica and Astronautics, Inc. No
copyright is uaerted in the Uni_d States under "l'i_ 17, U.S. Code. The U.S. Govertmmnt
has a royalty.free licem¢ to exerci_ all rigl_ under tha copyright claimed Icrein f¢¢
Gcvernn_ntal puwoses. All olhcr rights are reserved by the copyright owner,"
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decreases unexpected breakdowns and helps to ensure
the continuity of operation.
f_
A preventive maintenance program which
utilizes predictive engineering methods provides
numerous benefits including:
Reduced maintenance downtime
Reduced unplanned failures
Reduced risk of induced failures
Reduced repair costs
Reduced manpower requirements
Increased equipment availability
Extended useful life of equipment
Improved safety and reliability
In the current environment of decreased
funding there is a constant demand to reduce cost in all
areas. The cost of preventive maintenance is no
exception. The implementation of predictive
engineering into the existing Kennedy Space Center
preventive maintenance programs has resulted in
significant cost savings.
Shuttle Processing Contractor
The Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC)
introduced predictive engineering in 1988 with
Vibration Trend Analysis to address high failure rates
of the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) Environmental
Control System (ECS) Ground Support Equipment.
The initial program of Vibration Trend Analysis
involved 66 ECS machines from Launch Pads A and
B, the OPF's, and the Portable Purge Units for which
the prime contractor has maintenance responsibility.
SPC has stated that this program effectively reduced
the failure rate of ECS rotating equipment and the risk
of flight hardware damage and personnel injury.
In 1990 a plan to continue the Vibration
Trend Analysis program and expand predictive
engineering was developed. This plan has been
applied to all mechanical and electrical Ground
Support Equipment, Facility Equipment, and to some
f_
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designatedflight hardware. In order to accomplish
this the Kennedy Space Center Integrated Schedule,
which drives monitoring and dam collection schedules,
had to be revised.
There are currently three people under the
Shuttle Processing Contract that support over 1100
items being monitored by predictive engineering
methods. These technologies now include Vibration
Trend Analysis, Ferrography Trend Analysis,
Thermography, Ultrasonics, Ultrasound, Laser
Alignment, Laser Shearography, and Motor Circuit
Analysis.
Vibration Trend Analysis evaluates the on-
line condition of mechanical components and their
effect on related pieces of mechanical hardware. It can
detect, identify and isolate specific component
degradation in bearings, gears, pulleys, blowers, fans,
belts, and couplings. For this kind of analysis, the type
and amount of data required will vary from one
analysis problem to another. Fortunately, given the
advances in microprocessorsand vibration
instrumentation,vibrationanalysisis an adaptive
process where real time changes to test frequencies and
directions can be made in order to provide more
information.
Ferrography Trend Analysis is analogous to a
common blood test. This analysis uses diagnostic and
predictive techniques to evaluate the on-line condition
of interacting lubricated or fluid powered parts. The
lubricants or fluids are analyzed for condition, level,
and type of contamination. Analysis of wear particles
can isolate a falling component, the mode of failure,
and the estimated time to failure through trending.
Equipment life is extended by oil analysis instead of
depending entirely on operating hours as the driver for
scheduled maintenance. This technology identified
three suppliers who inadvertently shipped oil that was
contaminated with sand and metal particles. As a
result, a nationwide alert was issued and potential
damage to the KSC elevator and crane systems was
avoided.
Thermography is the science of detecting
temperature differences by scanning infrared
emissions. It is used to analyze equipment that
exhibits thermal discrepancies prior to failure or when
not operating properly. This includes equipment as
varied as electrical panels, circuit boards, pumps,
motors and many others. There are several advantages
to using non-contact thermal infrared measurement as
opposed to more conventional methods of temperature
measurement. The most commonly stated advantages
are that it is non-intrusive, it is much quicker, and it
can measure the temperature at the surface of the
equipment. The infrared camera effectively detected a
defective fuse at one of the KSC electrical switchyards.
If conventional preventive maintenance methods had
been used instead, the arcing would have gone
undetected. This would have caused emergency power
to be activated and could have resulted in a possible
launch delay.
Ultrasonics technology detects hidden flaws in
materials, especially metals. It also verifies weld joints
and fluid levels by monitoring the high frequency
sound generated by the turbulent or restricted flow of
escaping gasses. This technology has advanced into a
completely digital and portable microprocessor
controlled ultrasonic flaw detector. It is safer and
faster than current X-ray technology.
Ultrasound is an acoustical detection system
that detects sound waves generated by a component
and transmitted through some type of medium. This
medium can be air, water, or organic or inorganic
material. It is a technology which primarily detects
leaks involving all types of fluids. Equipment such as
gearboxes, compressors, relief valves, boilers, and tube
banks can be easily inspected using ultrasound.
Laser Alignment is the newest predictive
engineering method to be employed in the alignment of
rotating systems. It detects misalignment in
mechanical equipment, which places undue force on
bearings, and can lead to accelerated wear or possible
catastrophic failure. It verities proper installation and
even fabrication of mechanical systems prior to
operation. It also monitors proper alignment during
equipment operation. Correct alignment has been
credited with saving as much as ten percent on power
consumption.
Laser Shearography is a form of
nondestructive testing for general purpose strain
analysis and inspection of metallic or composite
materials. It is particularly useful for detecting
corrosion, which can go unnoticed during a typical
visual inspection. Laser Shearography has many
applications at KSC, principally in detecting
debonding of composite structures on the Orbiter, the
External Tank, and the Solid Rocket Boosters.
Motor Circuit Analysis determines the level of
degradation in electrical motor circuits such as
individual phase resistance from the power bus
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disconnectthroughthe motor windings, phase to
ground resistance, inductance of the motor coils and
capacitance of each of the three phases to ground.
Detecting and correcting a 4.5% phase imbalance saves
25% in additional power consumption and can double
the useful life of the motor. Considering that SPC
engineers believe that most of the three phase motors
in operation today are out of balance, this is one area
where enormous cost savings are anticipated at KSC.
Through the use of these eight preventive
engineering methods the contractor was able to save
approximately two million dollars last year alone.
Some of these technologies have exhibited very high
cost paybacks. The Shuttle Processing Contractor
believes that this type of program has and will continue
to save lives, extend the useful life of equipment, and
increase equipment availability in order to insure
operational success.
Pa_'load Ground Operations Contractor
The Payload Ground Operations Contractor
(PGOC) began incorporating predictive engineering
methods into their preventive maintenance program
with the use of Vibration Analysis in 1988 and
Ferrography in 1989. In 1992 they began focusing on
a reliability centered maintenance program. Systems
engineers reviewed the list of equipment Preventive
Maintenance Instructions (PMI) and provided
suggestions as to what requirements were needed in
order to utilize predictive engineering technologies
which would result in a more efficient and reliable
approach to maintenance. They then rewrote selected
PMrs and added documentation to incorporate
Vibration Analysis, Thermography, Ferrography,
Ultrasonic Monitoring, and Laser Alignment.
The Payload Ground Operations Contractor
has now established a complete reliability centered
maintenance plan which combines predictive
technologies with preventive maintenance procedures.
Five basic questions are addressed to determine the
amount of maintenance required for each piece of
equipment:
1. What does the equipment do?
2. What failures occur?
3. What are the consequences of the failures?
4. How can the failures be prevented?
5. What is the cost benefit of maintenance versus
failure.
In addition, criteria for predictive
maintenance depends on the type of equipment, how it
is used, and the mission criticality or safety aspects of
that use. Identical pieces of equipment can have
dissimilar maintenance requirements in different
applications. As a result of this, four distinct levels of
maintenance were identified.
The Level I maintenance procedure is for
equipment that requires no maintenance. The
hardware is run to failure and then repaired. The
reason for this is that the cost of replacing or repairing
the equipment is less than the cost of maintenance. It
should also be noted that this level of maintenance only
applies to non-critical systems where consequences of
failure do not impact safety.
The Level II maintenance procedure specifies
that only the maintenance which is required by KSC
regulations will be performed. In some cases, since
this is still non-critical equipment, a waiver to the
regulations will be processed to reduce the amount of
maintenance that must be done. Equipment within this
category may require some predictive maintenance, but
it is usually hardware that can be shut down for
extended periods of time for repair or preventive
maintenance.
Equipment that falls under the Level III
maintenance category are items where the amount of
preventive maintenance has been reduced and
predictive technologies are being utilized to monitor
and trend any potential problems.
The Level IV category is for those items that
require full maintenance, both preventive and
predictive, to avert functional failures. These are
critical items, where a single failure could result in the
loss of life or damage to flight hardware. Hardware is
also designated Level IV if it monitors hazardous
operations and where safety is a major concern.
As noted earlier, the PGOC has focused on
rewriting the PMrs to incorporate predictive
engineering technologies into these documents and as a
result they measure their cost savings in terms of man-
hours. In fiscal year 1994 alone, they saved
approximately 12,000 man-hours through the
implementation of predictive maintenance methods in
place of traditional preventive maintenance. A large
portion of these savings came from changing the PMrs
for the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
units, which include all facility boilers and pumps,
along with the compressed air and vacuum systems.
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This hasbeenaccomplishedwith a staff of two
engineers who perform predictive analysis and
trending on 185 pieces of equipment. The amount of
equipment tested using predictive technologies is
anticipated to increase during the next year with the
addition of the Space Station Ground Support
Equipment and facility hardware.
Base Operotions Contractor
The Base Operations Contractor (BOC)
maintenance program is a reliability centered
maintenance philosophy that incorporates preventive,
predictive, and proactive maintenance with equipment
life cycle management. This results in minimizing
equipment failures that could impact critical KSC
systems and accomplishment of required maintenance
in the most cost effective manner. The BOC uses
predictive engineering as a means to complement their
preventive maintenance program.
Their approach to predictive engineering is
similar to that of the payloads contractor. They do not
attempt to apply predictive engineering methods to all
their systems. When the predictive engineering plan
was first established, all of the equipment was assessed
based on operational criticality. The following
parameters determine these criticalities:
Safety
Mission
Environmental
Cost of Maintenance/Replacement
The Base Operations Contractor is responsible
for 32,000 pieces of equipment. They currently
monitor 51% of the two thousand pieces of equipment
that have been targeted for predictive analysis. This
has been accomplished with a staff of two engineers.
They have also developed a detailed data base to keep
track of equipment, failures, and savings associated
with the implementation of the predictive engineering
methods.
In addition to the technologies discussed
previously, the BOC also utilizes several different
predictive maintenance methods, including Megger
Testing, Power Factor Testing, Breaker Timing
Testing, Contact Resistance, Insulation Oil Analysis,
Gas-In-Oil Analysis, Impedance Testing, and Hi-Pot
Testing.
Megger Testing is primarily used on
transformers, circuit breakers, and switch gears. This
is a direct current test where a voltage is applied to the
equipment in order to determine insulation resistance
and monitor trends.
Power Factor Testing is basically a power loss
measurement. It is a non-destructive alternating
current test that shows the condition of the insulation.
When the circuit impedance changes due to aging,
moisture, contamination, insulation shorts, or damage,
the power factor will increase. The BOC enginee_
believe that this is one of the most useful predictive
engineering tests for transformers, circuit breakers, and
switch gears.
Breaker Timing Testing is a mechanical test
which displays the speed and position of breaker
contacts before, during, and after an operation. It is
used to trend information on medium or high voltage
breakers in order to determine if adjustments need to
be made to the breaker operating mechanism.
Oil Analysis is used on high voltage
transformers, circuit breakers and medium voltage
switches where oil is supplied as an insulator.
Performing this analysis on the electrical insulating oil
provides a great deal of information about the
operational history and current condition of the
equipment. Any type of heating, arcing, or coagulation
produces by-products that can be detected in the
insulation oil.
Gas-In-Oil Analysis is one of the best
predictive engineering tests for transformers that use
oil insulation according to BOC engineers. By
analyzing a small sample of oil to determine what
gases are present, failure and degradation patterns
internal to the transformer are be identified. This
predictive engineering technology was successfully
identified acetylene in the insulation oil in one of the
substations. Since acetylene is normally not present
unless there has been arcing, a critical problem was
recognized and corrected prior to failure.
Impedance Testing is used to trend the
internal impedance of battery ceils. Since this
impedance is directly related to the remaining capacity
of the battery, it projects battery end-of-life or cell
degradation.
Hi-Pot Testing is a technology used primarily
on cables and switches. It is a direct current, high
voltage test that detects excessive leakage current. It is
used for testing new equipment and also to trend the
degradation of equipment in use. However, Hi-Pot has
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thepotentialbea destructive test, so it is not a common
predictive maintenance tool. In many cases Power
Factor Testing replaces Hi-Pot Testing for high voltage
cables. Hi-Pot Testing is then used only when the
insulation condition has reached a questionable
threshold.
Through the use of these predictive
engineering technologies the Base Operations
Contractor has realized almost one million dollars in
cost savings over the past two years. The investment
in the predictive maintenance program thus far has
been minimal. Approximately $450K has been spent
on equipment and salaries. The BOC anticipates that
this program will save ten million dollars within the
next ten years.
Conelnsion
It is evident that there are numerous
predictive technologies that indicate machine health
and provide critical information about the operational
condition of equipment. Through effective utilization
of these predictive engineering methods, the amount
of preventive maintenance required to support critical
systems has been reduced, resulting in considerable
manpower savings. The implementation of predictive
engineering technologies also provides an early
indication of potential problems. Therefore, significant
cost savings have been and will continue to be achieved
through the reduction of downtime due to failures and
scheduled maintenance, and extended hardware life.
In addition to the long term cost savings, an increase in
the overall reliability of the systems at KSC will
continue to be realized.
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Abstract
The objective of this publication is to
introduce the enhancement methods for the overall
reliability and maintainability methods of
assessment on the International Space Station. It
is essential that the process to predict the values of
the maintenance time dependent variable
parameters such as MTBF over time do not in
themselves generate uncontrolled deviation in the
results of the ILS analysis such as Life Cycle Cost,
spares calculation, etc. Furthermore, the very acute
problems of micrometeorite, Cosmic rays, flares,
atomic oxygen, ionization effects, orbital plumes
and all the other factors that differentiate
maintainable space operations from nor_
maintainable space operations and/or ground
operations must be accounted for. Therefore,
these parameters need be subjected to a special
and complex process. Since reliability and
maintainability strongly depends on the operating
conditions that are encountered during the entire
life of tile International Space Station, it is important
that such conditions are accurately identified at the
beginning of the Logistics Support requirements
process. Environmental conditions which exert a
strong influence on International Space Station will
be discussed in this report. Concurrent (combined)
space environments may be more detrimental to
the reliability and maintainability of the International
Space Station than the effects of a single
environment. In characterizing the logistics support
requirements process, the developed design/test
criteria must consider both the single and/or
combined environments in anticipation of providing
hardware capability to withstand the hazards of the
International Space Station profile. The effects of
the combined environments (typical) in a matrix
relationship on the International Space Station will
be shown. The combinations of the environments
where the total effect is more damaging than the
cumulative effects of the environments acting
singly, may include a combination such as
temperature, humidity, altitude, shock, and vibration
while an item is being transported. The item's
acceptance to its end-of-life sequence must be
examined for these effects.
Copyright c 1995 by the American Instdute of Aeronautics and
A_,tronautlcs, Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. REFERENCES
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Spa(_e station freedom external
maintenance task team, July 1990,
final report; and
External maintenance solution
team, January 1991, final report.
2. OBJECTIVE
2.1 The objective of this report is to note the
environmental factors in a space environment
which must be accounted for in order to accurately
forecast the maintenance time dependent variables
(e.g: MTBF).
3. INTRODUCTION
3.1 In response to Reference A task, a series
of three (3) reports which describe the initial
approach to conduct refinement processes for the
maintenance time dependent parameters such as
MTBF in order to accurately forecast the Logistics
Support requirements were completed. This report
is the first of the three reports. The paramount and
complex problem relative to the time dependent
maintenance variable parameters became apparent
as a result of the investigations performed on the
RAM packages.
3.2 The process to predict the values of the
maintenance time dependent variable parameters
such as MTBF over time, as report 1 and annex A
of report 2 (this report is labelled as:
"INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT ANALYSIS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION,
BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF
MATHEMATICAL MODELLING & FAILURE
DENSITY DISTRIBUTIONS PERTAINING TO
MAINTENANCE TIME DEPENDENT
PARAMETERS", and is published in this
symposium) elucidate, must be treated by a
complex process to prevent uncontrolled deviation
in the results of the ILS analysis such as Life Cycle
Cost, spares calculation, etc. Fudhermore, the very
acute problems of micrometeorites, Cosmic rays,
flares, atomic oxygen, ionization effects, orbital
plumes and all the other factors that differentiate
maintainable space operations from non
maintainable space operations and/or ground
operations need to be accounted for. Therefore,
these parameters need be subjected to a special
and complex process.
4. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
4.1 Since reliability and maintainability strongly
depends on the operating conditions that are
encoL,ntered during the entire life of the MSS, it is
important that such conditions are accurately
identified at the beginning of the Logistics Support
requirements process. Environmental conditions
which exert a strong influence on MSS are included
in table 4.1 which provides a typical checklist for
space environmental coverage. Concurrent
(combined) space environments may be more
detrimental to the reliability and maintainability of
the MSS than the effects of a single environment.
In characterizing the logistics support requirements
process, the developed design/test criteria must
consider both the single and/or combined
environments in anticipation of providing hardware
capability to withstand the hazards of the MSS
profile. Figure 4.1 illustrates the effects of
combined environments (typical) in a matrix
relationship. It shows the combinations where the
total effect is more damaging than the cumulative
effects of the environments acting singly, may
include a combination such as temperature,
humidity, altitude, shock, and vibration while an
item is being transported. The items's acceptance
to its end-of-life sequence must be examined for
these effects. Table 4.2 illustrates the
environmental effects on the MSS.
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DTABLE 4.1: ENVIRONMENTAL COVERAGE CHECKLIST (TYPICAL)
NATURAL
Geomagnetism
Gravity, low
Ionized Gases
Meteorites
Pressure, Low
Pressure, High
Radiation, Cosmic, Solar
Radiation, Electromagnetic
Temperature, High
Temperature, Low
INDUCED
Radiation, Electromagnetic
Radiation, Nuclear
Shock
Temperature, High, Aero. Heating
Temperature, Low, Aero. Cooling
Vibration, Mechanical
Vibration, Acoustic
D
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4.3 Low temperatures experienced by the
electronic equipment can also cause reliability and
maintainability problems. These problems are
usually associated with mechanical elements of the
system. They include mechanical stresses
produced by differences in the coefficients of
expansion (contraction) of metallic and nonmetallic
materials, embrittlement of non metallic
components, mechanical forces caused by freezing
of entrapped moisture, stiffening of liquid
constituents, etc. Typical examples include
cracking of seams, binding of mechanical linkages,
and excessive viscosity of lubricants.
4.4 Additional stresses are produced when
electronic equipment is exposed to sudden
changes of temperature or rapidly changing
temperature cycling conditions. These conditions
generate large internal mechanical stresses in
structural elements, particularly when dissimilar
materials are involved. Effects of the thermal shock
induced stresses include cracking of seams,
delamination, loss of hermiticity, leakage of fill
gases, separation of encapsulating components
from components and enclosure surface leading to
the creation of voids, and distortion of support
members.
4.5 Electronic equipment is often expected to
be subject to environmental shock and vibration
both during normal use and testing. Such
environments can cause physical damage to parts
and structural members when deflections produced
cause mechanical stresses which exceed the
allowable working stress of the constituent parts.
4.6 The natural frequencies of items comprising
the MSS are important parameters which must be
considered in the logistics support of the MSS
since a resonant condition can be produced if a
natural frequency is within the vibration frequency
range. The resonance condition will greatly amplify
the deflection of the subsystem and may increase
stresses beyond the safe limit.
4.7 The vibration environment can be
particularly severe for electrical connectors on the
MSS, since it may cause relative motion between
members of the connector. This motion, in
combination with other environmental stresses, can
produce fret corrosion. This generates wear debris
and cause large variations in contact resistance.
4.8 High energy radiation can also cause
ionization effects which degrade the insulation
levels of dielectric materials. The environmental
factors that will be experienced by the MSS in its
total life cycle requires consideration in the logistics
support requirement process. This assures that
adequate provisions are made for effective MSS
logistic support requirements.
4.9 In the environmental stress identification
process that precedes the selection of
environmental strength techniques, it is essential
that stresses associated with all life intervals of the
MSS be considered. This includes not only the
operational and maintenance environments, but
also the pre operational environments, when
stresses imposed on the parts during the
manufacturing assembly, inspection, testing,
shipping, and installation may have significant
impact on the eventual availability of the MSS.
Stresses imposed during the pre operational phase
are often overlooked. They may, however,
represent a particularly harsh environment which
MSS must withstand. Often, the environments to
which MSS is exposed during shipping and
installation are more severe than those MSS will
encounter under normal operating conditions. It is
also probable that some of the environmental
strength features that are contained in the MSS
system design pertain to conditions that are
encountered in the pre operational phase, and not
in conditions that the equipment experiences after
being put into its orbit (i.e. infant mortality and/or
latent failures).
4.10 Reference A and B indicate that some of
the requirements such as the provisions for
oxidation, etc have been accounted for as part of
the K factors. Our analysis of the K factors, the
program's RAM data packages as well as Ref. A
and B of indicate the opposite. The failure rates
need to be predicted by following a consistent
approach which will account for all factors existent
in a space environment.
4.11 This consistent approach should include but
not be limited to the following:
A, Utilization of constant faihJre rates
(i.e. as report 2 indicate, different
family of ORUs belong to different
failure distribution). To universally
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Dg.
C.
D,
E.
F.
calculate the failure rates using
exponential failure distributionis an
incorrect method for predicting
time dependent maintenance
parameters;
Refo B assigns weibull distribution
for the life limit items, Iognormal for
MTTR calculation and exponential
for the random failures. This
assignment is not accurate and
such assignments should be
substantiated (please refer to
report 2);
Ref. A and B take the increase of
the failure rate due to duty cycle
granted. This is not true due to
the fact that items such as battery
of a car need be used in order to
avoid built up of the chemicals at
the contacts interface;
NPRD has been used as a basis
for comparison for estimating the
failure rates. This similiarization at
the CDR level is perceived as
rudimentary due to the absence of
any lay out in the NPRD thereby
incurring tremendous inaccuracy
for the results;
The K factors used by reference A
and B does not include the
preventive maintenance, inspection
and accurate overhead cost.
Furthermore, MSS is the first
maintainable space operation of its
kind and utilization of engineering
judgement to determine K factors
for this maintainable space
operation is not valid. Utilization of
previous spacecraft anomalies, as
supportive data, is encouraged in
parallel with accurate stochastical
and analytical techniques which
incorporate all the different space
environments such as cosmic rays,
flares, micrometeorites, etc;
In addition, the following areas
need to be accounted for:
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
Common mode failures;
Common cause failures;
Maintenance/Operations
induced failures;
Life limited items;
Duty cycle (i.e. duty cycle
does not necessarily
increase failure rates);
Construction induced
failures;
micrometeorites, atomic
oxygen, flares, cosmic
rays;
Advances in technology;
and
Etc.
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The International Space Station
Alpha (ISSA) End-to-End On-Orbit
Maintenance Process Flow
Kenneth W. Zingrebe, II
Barrios Technology, Inc.
Houston, Texas
As a tool for construction and
refinement of the on-orbit
maintenance system to sustain the
ISSA, the Mission Operations
Directorate (MOD) developed an end-
to-end on-orbit maintenance process
flow. This paper discusses and
demonstrates that process flow. This
tool is being used by MOD to
identify areas which require further
work in preparation for MOD's role
in the conduct of on-orbit
maintenance operations.
To fit this paper to the page length
limitations much of the detail of 1.2
- Perform Pre Maintenance I
Activities, 1.3 - Perform IMaintenance Activity, 1.4 Perform
Post Maintenance Activities, and the
Input and Output definitions (N1 to
N32) have been eliminated. The
process associated with I. I
Maintenance Definition and Planning
is of greater interest and of most
importance to the success of on-orbit
maintenance operations. If the
details of the latter part of the paper
are desired by any reader the author
will be glad to provide them.
|
1.1 - Maintenance Definition I
and Planning I
I 1.2- Perform Pre Maintenance IActivities
1.3 - Perform Maintenance [Activity
1.4 - Perform Post IMaintenance Activities
1.1 Maintenance Definition
Planning: This process is
tactical method that takes
and
the
the
, -, _5
declared failed item to the stage
where the resources are available to
do the task and task execution is
imminent. Sub processes are:
-Determine which type of
maintenance task is appropriate (IVA,
EVA, EVR, etc..) (Corrective,
Preventive, etc..)
-Ensure that a basic maintenance
procedure exists.
-Assure that the resources to perform
the task are available on-orbit
(including approved procedures,
spares, crew time, tools, etc..)
-Determine where this task falls in
the backlog and work to evaluate and
schedule the task.
START
I 1.1.1 - Identify and Log IMaint ance Task I
I
1.1.2 - Maintenance Activity I
Definition I
1.1.3 - Maintenance IActivity Planni g
1.2 ('N25- Sequence of_
I Maintenance Taskl
_,,on the Time Une j
I.I.I -Identify and Log Maintenance
Task: Formal statement that a
system component is failed. The
component may be an Orbital
Replacement Unit (ORU), structure,
cable, fluid line, etc. Determine if
the hardware is IVA, EVA, NASA,
NASDA, RSA, ESA, or CSA.
Identify the most efficient method of
repair EVR or EVA if the task is
external to the vehicle. The anomaly
report is updated.
1.1.1.1 - Perform Isolation Using
Maintenance: Hardware failure
isolation that cannot be performed by
BITE/BIT, malfunctions, telemetry,
or other hands-off type methods may
be performed by the crew using
isolation/troubleshooting procedures/
methods developed by ground
controllers.
ioo Copyright © 1994 American Institute of Aeronautics and
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START .
l Program lk
I MaintenanceI/"_'_
[Require-/+k.+)
ment j _r
fN2- TM
Declared
Failure
from
,i
System
Operator _)_
1.1.1.2 - Identify
the Type of
nrNlso'lved"_
System l
1.1.1.1 -
Perform
Isolation
Using
Maintenance
f N2-
Declare
Failure
The Ops Planner uses this
information to integrate the
maintenance procedure into the crew's
activity plan. This information will
be available to the entire flight
control team so they
maintenance activity
ISSA 7erations.
IN s. -'_
|Maintenance
_Criticality
1.1.2.1 -
Determine
if spare/
supplies &
tools/
support
..4-
can assess
impacts on
1.1.2.4 -
Determine
if
procedure,
primary
and
ancillary
SD&D
exists
Maintenance Task .from equipment T !
a _ystem are avaUble I[
v  O rator __ 1.1.2.3-II
I 1.1.1.3- Log the I I I Determine II
I Maintenance Task I 1.1.2.2- II levelof II
Determine II crewII
_1.1.2 systems II training II
configuration IL,---- ]1
1.1.1.2 - Identify the Type of
constraints& I
Maintenance Task: The level of resource [ _ [maintenance starts out at
Organizational but may progress to ava_ I
Intermediate level if the complete
RU is not stored On-Orbit. The
anomaly report is updated. _AI _1_ _
1.1.1.3 - Log the Maintenance Task:
After the type of maintenance has 1.1.3 /
been identified the task is logged in / oata 
so an execution time can be | for |
[ Scheduling[
| Maintenance I
Activity ,)
determined though the planning
system and then the anomaly report
is updated.
1.1.2 Maintenance Activity
Definition: The OSO compiles and
submits the data required for
scheduling the Maintenance Procedure
to the Operations Planning Officer
(Ops Planner) so it can be time-lined
on the Crew's activity plan. Data
includes: activity duration;
applicable procedures; Crew and
vehicle requirements; Vehicle/system
constraints; and any down-link/up-
link audio, video, or data
requirements.
1.1.2.1 - Determine if spare/supplies
& tools/support equipment are
available: This process involves how
maintenance operator interfaces with
the program office to obtain
maintenance spares/supplies and
tools/support equipment. This
process also establishes the interface
between the maintenance operator and
the inventory operator for launch and
landing manifesting of items required
for maintenance.
ioi
maintenance activities will be
performed.
The International Partners (IP) are an
1.1.1 exception to this maintenance process
flow in that they have analogous
organizations to make spares/supplies
and tools/support equipment
available and they are solely
responsible for the maintenance
performed on their own hardware.
1.1.2.2 - Determine systems
configuration constraints & resource
availability.
I.I.I
Yes - Request 1.1.2.1.2
and - Request
determine and
when the determine
tools/ when the
support spares/
equipment supplies
are are
available, available.
N26 -
1.1.3 Information on
the projected
availability of
tools/support
equipment and
spares/
supplies.
1.1.2.1.1 Request and determine
when the tools/support equipment are
available: The maintenance operator
contacts the inventory operator to
determine if the tools/support
equipment are available on-orbit. If
the tools/support equipment are not
available on-orbit, the maintenance
operator requests tools/support
equipment from the supply support
IPT/support equipment IPT. The
maintenance operator makes a
manifest request to the inventory
operator via CMILP. If the spares
/supplies, and tools/support
equipment are available then the pre-
1.1.2.2.1 -
Determine
Systems
Configuration
Constraints
1.1.2.2.2 -
Determine
Resource
Availability
1.1.3
Determine1.1.2.2.1 - Systems
Configuration Constraints: The
maintenance operator informs the
systems operators of the time to
perform the maintenance to determine
if the hardware can be down for that
period of time and coordinates the
systems configuration to perform
maintenance
1.1.2.2.2 Determine Resource
Availability: The maintenance
operator informs the operations
planners the resources required to do
the maintenance and confers with
systems operators & the operations
planners on the impact of performing
maintenance on resource availability.
1.1.2.3 - Determine level of crew
training: The maintenance operator
utilizes the Training Administration
System to determine the training
completed by the crew member.
Additionally the operator may
discuss with the instructor that
taught the crew member a specific
class or set of instruction to farther
determine the crew members
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proficiency at a given task. In
addition, a review of past mission
accomplishments/assignments and job
specialties may give insight into
determining the level of crew member
training.
1.1.2.3.1 - Develop and give onboard
training to crew: The ground
controllers/training personnel may
need to develop/administer on-orbit
training to crew members. The prime
method will be on-orbit on-the-job-
training (OJT). Another method uses
a lesson plan that allows the crew
member to be trained on-orbit by
studying a ground developed and up
linked lesson by performing the
related tasks in a non-
intrusive/destructive manner.
1.1.2.3.2 - Develop and give training
to crew on the ground: The crew
training is grouped into generic
training and task specific training.
The generic training is a set of
training that develops skills and
knowledge that can be used to
complete many similar type tasks;
however, specific training may be
necessary for training that is not
included in generic and is required
for proficiency. The ground training
will be given to the crew members
using training manuals, classroom
instruction, mock-ups, vendor
facilities, or other NASA Centers.
1.1.2.4 Determine if procedure,
primary and ancillary SD&D exists:
This process addresses the steps
taken by maintenance personnel, both
on- and off-console, prior to
scheduling and execution of a
maintenance activity, to assess
whether a previously developed and
approved maintenance procedure,
possibly from a previous increment,
is applicable and complete to address
the maintenance need present in the
increment in work.
If the previously developed and
approved maintenance procedure is
not adequate, this process outlines
the appropriate actions required to
perform additional research, to
update the procedure to bring it into
compliance with the demands of the
annotate the list of source and
present (in work) increment, and to
IC N27 -
Planning
onstraints
Conditions
1.1.1
;an & sho
wait until a
following
N5.6 -
Crew
Train-
ing
Infor-
mation
n-
.train- I_
ing re-I/
sources I /
_" --_"crewl"_d sef_ith_
1.1.2.3.1
- Develop
and give
onboard
training
to crew.
_tthe
onboard
going to perform
"_he Mainten
task?
on
traim
for this
Maintenance
task?
Yes
N28 -
Ground
training
resources
1.1.2.3.2
- Develop
and give
training
to crew
on the
ground.
N3O - Trained Crew availability formaintenance task.
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CN5.1 - Proceudre Information
1,1.1
procedureexist
for this task in
IODF for
incrementor
1.1.2.4.1
- Retrieve
a copy of
Procedure
for review
Does
any procedure
exist fora
milartask?# no
N31 -
Similar
Mainten
-ance
Proce-
dure
1.1.2.4.6
- Develop
Proce-
dure
procedure
apply to
currenttask
modifiedto apply • >I
currenttask?/
yes
1.1.2.4.3 - Evaluate
Sufficiency of SD&D to Support
Procedure Development and
Verification
1.1.2.4.4 - Modify Procedure
t 1.1.2.4.5- _ 1.1.2.4.2-
Perform Add to current
Procedure increment ODF
Verification (IODF)
N9 - Approved Maintenance Procedure
ancillary technical data used to
create the procedure and clarify its
contents.
1.1.2.4.I Retrieve a copy of
Procedure for review: This involves
obtaining a copy of the procedure as
it appears in the ODF, if it exists.
1.1.2.4.2 - Add to current increment
ODF (IODF): The procedure as
finally written is put into the ODF
for the upcoming increment. This is
a formal process controlled by the
Procedure Documentation, Authoring
and Control system.
1.1.2.4.3 - Evaluate Sufficiency of
Support Data & Documentation
(SD&D) to Support Procedure
Development and Verification: The
SD&D is judged for task sufficiency.
The purpose is to see if the activity
has enough supporting information
that most foreseeable problems or
questions can be readily handled. If
the SD&D is not sufficient, then an
effort is made to obtain the
"missing" information; either within
the CCC or from the program office
resources, i.e., information systems,
data bases, personal interfaces, data
that the original equipment
manufacturer may have, etc. The
SD&D may be used for support of the
verification of the procedure even
though it is not used directly in the
procedure.
1.1.2.4.3.1 Retrieve Additional
Support Data: If more Support Data
& Documentation is needed then that
information must be obtained. See
1.I.2.4.3 for sources.
1.1.2.4.3.2 - Link Additional
Support Data to Procedure: The
SD&D must be linked with pointers
to the activity and its procedure.
The data may be part of the procedure
or may be appended to the activity.
1.1.2.4.4 - Modify Procedure: The
procedure, if not appropriate for the
maintenance activity, is changed
until it is appropriate to the task.
This includes passing all verification
requirements.
1.1.2.4.5 - Perform Procedure
Verification: When the procedure has
been written or composed then the
procedure needs to be evaluated to
see if it will accomplish what is
intended. To do this the procedure
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D under goes a verification. Procedureverification may be accomplished byanalysis or by demonstration.
N5.3-_" _N23.3 -_
Ancillary [1 '
Ancillary Technical I,," 1,", 1.1.2.4.3.
Technical Data &--"q"" 2 - Link
Data &
Documen
-tation
(TD&D)
Require-
ment
Documen-
tation
(TD&D)
Know-
L ge
N5.2 -
N23.2 - Source
Source Data &
Data & Docum-
Docum- entation
entation (SD&D)
(SD&D) Know-
Require ledge
-ment
support data
available?
1.1.1 or 1.1.2.4.1
1.1.2.4.6.1 - Evaluate
Sufficiency of SD&D to Support
Procedure Development and
Verification per 1.1.2.4.3
t,Additional
Data to J_Preliminary Procedure
_1_, . J 1.1.2.4.6.5 -
Review ;ocedure
=
_ 1.1.2.4.3.1
- Retrieve
Additional
Support
Data
Implement/Incorporate
suggested modifications
I 1.1.2.4.6.3 - Perform Procedure [
i
Verification per 1.1.2.4.5 I
/
1.1.2.4.6.4 - Make I_r_
changes/updates to procedure
t
I 1.1.2.4.6.5- Review IProcedure
1.1.2.4.6.6 -
Implement/Incorporate
suggested modifications
I 1.1.2.4.6.7- Final Ireview of procedure
,I,
1.1.2.4.6.8 - Control
board final approval
2.4.4
I
esources Ready to I
upport Procedure I
Development and I
Verification J
1.1.2.4.6 Develop Procedure: If
there is not an existing procedure
that can be modified to meet the
maintenance activity's requirements,
then a procedure is developed from
scratch. The Consolidated
Maintenance, Inventory & Logistics
Planning (CMILP) system is the tool
used to pull together the information
for the procedure. The information
as completed in CMILP is then
passed to the Procedure
Documentation, Authoring and
Control system for the formal
procedure development, verification
and base lining under configuration
management.
1.1.2.4.6.1 Evaluate Sufficiency of
SD&D to Support Procedure
Development and Verification: See
1.1.2.4.3 - Evaluate Sufficiency of
SD&D to Support Procedure
Development and Verification 1.1.2.4.6.2 Draft Preliminary
Procedure: Develop Procedure;
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except for verification and base
lining within the configuration
system.
1.1.2.4.6.3 Perform Procedure
Verification: See 1.1.2.4.5
Perform Procedure Verification
1.1.2.4.6.4 - Make changes/updates
to procedure: The procedure is
modified based upon verification
activities to accomplish or better
accomplish the objectives of the
procedure.
1.1.2.4.6.5 - Review Procedure: The
review is conducted against the
Support Data & Documentation, the
Logistics Support Analysis Records
used in the production of the draft
preliminary procedure and the
standards for procedures.
1.1.2.4.6.6 Implement/Incorporate
suggested modifications: This is
modifying the procedure to include
the recommendations revealed within
the verification and configuration
base lining process.
1.1.2.4.6.7 Final review of
procedure: This is the completion of
the review and verification process
just before the procedure goes under
formal configuration management.
1.1.2.4.6.8 - Control board final
approval: The procedure becomes a
configuration controlled procedure at
this point. The process for
modification and verification may
need to be repeated if the final
control board approval is not forth
coming or minor changes required.
1.1.3 Maintenance Activity
Planning: This is providing to the
Operations Planner all of the
information needed to get the
maintenance activity a position of
the time line. The preceding process
should have produced all the needed
information such that this process is
straight forward. The internal
Operations Planner process is not
covered.
1.2 - Perform Pre Maintenance
Activities: This includes all of the
sub process to prepare for
maintenance. This is after the
planning of the maintenance and the
activities associated with getting to
the point of actually doing the
maintenance.
- Down-link
Video/Air to
Ground
Communication
1.2.1 -
Orchestrate
Systems
operators to
configure
system for
Maintenance
1.2.3 -
Configure
Console for
Maintenance
Support
1.2.2-
Monitor/As
sist Crew
Pre
Maintenance
Activities
Systems |
Configured]
for [
MaintenanceJ
 13-Orew' 
| "GO" for /
1.3 _Maintenance,)
1.2.1 - Orchestrate Console Operators
to Configure S ystem for
Maintenance: Prior to execution of a
repair action, the item/system being
maintained as well as other systems
may need to be reconfigured or
verified in a certain configuration.
1.2.2 Monitor/Assist Crew Pre
Maintenance Repair Activities: The
console conducting the on-orbit
maintenance will coordinate the
procedural details of task execution
of any pre-maintenance procedure
being executed by the crew.
1.2.3 - Configure Console for
Maintenance Support: OSO prepares
the console support tools to present
all information required by him or
her to support the crew and the rest
of the Flight Control Team while the
crew is performing maintenance.
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I i
1.2.3.1- I I
Configure HVoiceLoops
1.2.3.4 -
List Related
SD&D and
TD&D
Objects
N5.2 -
Source
Data &
Docu-
ment-
ation
(SD&D)
Know-
ledge
1.2.3.2- _ 1.2.3.3- I
Coordinate Retrieve
Video with Approved
(]D Procedure
1.2.3.6 -
Retrieve
Inventory
Data for
Failed
ORU and
Spare(s)
Next SD&D !TD&D Object 1.
no Will related
or TD&D object
be used for real-time
Ops support?
N5.3 -
Ancillary
Technical
Data &
Documen-
tation
(TO&D)
Knowledge
1.2.3.1
Prior to
activity,
Digital
requiredSD&D
TD&D objectalready
on console?
13o
1.2.3.5 - Retrieve I
SD&D or TD&D Object I
Configure Voice Loops:
the start of the maintenance
the OSO configures the
Voice Information System
keyset to contain all voice loops
required to maintain communications
with other MCC personnel supporting
the maintenance activity.
1.2.3.2 Coordinate Video with
Ground Systems Mission Controller
(GC): Prior to the start of the
maintenance activity, OSO will
ensure that GC will be providing air-
to-ground video during maintenance
operations.
1.2.3.1 - Retrieve Approved
Procedure: Prior to the start of the
maintenance activity, the Electronic
Documentation Processing (EDP)
server is used to retrieve a copy of
the approved maintenance procedure
for review and use as a checklist.
1.2.3.4 List Related SD&D and
TD&D Objects: For each procedure
used during a maintenance activity,
the list of reference information
which was used in the creation of the
procedure (the DSI-Data Source
Index) is reviewed, as well as a list
of any additional data (Ancillary
TD&D) that will illustrate, describe
in detail, or otherwise amplify the
operator's understanding of the
procedure methodology or the
hardware involved.
1.2.3.5 - Retrieve SD&D or TD&D
Object: Once the decision is made as
to what information is needed for
quick reference in support of
m ai nt enance executio n, the
Consolidated Maintenance, Inventory
and Logistics Planning system is
used to retrieve the Support Data and
Documentation and/or Technical Data
and Documentation for use on
console.
1.2.3.6 - Retrieve Inventory Data for
Failed ORU and Spare(s): TBD - The
mechanics of this has not been
established yet.
1.3 Perform Maintenance Activity:
The actual execution or conduct of
the maintenance activity takes place
within this process.
1.3.1 Monitor/Assist Crew
Maintenance Activities: The console
conducting the on-orbit maintenance
monitors/assists the crew during the
maintenance activity.
1.3.2 Collect Maintenance Data:
This process addresses the activities
involved with producing historical
documentation on the conduct of on-
orbit maintenance.
1.3.3 S upport Checkout
Maintenance Item/System: When the
maintenance item/system physical
interfaces have been re-established
and verified, the console conducting
the on-orbit maintenance requests
that a system checkout be performed
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by Ground
members.
Controllers/Crew
I_M 11 - System -_
onfigured for
aintenance j
N13 - Crew TM I
"GO" for .I 1 3 1 - 1.3.2 -
_1 Momtor/i L_aintenan,.,= " ". Collect
l Assist Mainten-
f N10- " | Crew anceData/
Console LI Mainten- • I
Configured "_ ance fN15--'_l
for / Activities Mainten II
Maintenance /I i -ance/I
_ SupportT/ [ 1 _ DataJI
4 Support
II Assistance14,Checkout of' "_
I[ to Crew J Maintenance ,L
System 1.4
.'1 ,
I Itemready|Mainten nce I ('N17- On-Orbit 1
_°rcheck°utJ |_ Maintenancecomplete
1.4 Perform Post Maintenance
Activities: This includes three
major processes and they are:
-1.4.1 Coordinate w/console
operators to configure system after
Item Repair
-1.4.2 Monitor/Assist Crew Post
Item Repair Activities
-1.4.3 OSO Performs Post Item
Repair Activities
1.4.1 Orchestrate console operators
to configure system after item repair:
This is any processes/actions of
coordinating with the console
operators and/or crew (through the
console operators) to get the
maintenance item/system back in the
operating configuration.
1.4.2 Monitor/Assist Crew Post
Maintenance Activities: The
maintenance console operator
monitors/assists the crew during the
post item repair activity.
1.4.3 Perform Post item repair
Activities: This is composed of four
, 1.4.1 -
Orchestrate
console
operators to
configure
system
after
Maintenance
1.4.2 -
Monitor/
Assist Crew
Post
Maintenance
Activities
N18 -
Recon-
figured, N19 -
Function Results of
-ing Crew Post
Item/ Maintenance
System Activities
f N21-
Done Console
Configured
for
Standby
Support j
major processes actions.
1.3
N15- _
Maintenance I
Data _J
r '_f 1t'
1.4.3 -
Performs
Post
Mainten-
ance
Activities
N20 -
Results of
Post J
Mainten-
ance
Activities
They are:
Review/Modify Procedure
as Executed Task
Assure all console and
is updated
Assure all data is
for external data base
-1.4.3.1
against the
-1.4.3.2
Office data
-1.4.3.3
available
update
1.4.3.1 - Review/Modify Procedure
against the as Executed Task:
Annotations are made of deviations
of the as-executed procedure from the
official procedure.
1.4.3.2 Assure all console and
Office data is updated: This is
updating any of the console products,
CMILP resident data or data at the
office location.
1.4.3.3 - Assure all data is available
for external MCC data base update:
This is updating any of the data that
flows to external MCC organizations.
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is an attempt to get
the reader to recognize that different
requirements that are surfacing and to be
proactive in achieving successful support of
these systems. This paper will identify areas
of concern and present some areas of focus
applicable to the development and support of
software intensive systems.
Introduction
Over the past few years, major weapon
systems and electronic systems have become
software intensive. A recognizable pattern
has occurred whereby system changes in
hardware are not as dramatic as those
encountered in the area of software. This is
very apparent for space systems which are
positioned, activated and repaired (limited) via
software programs. The following graph, not
drawn to scale, depicts a graphical
representation of the changing from hardware
intensive to software intensive systems found
today.
i
SYSTEM CHANGES FROM HARDWARE
INTENSIVE TO SOFTWARE INTENSIVE
200[ SOFnNARE _/
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Due to the rapid changes that occur in
today's High Technology systems, it is
imperative that individuals let loose of the
"Traditional ways" of doing business and
focus on what is needed to properly develop,
implement and support these High
Technology systems which are becoming
more prevalent in today's space systems.
Even though the goals of the "traditional"
processes and methodologies remain relatively
unchanged, the work effort expended on the
the Space Station program has resulted in
recognizing that issues and concerns have
surfaced that make it imperative to "re-
assess" the way that development and
support of software needs to be conducted
on current and future Space Programs.
Overview
In years past, the amount of software written
constituted a small percent of system
development• This effort focused upon
support of the system m terms of repair and
"checking the health" of the system. If the
software had errors in it, it didn't make a lot
of difference in terms of achieving the
mission. Software was written for diagnostic
testing purposes. Thi._ is not what is being
experienced in today's high technology arena.
Computer and its associated software
technology is undergoing rapid advancement.
The following drawing shows this lag in time
and technology between the design of the
system and the deployment of the system.
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This isnot thecaseanymore,computerandassociatedsoftwaretechnologyis advancingsorapidlythat:
Technologywhichiscurrentlyhere isoftenobsoletehere
Spacesystemsrepresentundertakingsof
massiveproportionsthat introduce
requirements,concernsandconstraints
resultinginnewapplicationsof existing
proceduresandmethodologies,including
support.Thisrealizationcameabouton the
currentSpaceStationprogram.
Forexample,launchingtheshuttlerequires
volumesuponvolumesof dataand
informationto assessthesafetyof the
proposelaunch,allof this isaccomplishedat
"Real Time" speed. If a major problem
develops, it is possible to scrub the launch
with scant seconds to spare.
With planned manned space systems you
don't have this type o= luxury, with software
controlling of having a major part in the
control of on-board systems, if a "software
failure" occurs there exists a large potential
probability of loss of life. It is not possible to
"cancel".
Reliability and maintainability are used in
software development; however, quite a few
individuals try to view software development
and associated analyses in the same light as
hardware.
When considering software design and
development and associated analyses for
assisting in the software Supportability for
space systems, it is imperative to recognize
that there is a separation between software
development and hardware development.
Due to the nature of the operational scenario,
not treating software as a separate entity will
not completely satisfy the determination of all
Supportability requirements for space
systems. The following table depicts the
differences in the difference between
maintainability and reliability for hardware and
software.
i!Iiii!!iiiiiii
iii ]iiiiiiii ii i i  iii ii iiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiii
probability that a system or product will
perform its intended function under
defined conditions at designated times for
specified operating periods.
probability of failure free operation of a
computer program in a specified
environment for a specified time
'i,i',iii iii iiiiiiiiiiii!il
inherent characteristic of a design or
installation that determines the ease,
economy, safety, and accuracy with
which maintenance actions
can be performed.
ease at which software can be
understood, corrected, adapted,
and/or enhanced.
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Definitions
1. Correctness - Extent to which a
program satisfies its specification and fulfills
the customer's mission objectives.
2. Efficiency - Amount of computing
resources and code required by a program to
perform its function.
3. Integrity - Extent to which access to
software or data by unauthorized persons can
be controlled.
4. Interooerabilitv- Effort required to
couple one system to another.
5. Mpintainability_ - Effort required to
locate and fix an error in a program.
6. Portability- Efl:ort required to transfer
the program from one platform and/or
software system environment to another.
7. Reliability - Extent to which a program
can be expected to perform its intended
function with required precision.
8. Reusability- Extent to which a
program (or part of a program) can be reused
in other applications.
9. Testability - Effort required to test a
program to ensure that it performs its
intended function.
10. Usability - Effort required to learn,
operate, prepare input and interpret output of
a program.
As with hardware development, there are a
number of areas that need to be addressed
when developing and assessing support
requirements over the life of a system. The
following chart delineates some of the
components of software development and
support that need to be considered to arrive
at effective software development and
support for high technology space systems.
SPACE SYSTEMS CONCERNS/ISSUES
SOFTWARE QUALITY
SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
SOFTWARE SAFETY
SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE
MAINTAINABILITY
HUMAN FACTORS
ROBOTICS
REPAIR SCENARIOS
What follows is a brief description of and
some guidelines for each of the
aforementioned areas.
Software Quality
Quality is ever present in everything that we
do. No one individual works in a total
vacuum, we all have people that rely upon
what we do. Software quality is applied
throughout the software development
process, it is not something we look at after
writing the code.
Software quality is comprised of the following
three (3) components:
1. Software requirements - These
represent the starting block from where
quality is measured. These make up the
program definition.
2. Standards - These tell you how to
plan and carry out the software development.
3. Inherent Requirements - These
represent "Just good, smart" developmental
practices that support definitive requirements.
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Software Reliability
This represents an important component of a
software program's overall quality, software
reliability can be measured directly and
estimated utilizing historical and
developmental data. Software reliability is
defined as the Probability of failure free
operation of a computer program in a
specified environment for a specified time.
Failure can be a difficult term to grasp,
failures can range from something easy to
correct or something catastrophic. Correction
of one failure can induce multiple errors (this
happens when one introduces a "Band-Aid"
fix to software.
Hardware-related reliability models are based
on failures due to wear whereas software
failures can be traced to design or
implementation problems. Software reliability
is usually measured in terms of:
# of Defects
K Lines of Code
Software Safety
Software safety needs to be looked at intently
when developing a computer program, this is
especially true when the software is used to
control safety critical processes. An
undetected fault in a computer-based control
or monitoring system could result in
significant human injury, loss of life, or
tremendous financial tragedy. When software
is used as part of the control system,
complexity can increase by a significant order
of magnitude.
Design faults induced by human error - which
can be uncovered and eliminated in hardware-
based conventional control - become much
more difficult to uncover when software is
used. Software safety is a quality assurance
activity that focuses on the identification and
assessment of potential hazards that may
impact software negatively and can cause an
entire system to fail. By identifying hazards
early in the software d_,velopment process,
software design features can be specified that
will either eliminate or control potential
hazards.
Hazards are identified and categorized by
criticality and risk. To be considered
effective, the software needs to be analyzed
in the context of the entire system. You do
not separate the software from the system.
should be noted that people are components
of the entire system.
It
I.E., a subtle user input error may be
magnified by a software fault to produce
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 113
control data that improperly positions a
robotic arm. If a set of external
environmental conditicns are met (and only if
they are met), the improper positioning of the
robotic arm could cause a disastrous failure.
Software Maintenance
There are four (4) activities that are that
comprise software maintenance:
1. Corrective Maintenance - includes the
diagnosis and correction of one or more
errors. This activity occurs because it is
unreasonable to assume that software testing
will uncover all latent errors in a large
software system. With systems operating in
orbit, it is extremely difficult to ascertain all
the problems that could occur prior to
becoming operational. Errors that occur in
orbit will need to be relayed back for proper
code correction. The possibility exists that
some errors would not be to be duplicated on
earth.
2. Adaptive Maintenance - modifying
software to properly interface with a changing
environment. This occurs due to the rapid
changes that occur within the computing
environment. New pieces of hardware, new
operating systems, peripheral equipment and
other system element= are frequently
upgraded or modified. When designing a
major space system, the current method is
modularity. Here it can be seen that
hardware and systems will develop over a
period of time and that changes could occur
rapidly in the beginning of system
development resulting in the probability of
unanticipated requirements and needs. These
would result in adapting the software to
coincide with system changes.
3. Perfective Maintenance - this accounts for
the majority of all effort expended on
software maintenance. This activity deals
with incorporating enhancements to the
software requested by users. I.E., new
capabilities or modifications to existing
functions.
4. Preventive Maintenance - this activity is
characterized by reverse engineering and re-
engineering techniques. This activity occurs
when software is changed to improve future
maintainability or reliability, or to provide a
better basis for future enhancements.
It should be noted that analogies between
software and hardware maintenance can be
misleading. As was pointed out previously,
software, unlike hardware, does not wear out;
therefore, any major activity associated with
hardware maintenance - replacement of worn
or broken parts -does not apply.
Adaptive and perfective maintenance tasks
are the same tasks applied during the
development phase of the software
engineering process. To adapt or perfect, you
need to determine new requirements,
redesign, generate code, and test existing
software. This is known as maintenance.
Problems:
Most problems associated with software
maintenance can be traced to deficiencies in
the way software was planned and
developed. The following delineates what
usually causes problems. These need to be
kept in mind when developing software:
1. It is difficult or imoossible to trace the
evolution of the software through many
versions or releases. Changes therefore need
to be adequately documented.
2. It is often difficult or impossible to trace
the process through which software was
created. To preclude this document the
process.
3. It is often extremely difficult to understand
"someone else's" program. The difficulty
increases as the number of elements in a
software configuration decreases. Maintain
the software configuration.
4. "Someone else" is often not around to
explain. Do not build a "single point failure"
into the software development.
5. Documentation doesn't exist or is
incomplete. It is important to recognize that
documentation is necessary but it must also
be understandable and consistent with source
code to be of any value.
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6. Most software is not designed for change.
Modifications to software are difficult and
error-prone.
Maintainability
Maintainability can be defined quantitatively
as the ease with which software can be
understood, corrected, adapted, and/or
enhanced. Maintainability is affected by
many factors. These factors include:
inadvertent carelessness in design, coding,
testing and poor software configuration. It is
easy to understand the need for
standardization of mehodology employed,
resources and approach. If software is
viewed as a system element that will
inevitably undergo change, the chances that
maintainable software will be produced are
likely to increase substantially.
Software Maintainability can be difficult to
quantify; however, it can be assessed
indirectly be considering attributes of the
maintenance activity. The following
delineates maintainability metrics that relate
to the effort expended during maintenance:
1. Problem recognition time
2. Administrative time
3. Maintenance tools collection time
4. Problem analysis time
5. Change specification time
6. Active correction (or modification) time
7. Local testing time
8. Global testing time
9. Maintenance review time
10. Total recovery time
At each level of software engineering,
maintainability should be considered.
Consideration should be given to: areas of
future enhancements and potential revisions;
software portability; system interfaces that
might impact software maintenance; data
design, architectural d3sign, procedural
design, and interface design are considered
for ease of modification and overall design
quality, review code to stress style and
internal documentation.
Maintenance Side Effects:
Design documentation and testing can help
eliminate error, but there is still the possibility
of encountering Maintenance side effects.
When viewing software maintenance, the
term "side effects" implies an error or other
undesirable behavior that occurs as a result of
modification. There are three (3) major
categories for side effects.
Coding Side Effects:
A simple change to a single statement can
sometimes have disastrous results. Change
invites error and error always to problems.
Communication to machines is accomplished
through programming language source code.
Although every code modification has the
potential for introducing errors, the following
set of changes tend to be more error-prone
than others:
1. A subprogram deleted or changed.
2. A statement label is deleted or modified.
3. an identifier is deleted or modified.
4. changes are made to improve execution
performance.
5. File open or close is modified.
6. Logical operators are modified.
7. design changes are translated into major
code changes.
8. Changes are made to logical tests of
boundary conditions.
Data Side effects:
During maintenance modifications are often
made to individual elements of a data
structure or to the structure itself. When data
change, the software design may no longer fit
the data and errors can occur. Data side
effects occur as a result of modifications
made to the software information structure.
The following changes in data frequently
result in side effects:
1. redefinition of global and local constants
2. redefinition of record or file formats
3. increase or decrease in the size of an array
or a higher-order data structure
4. modification to global data
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5. reinitialization of control flags or pointers
6. rearrangement of arguments for I/O or
subprograms
Data side effects can be limited by thorough
design documentation that describes data
structure and provides a cross reference that
associates data elements, records, files, and
other structures with software modules.
Documentation Side Effects:
Maintenance needs to focus on the entire
software configuration and not on source
code modification alone. Documentation side
effects occur when changes to source code
are not reflected in the design documentation
or user-oriented manuals. Whenever a
change to data flow, design architecture,
module procedure, or any other related
characteristic is made, supporting technical
documentation must ba updated. Side effects
occur in subsequent maintenance efforts
when an innocent pen_sal of technical
documents leads to an incorrect assessment
of software characteristics.
If modifications to the executable software
are not reflected in the user documentation,
side effects are guaranteed. Documentation
side effects can be reduced substantially if
the entire configuration is reviewed prior to
re-release of the software.
Maintenance is the last phase in the software
engineering process, occounting for the
majority of all dollars spent on computer
software. The result is that the amount of
effort and resources expended on software
maintenance is growing. Two methods can
assist in the maintenance process: (1).
Reverse engineering - this extracts design
information from prog=am source code when
no other documentation exists. (2). Re-
engineering - takes th=, information obtained
and restructures the program to achieve
higher quality and, therefore, better
maintainability in the future.
Human Factors
When developing systems it is extremely
important to note Individual skill level
differences, personality variations, and
behavioral distinctions among users of a
computer-based system.
An interface acceptable for one skill level
might be inadequate for another. The same
interface for two individual of the same skill
level but different personalities might be user
friendly for one but unfriendly to the other.
An interactive computer-based system rarely
enables a user to do something entirely new.
In most cases, the system is built to automate
(and thereby improve) certain tasks that were
previously performed by hand or some other
approach. This is very useful in hazardous
environments. I.E., external repair of a space
system can be accomplished by a technician
without venturing outside the craft using
computer controlled robotics Ideally, the new
technology enables a user to perform tasks
better, faster, more efficiently, more
accurately, more safely, or less expensively.
Even with interactive computer-based
systems, the following tasks are almost
always performed:
Communication tasks - activities that
enable information to be transferred from one
individual to another.
Dialog tasks - activities that enable the
user to direct and control interaction with the
computer-based system.
Cognitive tasks - activities that are
performed once information has been
obtained; activities associated with the
function of the system.
Control tasks - activities that allow the
user to control information and cognition and
order process through which other generic
tasks occur.
Interfaces can range from simple menus to
icons, windows, touch screens, and pointing
devices.
Simple menus provide the user with an overall
context and is less error prone that typing
command lines. If comprised of numerous
layers, simple menus (an be tedious to use
since the user needs to transverse through
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the different layers to achieve the goal. It is
easy to see that this approach is not efficient
for running space systems where time is a
critical factor.
With sophisticated hardware being developed,
it is imperative that better interfaces be
utilized. To support today's high technology
systems, the following improvements in
interfaces have evolved:
1. Different types of information can be
displayed simultaneou31y, enabling the user to
switch context without losing visual
connection with other work. Windows
enables the user to perform many
communication and ccgnitive tasks efficiently.
2. Many different interactive tasks are
available through pull-down menu schemes.
These menus allow users to perform control
and dialog tasks in a facile manner.
3. Use of graphical icons, pull-down menus,
buttons, and scrolling techniques reduce the
amount of typing. This can increase the
interaction efficiency.
Multitasking, window-oriented, point and pick
interfaces make the human computer interface
more friendly, faster and easier only if careful
design of the interface is conducted.
Variability - this refers to the deviation
from average response time. Varying the
response time with wide margins can cause
stress on the part of the user. There is
enough stress being in orbit without adding
more. A consistent response time is
beneficial for the user.
2. Help Facility - Interactive systems require
some sort of on-line help that enable the user
to get a question answered or resolve a
problem without leaving the interface.
The following represent design issues when
considering a help facility:
a. Will help be available for all system
functions and at all times during system
interaction?
b. How will the user request help?
(Help menu, special function key, HELP
command).
c. How will the help be represented?
(Separate window, re_erence to a printed
document, one or :wo line suggestion
produced in a fixed screen).
d. How will the user return to normal
interaction? (Return button displayed on the
screen, function key, or control sequence)
Design Issues
During the design of a user interface, four
common design issues almost always surface:
System response timE, user help facilities,
error information handling, and command
labeling.
1. System response time - this is measured
from the point at which the user performs
some control action until the software
responds with the desired output or action.
Response time possesses two very important
variables: length and variability.
Length - this represents the length of
time associated with a response. Too short a
response time can cause the user to rush and
possibly make mistakes. Too long a response
is not efficient.
e. How will the help information be
structured? (Flat structure where all
information is accessed through a keyword,
layered hierarchy of information - provides
increasing detail as the user proceeds into the
structure, hypertext).
3. Error Messages - these are delivered to the
user of interactive systems that something
has gone awry. If poorly designed/displayed,
error messages impart useless or misleading
information and serve only to increase user
frustration. Most users have seen error
messages that present a failure type and a
code [i.e., System Failure -- 23S]. This
indicates a failure has occurred but not what
it is or even where to look. Every error
message or warning should have the
following characteristics:
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The message should describe the
problem in jargon that the user can
understand.
The message ,,hould provide
constructive advice for recovering from the
error.
The message should indicate any
negative consequences of the error so that
the user can check to ensure that they have
not occurred (or correct them if they have).
The message should be accompanied
by an audible or visual cue. This can be a
beep or a momentary flash of a identified
"error color".
The message should be
nonjudgmental. Do not place blame on the
user.
Interface Design Guidelines:
There are three categories of human computer
interface design guidelines - general
interaction, information display, and data
input.
General Interaction - this area crosses into
information display, data entry, and overall
system control. The following should be
considered:
Be consistent - use a consistent
format for menu selection, command input,
data display, and other functions that occur.
Offer meaningful feedback - provide
the user with visual and auditory feedback to
ensure that two-way communication
(between user and interface) is established.
Ask for verification for any non-trivial
destructive action - if the user requests the
deletion of a file, indicates that substantial
information is to be overwritten, or asks for
termination of a program, an "Are you sure
...?" message needs to appear.
Permit easy reversal of most actions.
Reduce the amount of information
that must be memorized in between actions -
the user should not be expected to remember
a list of items so that they can be reused in a
subsequent function. Memory load should be
minimized.
Seek efficiency in dialogue, motion,
and thought - Keystrokes should be
minimized, distance a mouse travels between
picks needs to be considered, the user should
never be placed in a situation where they
need to ask "What does this mean?".
Forgive mistakes - the system should
protect itself from use; errors that might
cause it to fail.
Categorize acti#ities by function and
organize screen geography accordingly - One
key benefit of a pull-town menu is the ability
to organize commands by type.
Provide help facilities that are context-
sensitive.
Use simple action verbs or short verb
phrases to name commands - a lengthy
command name is mo,e difficult to recognize
and recall. It can take up space on a menu
list.
Information Display:
Information is displayed in many different
ways - with text, pictures, and sound; by
placement, motion, and size, using color,
resolution; and even L,:/ omission. Information
needs to satisfy the needs of the user;
therefore, it can not be incomplete,
ambiguous, or unintelligible. The following
guidelines focus on information display:
Display only that information that is
relevant to the current context - the user
should not have to wade through extraneous
data, menus, and graphics to obtain
information relevant to a specific system
function.
Don't bury the user with data - use a
presentation format that enables rapid
assimilation of information. Graphs or charts
should replace voluminous tables.
Use consistent labels, standard
abbreviations, and predictable colors - the
118 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
meaning of a display should be obvious
without reference to some outside source of
information.
Allow the user to maintain visual
context - If graphs are, scaled up and down,
the original image needs to be displayed
constantly so that the user understands the
relative location of the portion of the image
currently being viewed.
Produce meaningful error messages.
Use windows to compartmentalize
different types of information.
Consider the _vailable geography of
the display screen and use it efficiently.
Data Input:
Much of the user's time is spent on providing
system input. This can be accomplished by
means of a keyboard, mouse, digitizing tablet,
and even voice recognition. The following
guidelines focus on d_ta input:
Minimize the number of input actions
required by the user - reduce the amount of
typing required by the user. This can be
accomplished by using a mouse to select from
predefined sets of input; using a "Sliding
scale" to specify input data across a range of
values; using "macros" that enable a single
keystroke to be transformed into a more
complex collection of input data.
Maintain consistency between
information display and data input - the visual
characteristics of the display (e.g. text, color,
size, placement) should be carried over to the
input domain.
Allow the user to customize input - an
expert user might decide to create custom
commands or dispense with some types of
warning message and action verification.
Interaction should be flexible but also
tuned to the user's preferred mode of input.
Deactivate commands that are
inappropriate in the co,}text of current actions
- this protects the user from attempting some
action that could result in an error.
let the user control the interactive
flow - the user should be able to jump
unnecessary actions, change the order of
required actions (where possible) and recover
from error conditions without existing from
the program.
Provide help to assist with all input
actions.
_Repair _cenarios
When analyzing spam_ systems some of their
peculiarities surface, o me are is that of their
evolving "repair scenarios". The following
chart depicts the growth trend with regard to
who or what accomplishes the repair:
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Repairs currently being performed by human
technicians will be transferred to robotics and
eventually we will see a large degree of
software "self-repair" being accomplished
(which is facilitated by reusable software and
modularity). This allows on-board personnel
to focus their efforts on the primary mission
of the space system.
Robotic Tasks
Due to the ever present life threatening
environment outside the station, robotic tasks
are to be used where practical and cost
effective. Markings and lights need to be
provided to support computer vision and other
vision requirements. The plan is for evolving
space station design incorporating increased
utilization of autonomous Robotic devices.
The ultimate goal is for all EVA tasks to be
performed by Robots, until that time, humans
need to journey outside the space craft into
probably the most dangerous and unfriendly
environment known to man and assist Robots
in performing necessary tasks.. This means
that space systems will evolve into software
intensive systems.
Bottom Line
It seems apparent that software developers
need to make more u_e of "reusable" code.
This represents code that is written once and
possesses multiple uses. As more space
systems are developed, code written and
debugged for one system can be "re-used" on
other systems. This demonstrates the need
for standardization and modularity of
software. Standardization of parts (hardware
application) has been in effect for a number of
years.
Also, there needs to be more work done in
the area of artificial intelligence in terms of
software being able to maintain and correct
itself. This can be seen if one understands
that space system software is embedded in
the control/monitoring subsystems for orbit-
sustaining critical mec_anical and electronic
systems.
The growth trend for the repair scenario on
space systems is more toward robots and
self-repairing software. The space station's
purpose if for materials research and life
sciences research. It is not the intent of on-
board personnel to deviate from this and
spend long hours on effecting repairs.
Therefore, design and Supportability
requirements identification via LSA need to
keep pace with the rapidly changing advances
in technology.
Space systems exist in a very hostile
environment where information flow is very
important and time critical. These software
systems are real-time systems that must
integrate hardware, software, humans and
database elements. Real-time systems
generate some action in response to external
events. To accomplish this, they perform
high speed data acquisition and control under
severe time and reliability constraints.
Although all software must be reliable, real-
time systems (especially those in space
systems) make special demands on reliability,
restart capability and fault-recovery. Real-
time systems process a continuous stream of
incoming data. During the designing of the
system, it is imperative that data will not be
missed.
Real-time systems must take into account the
usual software engineering factors (i.e.
reliability, maintainability, human factors, etc.)
but also they need to contain restart
capability, fault recovGry mechanisms and
have built-in redundancy to ensure back-up.
This realization is just _tarting to surface on
the Space Station program and will continue
to do so on other space programs.
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Abstract
ELECTRONIC VERIFICATION AT THE
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
T. W. Johnson
NASA
Kennedy Space Center, Florida
This document reviews some current
applications of Electronic Verification and the benefits
such applications are providing the Kennedy Space
Center (KSC). It also previews some new
technologies, including statistics regarding
performance and possible utilization of the technology.
Introduction
As we enter into the 21st century we are
finding more and more challenges and projects with
even higher goals and standards. We are also finding
lower budgets and a need for new levels of efficiency
and innovation. Fortunately, the coming century
brings with it a wealth of new ideas, perspectives, and
technology. Electronic Verification and the Automatic
Identification Industry are just part of this new era.
With a little planning and education we will find
ourselves ready to take full advantage of what the
future has to offer.
Barcode applications at KSC
The benefits of an Electronic Verification
(EV) system can be discussed, savings can be
calculated, and all the estimates, charts, proposals, and
comparisons can be done, but if the ideas are not put
into practice it doesn't mean anything. The Kennedy
Space Center has taken steps toward using some of this
available technology. Barcodes have found their way
into many different areas, from hardware and software
to boxes, blankets, and badges. Any area that requires
accurate tracking and accountability are looking at
putting EV systems in place if possible. The world of
Mission Kits is particularly interested in implementing
an EV system for hardware tracking. Mission Kits are
sets of hardware that are required for" shuttle missions.
Some are mission specific while others are considered
standard equipment. There are approximately 110
different Mission Kits used throughout the space
program for various applications. The largest of these
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kits, the V073 kits, contains over 10,000 individual
parts. Currently, efforts are being made to finish a
large barcoding project for the V073, V7XX, and
V8XX kits. Once completed, the barcode tracking
system will provide greater visibility and status of
Mission Kits within the processing flow. Supporting
hardware and software are in place and the actual
application of barcode labels is in its final stages with
other applications scheduled.
Another benefit that is derived from the use of
the barcoding system can be seen during assembly of
the Mission Kits in the world of payload integration.
Before EV was introduced to the warehouse, the
procedure was filled with bottlenecks and opportunities
for error. First, a list of required parts would be
received at the warehouse, marked for kitting. A
physical retrieval of all the parts listed was required as
well as documentation of the hardware for
accountability purposes. Once a part was removed
from the shelf it had to be removed from the database
as being available. Therefore, after retrieval of the
hardware, the computer was updated via keyboard
entry. Mistakes were made during kitting because of
copy errors, illegible handwriting, misplaced parts, or
in the entry of information into the computer. A study
performed by RI estimated that over 10,000 errors per
month could have been attributed to keystroke errors
alone, during data entry in the Orbiter Processing
Facilities (OPF). And since one list required several
people across multiple shifts to complete, the
possibility for errors was increased. With a barcode
system a portable scanning unit can now be taken into
the warehouse to scan in the barcode of the part
retrieved. This eliminates the possibility of a copy
error or the recording of an inappropriate number
(OCN number for example). After the collection is
complete the information on the portable scanner can
then be downloaded into the computer, again removing
the possibility for human error. Plus, the system can
compare the downloaded information to the kit
requirements and display any discrepancies. This
serves as another safeguard to help eliminate errors,
reduce paper processing, and increase the accuracy of
inventory data. And with increased accuracy comes
monetary benefits. One survey estimated that
implementing barcodes into the world of payload
12]_
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integration would generate over $91,000 per year in
recurring savings.
Unconventional barcoding
EV systems are not limited to 'hardware'
tracking applications. Using a barcode system on
paperwork can also increase productivity and reduce
errors. An Automatic Identification system is being
used in the Test Assembly and Inspection Record
stations (TAIR) in the Orbiter Processing Facilities.
The TAIR stations keep track of work that is being
done according to Work Authorization Documents or
WADs. WADs can be prepared for tile work, orbiter
work, or even ground support equipment work. Each
time a tasks is completed, the WAD must be logged in
as finished and then prepared for the QDC or Quality
Data Center to be archived. Depending on the position
of the orbiter in the flow, the TAIR station can receive
as many as thirty or forty documents a day to close out.
Previously, this has been done by manually reading
through the stack of documents, recording the WAD
number, and alphabetizing the list according to system.
At the end of the day this was a two hour job that
nobody wanted. By assigning each WAD a barcode
that would pull up all the information associated with
that document and printing a cover page, much of this
hassle was avoided. To scan in forty documents with a
barcode wand takes about five minutes, and the
computer automatically sorts the numbers and prints
out a listing. When QDC picks up the documents they
can simply scan the barcodes to verify the list with a
portable scanner and then download that information
into their computer record system back at the office.
This saves time, eliminates errors, and decreases the
number of times the information has to be manually
entered into the computer.
Barcodes are also being used in the TAIR
stations to replace the manual entry of repetitive
information. When creating the WAD cover sheet,
information must be entered to identify the type of
work, location, and date, as well as other information.
Barcodes are being used instead of the keyboard to
shorten processing time and again reduce human
errors. For instance, many of the WADs that go
through a TAIR station will have an identification code
that tells which OPF Bay the work is being done in and
which orbiter and flight number is receiving the work.
So a sheet of barcodes has been created that allows the
user to simply scan a barcode in place of typing the
information. The information contained in the
barcode is translated directly into ASCII, (just as it is
from the keyboard), f'dls in appropriate fields, and
advances the cursor to the next line requiring input.
Another possible use for barcodes in the TAIR
station is the charge out record. Efforts are being made
to replace the handwritten sign out sheet with an EV
system that will electronically assign responsibility to
the technician picking up the WAD. Not only will this
provide a more legible record it will also track the time
spent in each phase of the repair. This should aid in
streamlining work procedures and reducing
bottlenecks.
Investigating new technolot_v
The current technology used at KSC has many
applications that are being taken advantage of, and
there are other possibilities that make the barcode
system a tool that will provide benefits well into the
future. There are, however, some limitations to the
barcode symbology. And while many of these
limitations can be reduced or eliminated through the
computer programming and software, there is still
room for improvement. That is where the next
generation of EV will take over. This new technology
is two dimensional Compressed Symbology or CS. CS
simply expands on the idea of the barcode. It still uses
a machine readable code and corresponding software to
process the received data, but it takes advantage of new
ideas and advancements in technology.
Vericodes are currently the most prominent
form of two dimensional symbols available. Two
dimensional coding systems were first introduced in
the form of tiered or layered barcodes by INTERMEC
back in 1987, called Code 49. Other, similar coding
systems soon followed. These included Code-a-Block,
PDF 417, and 16K. While these forerunners of two
dimensional technology were important to the
development of the basic foundation, Vericodes are
currently at the peak of this evolution.
Vericodes were created by Veritec, a
California based company that was started when
Robert Anselmo patented his ideas for the system in
May of 1990. A Vericode is described as a symbol that
includes a square array of data cells surrounded by a
border of orientation and timing cells. Information
related to the encoded data is contained within the
square, while timing and orientation information about
the actual symbol, is found along on the edges of the
square.
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Sample Vericode (Average size)
Vericodes use Charge Coupled Devices (CCD) to scan
and decode the symbols. The CCD's look more like a
high resolution camera, but the principle behind the
technology is similar to that used on barcodes,
specifically reflection scanning.
It is the versatility of the Vericode that brings
it to the cutting edge of innovation. It's capacity is
greater, it's durability is better, its accuracy is
improved and the Vericode is an actual compressed
symbology. It uses mathematical algorithms to convert
streams of data into coded patterns. Therefore, there is
not the one-to-one mapping of character to symbol that
is found with conventional barcodes. This allows for a
greater amount of information to be stored in the same
amount of space. In fact, the capacity of the Vericode
is nearing one hundred times that of a barcode. The
average Vericode is 3/8 inch square and contains
anywhere from 20 to 50 characters. In comparison the
average barcode is approximately 3/8 X 1 inch and
contains 5 to 9 characters. Microvericodes have also
been developed that are as small as four microns
(4/10,000 of a meter), which can be decoded using a
microscope. Using ultra high density data
compression these symbols can still contain up to 16
characters.
Another advantage of Vericodes is their
durability. This is not only a reflection of the various
marking methods developed for the symbol, but also an
indication of the error checking and redundancy built
into the system. Vericodes can be damaged or missing
up to 50% of the symbol, and through the use of the
algorithms and built in redundancy, still recover the
encoded data.
Speed and accuracy are not lost due to this
improvement in size and capacity. The accuracy of the
system can be set to the limits desired by the user.
Currently the error rate is set arbitrarily at one per
seven million. During lab tests, a Vericode system
successfully decoded four million symbols without
error. This test was repeated with similar results. This
would correspond to approximately 635 million bits of
data. The speed of this process can be set to decode up
to 60 symbols per second.
Another advantage of the Vericode is that it
can be decoded regardless of it's orientation. The outer
edge of the square contains information that provide
the capability for 360 degree readability. This
information could also be used to determine the
orientation of the part the Vericode labels. Such a
property could have applications in the manufacturing
and assembly industry where alignment and orientation
are critical.
With the variety of advantages that are
available through the use of compressed symbology,
the limits are only that of finding beneficial
applications and utilization of this technology.
And while there are many benefits to the
Vericode system, there are also drawbacks which must
be examined before barcodes are completely
abandoned. One of which is that there are real-time
considerations when dealing with a new system. The
idea to implement the barcode system began back in
1982 and has yet to achieve completion. The ability to
change things overnight does not occur just because of
a breakthrough in technology. The incorporation of
the Vericode will take time even if it is deemed
necessary and extremely beneficial. Another
consideration is that of compatibility. Currently, the
barcode systems do not have the capability to read
Vericodes, and it would be hard to phase in a Vericode
system. Money is of course another factor not to be
overlooked. Cutting edge technology is never
inexpensive, especially when the project is as far
reaching as that of the space industry. The availability
of the product is limited solely to Veritec and that
would be a single point of failure in the system.
Conclusion
Electronic Verification does have potential
and the space industry needs to take full advantage of
the opportunities available with it, but we must also be
reasonable in our approach. Electronic Verification as
a whole has provided us with many benefits and
savings as well as the ability to see new possibilities.
We need to continue to work toward finishing the
project started 14 years ago, but not dismiss upcoming
ideas because of complications. We need to continue
to consider new applications for the current resources
and think of ways to incorporate new technology into
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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both prevailing and upcoming systems. As long as we
continue to think, apply, and strive for efficiency, we
will continue to grow, improve, and succeed.
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Abstract
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) on site and leased warehouses contain thousands of items of Ground Support
Equipment (GSE) and flight hardware including spacecraft, scaffolding, computer racks, stands, holding fixtures, test
equipment, spares, etc. The control of these warehouses, and the management, accountability, and control of the
items within them, is accomplished by the Logistics Management Division, Code 230. To facilitate this management
and tracking effort, the Logistics and Transportation Management Branch, Code 234, is developing a system to provide
warehouse personnel, property owners, and managers with storage and inventory information. This paper will
describe that PC-based system and address how it will improve GSFC warehouse and storage management.
Introduction
At any given time there may be a dozen or so space
projects in various stages of development at NASA's
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) in Greenbelt,
Maryland. COBE, EUVE, BBXRT, HST, GEOTAIL,
GGS, GOES, SPARTAN, SHOOT, EOS, GRO, TRMM,
XTE, are just a sampling of the acronyms and
abbreviations that make up the alphabet soup of project
names at GSFC. Each of these projects has varying
amounts of space flight hardware, flight support
equipment, and ground support equipment that is used
for fabrication, manufacture, assembly, test &
integration, launch support., or operations. When this
equipment is not in use, it must be stored. The HST
project alone requires approximately 22,000 square
feet of storage space for GSE and hardware. After the
launch of a project, equipment is placed into storage for
a myriad of reasons. These include reuse on the same
project, reutilization by another project, or use for a
servicing or repair effort. The equipment may also be
declared excess to be screened for utilization by other
agencies. In order to effectively manage a storage
program, records must be maintained that can, as a
minimum, identify the item and its location in the
warehouse. Additional information such as the owner,
the owner's phone number, physical dimensions of the
equipment, when it was placed into storage, expected
duration of storage term, special environmental and/or
handling requirements, etc., is also needed by the
warehouse manager. As the quantity and complexity
of information increases, it becomes readily apparent
that an automated system for managing and
manipulating the data and preparing reports becomes
an asset, if not a necessity. To more effectively
manage the warehouses and the assets they contain,
Iogisticians of the Logistics Management Division/Code
234, sought data base management system that could
be adapted to their needs. When an existing system
could not be readily identified, they set out to develop
their own. As a result, SiMS has been developed and
is now undergoing system test and refinement at
GSFC.
General Requirements
Code 234 desired that the system be inexpensive to
develop due to the budget constraints that affect most
government agencies. They also wanted a PC-based
system to preclude the need for exotic or expensive
special-purpose hardware or software. The GSFC
Local Area Network (LAN) was to be used to provide
multiple workstation access to the system for
simultaneous use from both contiguous and remote
locations. Although the system was to be developed
and used primarily by Code 234, it would have the
*"Copyright ©1994 by tile American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. No copyright is asserted in the United States under Title 17,
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potential to be used by the flight projects and other
organizations for inventory control of their hardware.
To ease the burden of the user, the ability to expand the
system to use a full-feature bar code capability was
required. Also, the software had to be fully expandable
to meet future requirements such as being able to
interface with optical disk storage and imaging. Imaging
was desired to enable users to have a ready display of
the items in storage especially for identifying potential
for utilization by more than one project. It was envisioned
that this data base system was to be the first of a series
of applications to ease the burden of inventory control
at GSFC for both capital and non-capital equipment.
Inventory Control
SIMS was developed to be a menu-driven inventory
control package that could provide rapid information on
the status of inventories, the location of items, and a
history of 2transactions. Controls within the software
allow the users to perform inventory tracking and
control by project, transfers, and inventory maintenance.
Code 234 dictated the following functions as necessary
to SIMS:
Project Equipment Receipt
Transfer
Inventory/Location Maintenance
Equipment History
Tables
Reports and Forms
Batch Updates with Verification
Forms Generation
File Import/Export Capability
Bar Code Scanning
Graphic Imaging
Interface with other property control
systems (NEMS, NPDMS)
Equipment Receipt
The Equipment Receipt function is derived from a
listing or importable database of equipment to be
entered into the inventory. This listing is provided by
projects or organizations which own the equipment.
The listing is used to process and verify receipts and to
forecast space requirements for utilization and planning.
SIMS has the capability to check records for duplication
during manual entry or import of data from a list. Once
the item has been entered into the system, the system
automatically flags available storage locations that fit
the parameters and criteria entered into the record.
When the record is completed and saved, the item
quantities are entered as received and automatically
added to the update buffer for appending to the main
inventory file.
Transfers
The Transfer File contains records with information on
the movement of equipment for the following conditions:
From one GSFC location to another
From one bin to another
From container to clean room and/or back into
storage
If an item is removed from the inventory because it has
been excessed, incorporated into a product, returned
to the supplier/producer, or is withdrawn from inventory
for any other reason.
The Transfer File provides most of the data for a History
File and it includes all fields necessary to indicate a new
location, transfer date, transfer document, new
responsible party, etc., and must automatically append
to the History File whenever a transfer is entered.
When equipment ownership changes, SIMS will globally
replace organization code or other unique fields related
to ownership. SIMS will also globally replace locations
for any set of items.
Inventory/Location Maintenance
The Inventory Maintenance File provides access to
defined tracking tools and includes the following specific
capabilities:
Project Inventory by Project - The historical file of
active/closed projects accessed through a pop up
screen or by manually entering the project number.
Current Inventory Status - Provides the current
inventory by project and/or location, with automatic
flags if schedule review action is required.
Space Utilization and Projections- Provides graphic
and tabular records of storage space utilization,
and provides forecasts of space needs derived
from project requirements defined in the Project
Equipment Receipt records.
Periodic, regular Transaction Reports by Project
and/or Location - Provides the basis for periodic
activity reporting.
SIMS includes an Interactive Locator System to assist
in the warehousing and management of inventory by
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selecting and displaying tabular listings of available
storage locations. The storage location dimensions for
each storage facility and grid locations within the storage
facility are entered into the system. Information such
as physical description (e.g., 2rid tier or drawer #6) and
load limits of bin/storage areas are also entered into the
system. Available bins/storage areas are selected
against information entered into the database for
individual inventory items. In usage, for example, the
weight and dimensions of an inventory item would be
entered along with relevant environmental requirements
such as temperature, humidity, etc., The system would
search all available storage locations and bins, and list
those locations that match the required parameters. In
addition, using data entered into the database for
inventory items, the system will generate space
utilization and forecasting reports for use in managing
existing warehouse space and planning for future
storage needs. NASA-defined tracking requirements
are built into the system design. Any field orcombination
of fields in the database can be queried for information
on the inventory and its movement. This includes
capability for t racking/verification, down to and including
the level of detail necessary for the verification that
equipment has been loaded onto a vehicle for delivery,
and (as a next step) then delivered. The system is
capable of matches and near matches, sorting in order
by closest match, and indicating where exact matches
do not occur.
Equipment History
The software maintains a historical record of all record
changes for each item of equipment. This history is
displayable on request either as a movable window
over the record display or as a full-screen display which
may be scrolled as necessary. An item report can also
be formatted providing the main record information of
a particular item and its chronological history. The
history files are a permanent part of the record and are
updated automatically whenever the data base is
updated and the update buffer is cleared. Data can be
entered directly into the history database and edited
without accessing the property record. History data
can be entered in random order and will always be
displayed in chronological order.
Tables
Project Table - Provides information on GSFC
projects including data such as project name,
location, responsible person, phone number,
inventory locations, and assigned project assembly
location.
Manufacturer Table- Contains Manufacturer Codes
(CAGE) as referenced in Defense Logistics Agency
Cataloging Handbook.
Unit of Measure Table - Contains unit of measure
information expressed as a two-character
alphabetic code that denotes a recognizable
physical measurement (length, weight, volume) or
count of an item ( foot, gallon, pound, each).
Environmental Code Table - Contains specific
conditions (i.e., temperature, humidity, purge,
cleanliness, packaging, inspection) under which
an item is handled, stored, or maintained.
Hazard Class Table - Contains hazard related
categories based on NASA requirements.
Storage Location - Contains information related to
NASA utilized storage sites.
Status - Contains NASA developed and approved
status codes and descriptors.
Condition - Contains condition codes and
descriptors.
Transfer Types - Contains codes and descriptors
for type of transfer categories (i.e., Shipped to
another location, moved to another bin, final
disposition, declared excess, etc.)
Document Type - Contains information on
authorizing document types.
Address Table - Shipping address.
Security Table - List of authorized signature/
approval codes. This table is accessible to users
and is maintained bythe GSFC Designated System
Supervisor.
Tables are available for access through pop-ups and
windows to provide rapid Iockup capability for the
following database fields:
Location Table - Relates location bar codes to
clean rooms/containers/warehouses/bins.
SIMS software accommodates at least 20 additional
user-defined tables without software modification. SIMS
provides for rapid marking of data ranges within tables
allowing direct entry into the database utilizing the
mouse.
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Reports and Forms
SIMS has a very flexible report generation capability,
reporting to screen, disk, or to choices of at least ten
common laser and matrix printers. Reports include
inventory status, stock location, monthly operations
reports, etc.,and has a menu-driven capability to
produce ad hoc reports forany of the records. Searches
can be accomplished using variables such as project
code, receipt or issue dates, location, etc., and report
to screen, disk, or printer. The system can also
generate forms. The forms which have been scanned
are available on screen for the operator to fill out and
print. Logistics forms such as shipping documents,
storage requests, etc. can be produced automatically,
retrieving applicable fields from the database records.
The security levels within SIMS allow users to
electronically approve their requests, thus eliminating
the need to send the form to the Storage Manager and
cause undue delays in processing requests. SIMS can
also produce property labels including bar codes for
property identification and control.
Summary
Initial SIMS development is completed, and the system
is presently undergoing test, evaluation and debugging
by Code 230 Logistics Management Division personnel
at GSFC. A data entry clerk has transferred existing
storage data into the system and has completed the
on-screen forms for new storage requests. SIMS users
will have Local Area Network (LAN) access to SIMS,
and the requirement for hard copy paperwork will be
eliminated. It is anticipated that SIMS will greatly
facilitate the storage operations and inventory control
of project hardware and equipment at GSFC. The
inherent flexibility of the system will enable the
government to expand its capabilities as the need
demands.
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Our Desert Storm experience in the tactical utility of
DoD space vehicles demonstrated that DoD's
investment in space technology can provide a
significant military advantage during times of crisis
and war. The satellites what gave us such marvelous
intelligence in locating, tracking, and enabling the
successful attack of key targets resulted in a
spectacular military success. However, without an on-
orbit servicing capability, the fuel consumed to
maneuver these satellites into position over the
battlefield shortened their useful life by as much as
two years. During the 1970's and 1980's, the Air
Force aggressively pursued an or-orbit support
capability to support and maintain it's space-based
assets. However, in the early 1990's, budgetary and
political priorities canceled the programs that would
have made this a reality. Realizing that a future
decision may be made to reinvestigate on-orbit
support, the United States Space Command
(USSPACECOM) sponsored a study to document
efforts undertaken by the Air Force during the 1970's
and 1980's in developing strategies and actions to
achieve certain tenets of on-orbit support. The study
represents an attempt to gather, review, summarize,
and archive the most important research performed
during this period. It will serve as a historical
perspective upon which to base future research and
development activities. This paper presents an
overview of that study. '
INTRODUCTION
From the 1960's through the 1980's, on-orbit support
concepts and analytical tools were developed by
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and DoD to access and evaluate the potential
for on-orbit servicing of space systems. Many studies
were performed to assess the technical feasibility and
=i. This paper is declared a work of the U.S.
Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States."
cost effectiveness of accomplishing satellite
maintenance and servicing operations in space.
In general, these studies concluded that on-orbit
maintenance and servicing is technically feasible and
that no technology breakthroughs are required.
Depending on constellation size, location, and on-
orbit support concept utilized in the analysis, these
studies demonstrated a potential life cycle cost
savings range of 10 to 50 percent through the
employment of an or-obit support strategy.
With the cancellation of the Orbital Maneuvering
Vehicle (OMV) and the Satellite Servicer System
Flight Demonslration (SSS/FD) programs, the Air
Force has not played an advocacy role or
demonslrated an interest in developing an on-orbit
support capability. NASA, on the other hand, has
continued to develop an on-orbit support capability
that was, again demonslrated during the Hubble Space
Telescope (HST) repair mission.
The March 1992 update of Air Force Manual (AFM)
1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine, addresses the
increasing role of space assets in su,_porting and
sustaining space operations. The docun,J_t states, in
part, that sustained employment of space assets must
be planned for to ensure sufficient replenishment of
space-based resources is achievable when adapting to
changes in circumstances dictated by mission
operations. The doctrine clearly states that on-orbit
support for space assets can be crucial to campaign
success and that flexibility in space employment will
require a combination of reserve platforms and launch
systems, development of on-orbit spares, and the
employment of both robotic and manned space
platforms. Further, it cites that a space platform's
effectiveness can be significantly expanded by
providing vehicles and crews to repair or modify the
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platform, service it, or restock consumables such as
fuel.
USSPACECOM's December 1990 Assured Mission
Support Space Architecture (AMSSA) focused upon
the follow key objectives: Robustness, flexibility,
survivability, sustainability, availability, affordability,
and normalization of support to space assets, and
supportability of deployed space systems. To assure
the United States has and retains ready access to space
during peacetime and during times of increased global
and regional tensions, the AMSSA study identified six
specific initiatives, referred to as the "Big Six", that
must be improved and/or implemented:
Communications; Navigation; Launch Capability;
Command and Control; Satellite Control; and
Integrated Logistics Support of space systems. It is
the latter that addresses several tenets of the on-orbit
support doctrine contained in AFM 1-1.
FEASIBILITY OF ON-ORBIT SUPPORT
Since the 1950's, man has been launching and
operating satellites in space. These spacecraft have
had varied missions such as communications,
navigational aids, experiments, weather, surveillance,
and other military missions. The concept of on-orbit
support dates from the first satellite failure. In the
early days of space flight, the first concern was to
merely get the satellite into orbit. Once that barrier
was passed and orbiting satellites began returning
data, interest turned toward increasing satellite
performance. The strategy for maintenance of these
spacecraft was reconfiguration by telemetry to correct
individual element failures and abandonment after
critical failure. Abandoned satellites are usually
replaced with either a new satellite launched from the
ground or a pre-positioned on-orbit replacement
satellite. The concept of abandoning large and
expensive satellites after failure is counterproductive
in a time of reduced defense budgets.
During the 1980's, in partnership with private
industry, NASA developed the Multimission Modular
Spacecraft (MMS) design, a reusable bus containing
three replaceable boxes that control spacecraft power,
data handling, and attitude. Solar Max, launched on
14 February 1980, was the first satellite to use the new
design. After nine months of operation fuses failed in
the attitude control subsystem module, rendering four
of its seven instruments useless and compromising
operations of the remaining three. In April 1994, the
Space Shuttle Challenger was launched on a mission
to capture and repair Solar Max. Although many
unexpected difficulties arose during this mission,
Solar Max was restored to service and a new era in
orbital servicing and repair was launched. This
mission provided the experience and know how
necessary to capture and launch into their proper
orbits the Palapa-B and Westar-6 satellites later the
same year. These satellites had been placed into a
wrong orbit due to a failure in their booster stage.
Also, during this period, NASA designed and built the
Hubble Space Telescope (HST) specifically to be
maintained on on-orbit by astronauts through
extravehicular activity (EVA). Should the space
station become a reality, it is intended to be
maintained on-orbit through a combination of EVA
and the use of sophisticated robotics.
By the end of the 1980's numerous DoD and NASA
studies and design concepts resulted in the
establishment of a clear requirement for an on-orbit
support capability. As a result, NASA and the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)
formed a partnership to develop a Satellite Servicer
System Flight Demonstration (SSS/FD) program.
This was a joint effort to initiate a program to design,
develop, and demonstrate a satellite servicing
capability. A series of three flight demonstrations
scheduled for 1993 through 1995 was planned.
During the same timeframe, SDIO formulated a Space
Assets Support Systems (SASS) implementation plan
based upon existing and near-term technologies and
capabilities. The plan, essentially a preliminary
acquisition program plan, recommended that a SASS
system program office be established to manage the
design, development, and deployment of the SASS.
National political and budgetary considerations forced
the premature cancellation of the SSS/FD program
and eliminated an opportunity to develop and
demonstrate a very feasible, cost-effective alternative
to the expensive abandon and replace concept
currently used when spacecraft encounter failures,
critical anomalies, or even fuel shortages.
In addition to the satellites that were diverted from
other strategic surveillance missions during Desert
Storm, there are several communications satellites
currently on-orbit that have drifted slightly out of
their intended orbits. There is insufficient fuel
remaining in these satellites to maneuver them back
into the proper orbit for maximum utilization of their
capabilities. The capability to refuel these satellites
on-orbit would provide military commanders the
flexibility to reposition satellites to meet theater
contingency requirements without significantly
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affecting the lifetime of the satellite. Additionally,
survivability of the spacecraft could also be enhanced
by an assured refueling capability in extending the
satellite's ability to perform elusive and evasive
maneuvers to counter threats.
NASA and DoD currently cosponsor an active
committee under the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Aeronautics (AIAA) that is
developing necessary standards with the assistance of
industry that, if implemented on future space vehicles
or during block upgrades to existing space systems,
could quickly produce the design and employment of
on-orbit refueling ports or receptacles aboard many
space vehicles to facilitate the safe, on-orbit transfer
of fuel.
f.D.]S.C.LI/$2.O_
Many studies have been conducted which identified
potential cost savings and other benefits to be realized
through on-orbit support of space systems. There are
wide differences in the amount of savings projected,
sometimes even for the same space system, and the
method of measuring the savings. The differences are
due to the varied methodologies, assumptions,
parameters used by the organizations conducting the
studies. In addition to the potential cost savings,
these studies have demonstrated that on-orbit support
provides service life extension through a refueling
capability, the capability to infuse new technology
through the replacement of orbital replaceable units,
and the ability to upgrade a system to meet expanded
threats, etc.
There does not appear to be any technological
roadblock to on-orbit servicing. The driving
technologies have been identified. An increased
capability to service and maintain spacecraft on-orbit
will continue to evolve through NASA efforts and
independent research and development efforts of the
aerospace industry.
All of the studies examined concluded that there are
several support capability needs which are key to the
success of assuring mission support, and that these
needs require positive commitment from senior Air
Force and DoD decision makers. Most notable of
these are the normalization of support of DoD space
systems, modularity and standardization in space
vehicle design, expanding DoD organic support, and
the pursuit of on-orbit servicing capabilities to
enhance satellite endurance.
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The requirements for Space Technology are outlined
in terms of NASA Strategic Plan. The national emphasis
on economic revitalization is described along with the
environmental changes needed for the new direction.
Space Technology Interdependency (STI) is elaborated in
terms of its impact on national priority on science,
education, and economy. Some suggested approaches to
strengthening STI are outlined. Finally, examples of
Technology Roadmaps for Space Operations area are
included to illustrate the value of STI for national
cohesiveness and economic revitalization.
Introduction
The strategic approach to space technology
development can be viewed as a set of interwound
modules floating in tile ocean of business environment
(Figure 1). The vision, go,'ds, objectives are formulated
will customers ,and resources available in mind (Ref. 1).
Tile business plan tr_mslates the detailed objectives into
products and services. A critical part of file entire
enterprise deals with identifying and implementing
processes which provide tile most efficient operation for
the good health Of the business. Marketing is an integral
part of ascertaining the viability of the products and the
requirements for new products.
The ultimate goal of the process is to enlarge file
customer base and/or increase the satisfaction level of
customers. The correct process utilizes surveys,
interviews, and other types of evaluations from tile
customers to develop a continuous stream of actions
which should be undertaken to modify the strategy to
provide tile customer with the quality product, at the
lowest price, and in the shortest possible time. The entire
process has to be adjusted according to tile changes in the
business environment. The environment includes the
overall health of tile national economy, crisis situations
caused by natural or human-made factors, status of
competition, technological innovations, and any large
shift in the preference of file customers.
This customer-driven process is tile essence of ti_e
overall concept behind tile development of space
technology and its transfer to space projects/prognuns ,and
the industry Ik)r commercial applications. The customers
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are the NASA and DOD program offic6s and aerospace
and non-aerospace industry. The environment to which
overall strategies must be linked continues to change as it
always has. According to the Electronic Industries
Association, Washington, D.C., during the first half of
1994, a record $48 billion worth of electronic products
were exported, up 16 percent from the same period in
1993; however, during the same period, imports of
electronic goods rose 18 percent to $55.3 billion (Ref. 2).
The products included are computers, peripherals, solid
state devices, communications, electrochemical
equipment, electron tubes, passive components, and
consumer electronics. The national deficit and the
balance of trade have made economic revitalization a key
item for the USA. The Council on Competitiveness has
shown that growth rates in real standard of living
correlate strongly with the manufacturing productivity.
For the period of 1972-1992, the US ranked sixth in the
world in this comparison behind Japan, Italy, France,
United Kingdom, and Canada Ref. 3).
The role of technology in economic revitalization is
widely recognized by academic, government, and industry
communities. Recent studies conducted by the US
National Critical Technologies Panel have identified
applied molecular biology, distributed computing and
teleconmmnications, flexible integrated manufacturing,
electricity supply and distribution, materials synthesis and
processing, microelectronics and optoelectronics,
pollution minimization and remediation, software, and
transportation as the nine industrial sectors particularly
technology intensive and economically significant (Ref.
4). Taken together, they represent major portions of the
future growth of the US economy. In the recent past, US
President William J. Clinton and Vice President Albert
(lore, Jr., have issued two major policies titled,
"Technology for America's Economic Growth, A New
• Global
• Local
Enterprise Stxategic Process
• Mad111_tJ,onl
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Direction to Build Economic Strength,” and “Science in 
the National Interest” (Refs. 5,6). 
The technology policy states that, ’Technology is the 
engine of economic growth.” Two-thirds of the 
productivity growth since this century’s major depression 
can be attributed to technological advances. Thus, this 
policy states that, “Investing in technology is investing in 
America’s future . . .”(Ref. 5). 
The science policy draws its roots from President 
Clinton’s November 23, 1993 statement, “This country 
must sustain world leadership in science, mathematics, 
and engineering if we are to meet the challenges of 
today ... and of tomorrow” (Ref. 6). Another idea behind 
the science policy is from the statement of Vice President 
Gore at the Forum on Science in the National Interest, 
February 1994, “Science reveals new worlds to explore, 
and by implication, new opportunities to seize and new 
futures to create.” 
Three new directions discussed in these policy 
documents are: (1) coordinated management of 
technology all across the government, (2) forging a closer 
working partnership among industry, federal and state 
governments, workers, and universities, and (3) 
redirecting the focus of US national efforts toward 
technologies crucial to today’s businesses and a growing 
economy. Laboratories managed by the Department of 
Energy, NASA, and the Department of Defense are being 
reviewed by the Administration with the aim of devoting 
at !east 10-20 percent of their budgets to research and 
development (R&D) partnerships with industry. The 
overall environment is changing to gravitate highly 
toward technology partnerships for the economic 
revitalization which includes educational, research, 
manufacturing, and marketing aspects of newly developed 
products and services. 
%ace Technolow Development 
The vision of NASA has been expressed in various 
ways in the past three decades. Perhaps the most 
encompassing statement comes from the NASA Strategic 
Plan which was issued in May, 1994, and reads as 
follows: “NASA is an investment in America’s future. 
As explorers, pioneers, and innovators, we boldly expand 
frontiers in air and space to inspire and serve America and 
to benefit the quality of life on earth” (Ref. 7). As a result 
of this vision, NASA has identified five strategic 
enterprises: 
- Mission to Planet Earth 
- Aeronautics 
- Human Exploration and Development of Space 
- Scientific Research 
- Space Technology 
NASA’s Strategic Functions provide capabilities 
required by these enterprises. Specifically, these 
functions are (Ref. 7): 
a 
- Transportation to Space 
- Space Communications 
- Human Resources 
- Physical Resources 
The interplay of the strategies, functions, and 
customers is detailed in the NASA Strategic Plan. Figure 
2 from this plan , shows this interconnectivity graphically. 
The Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board 
(ASEB) Commission on Engineering and Technical 
Systems of the National Research Council (NRC) 
reviewed NASA’s technology development for space 
science and issued a report in 1993. ASEB recommended 
eight technology areas with specific targets which are 
listed as follows (Ref. 8): 
- Advanced propulsion 
- Advanced Earth-to-orbit engines 
- Reusable cryogenic orbital transfer vehicles 
- High-performance orbital transfer systems for sending 
humans to Mars 
- New spacecraft propulsion systems for solar system 
exploration 
- Radiation protection 
- closed-cycle life support systems 
- Improved EVA equipment 
- Autonomous system and robotic augmentations far 
humans 
- Human factors research 
- Humans in space 
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- Autonomous systems and robotics
- Lightweight, limber manipulators
- Advanced sensing and control techniques
- Teleoperators
- Space power supplies
- 100 Kw nuclear power source
- Materials and structures
- Advanced metallic materials based on alloy synthesis
- "Hot" structures to counter reentry heating
- "Trainable" control systems for large flexible
structures
- Information and control
- Autonomous on-board computing system
- High-speed, low-error rate digital transmission over
long distances
- Voice/video communications
- Spacebome tracking and data relay
-Equipment monitoring technology
- Ground data handling, storage, distribution and
analysis
- Advanced sensor technology
- Large aperture optical and quasi-optical systems
- Detection devices and systems
- Cryogenic systems
- In-situ analysis and sample return
- Supporting technologies
- Radiation insensitive computational systems
- tligh-precision attitude sensors and axis transfer
systems
The Space Technology Enterprise has identified the
following activities in support of the national needs
( Ref. 9):
Space Technology Enterprise
National Need Activity
Fundamental Science
National Security
Environmental Protection
Industrial Competitiveness
Space Exploration
and Aeronautics
- Materials Research
- Remote Sensing
- Advanced Space
Transportation (AST)
- Space Communications
- Small Spacecraft
Technology
- Remote Sensing
- Small Spacecraft
Technology
- Space Processing
- Commercial Network
- Advanced Integrated
Technology Program
- Technology Reinvestment
Program
- AST
- Space Research and
Technology
Flight experiments support each of the NASA Space
Technology Enterprise Activities. In parallel with these,
there is continued and new emphasis on space technology
transfer programs including the Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) program. The vision of the
NASA Space Technology Enterprise (STE) is to pioneer
with industry the development and use of space
technologies to secure national economic
competitiveness, to support space missions, and to
provide low cost, highly operable access to space. The
mission of STE is to stimulate the development and
transfer of space technology to promote the creation of
new knowledge, jobs, products and industries and their
strategy is to maintain customer focus; provide space
critical, world class capabilities; and leverage our
resources. This includes inter-center collaborations,
intemgency collaborations, and private industry
partnerships. Indeed, NASA offers unique opportunities
for scientific research, technology development, and
innovative methodologies for academic and research and
technology institutions.
The space characterized by open space in terms of
distance, voids, debris, gravity, electricity, magnetism,
atmosphere, particles, temperature, acoustics, time,
seismic activity, and electromagnetic radiation, provide a
unique laboratory environment which can be
economically used for experimentation and
manufacturing of certain products. NASA's facilities and
personnel offer a unique resource to other agencies,
universities, and industry for developing partnerships. In
addition, NASA has played an important role in the
identification of new research areas and technology
development needs because of its mission and objectives.
Many of die fundamental research and technology
areas which have been identified by NASA as priority
items continue to be special emphasis areas in the
Department of Defense and several other agencies. This
overlap in technology development is significant and
needs to be addressed in overall national interest of
avoiding duplication.
Space Technology Interdependence
The Space Technology Interdependency Group
(STIG) was established in May, 1982 to identify and
promote the pursuit of new opportunities for cooperative
relationships between NASA and the US Air Force
Systems command (AFSC).
In addition, STIG is chartered to monitor ongoing
cooperative activities and identify areas of overlap and
duplication. The Air Force responsibility now is located
in the Materiel Command after the reorganization of the
Air Force became effective in 1991. The goal of STIG is
to provide advocacy, oversight, and guidance to facilitate
and encourage cooperative development programs and to
avoid duplication of effort and resources on space
technology activities. Three categories of programs have
been defined by STIG to characterize interaction The
dependent program is the one in which a single set or
subset of mutually constructed management, shared
resources, and strong agency executive management
support. An interdependent program is one in which
somedegreeofoverlapisSiltedintheagencyprogram
and/ortechnicalgoals,asoutlinedinajointlydeveloped
programplan.It isassumedthatherearecomplementary
synergisticresultsbeneficialtotheparticipatinga encies.
Independentprogramsareconductedbyoneagency,with
minimalornocooperationfromotheragencies.Inthe
pastfiveyears,USArmy,USNavy,Departmentof
Energy(DOE),AdvancedResearchProjectsAgency
(ARPA),BallisticMissilesDefenseOrganization
(BMDO),andNationalOceanicandAtrnospheric
Administration(NOAA)havejoinedSTIG.
TheSTIGwasorganizedandisimplementedby
directionfromaSteeringCommittee.TheAFmateriel
CommandDeputyChiefofStafforTechnologyandthe
NASAAssociateAdministerfortheOfficeofSpace
AccessandTechnologyserveasCo-chairpersonsa dare
responsiblefordesignatingmemberstotheSteering
Committee.TheSteeringCommitteecurrentlyhas
membersfromtheArmy,Navy,BMDO,ARPA,and
DOE.Steeringcommitteemembersarefromthe
Headquartersxecutivestafftoprovidetechnical
expertiseneededfordirectionandevaluationorprograms.
TheSTIGprogramisimplementedthrougheight
technicalcommittees.Thesecommitteesareestablished
bytheSteeringCommittee(SC).Themembersare
selectedfromparticipatingfieldcentersandlaboratories.
Theco-chairpersonsforthetechnicalcommitteesare
nominatedbymembersoftheJSCandapprovedbySC
co-chairpersons.Wewillbrieflydescribethe
implementationstrategyfortheSTIGOperations
Committee(SOC)toillustratetheorganizationa d
productshatcomefromeachoftheSTIGtechnical
committees.
TheSOCisco-chairedbyDr.KumarKrishenofthe
NASAJohnsonSpaceCenterandDr.RichardMillerof
theUSAFArmstronglaboratory.Therearefive
subcommitteesunderSOContheRoboticsand
Telepresence,AutomationandIntelligentSystems,
HumanFactors,LifeSciencesandAvionics.Thesefive
subcommitteesarejointlyco-chairedbytechnicalexperts
fromthetwoorganizations,NASAandUSAF.The
membershipoftheSOCincludesArmy,Navy,DOEand
BMDOinadditiontoNASAandtheUSAF.TheSOC
has65members.ThemembersofSOCwerenominated
bytheirlaboratories,researchcenters,ororganizations
andareapprovedbySOCco-chairpersonsa dtheSTIG
SteeringCommittee.TheSOCconductswomeetingson
ayearlybasisto:(1)reviewoperationsresearchand
technology(R&T)plans,resourcesandprogresswithin
NASA,DOD,andDOE;(2)developandmaintainlistand
descriptionsofcurrentinterdependentprogramsand
encourageandrecommendfutureinterdependent
programs;and(3)developandreviewtechnology
roadmapsforinteragencyprojects.Onekeyareaof SOC
workinvolvesfacilitatingcommunicationofR&Tresults
intheoperationsareaacrossagenciesandvariouscenters
withintheseagenciesinvolvedintheoperationsR&T.
ThistechnicalinterchangeisfacilitatedthroughSTIG
Operations,ApplicationsandResearch(SOAR)
SymposiumandExhibition.
ThisauthorhasparticipatedintheSTIGforanumber
ofyears.Furthermore,theauthormaintainsveryactive
interfacewithacademia,ndustry,andR&Tagencyofthe
StateofTexas.Onthebasisofmanyearsofexperience,
theauthorproposesthefollowingvisionforSpace
TechnologyInterdependency(STI):"Createandpromote
STIinfrastructurestoencourageandcoordinate
cooperativeprojectsinR&Tformutualbenefitstothe
organizationsi volved."ThebenefitsofSTIare
numerousandcanbesummarizedasfollows:
(1)increasinginteragencyommunicationsatall levels;
(2)creatingnationaltechnologycohesivenessthrough
interactionwithindustryandacademia;(3)sharingof
expertiseandfacilitiesacrossagencies,industry,and
educationalinstitutions;(4)avoidingundesired
duplicationandreinventingthroughsharingoflessons
learned;(5)developingcost-effectiveapproachesthrough
interdependentprograms;(6)facilitatingtheidentification
oftechnologyrequirementsforspecificapplications;and
(7)creatinganenvironmenttogainasubstantialedgein
intemationalcompetitivenessthroughtechnologytransfer.
TheSTImanagementinfrastructureshouldbeeasily
implementablewithaminimumimpacttocooperating
organizations.Furthermore,suchastructureshouldbe
leastaffectedbyfrequentreorganizationsfthe
cooperatinga encies/organizations.One uch
organizationisproposedinFigure3,andispatternedafter
theSTIGdiscussedarlierinthispaper.
Headqua-ters ......
of Agencies/
OrgaQizations
Experts from ....
Across the nation
Ot'ganization/
Figure 3 - Proposed STI Management Infrastructure
Operations Technology Ro#dmaps
As part of the Space Technology Interdependency
Group (STIG) key activities, NASA and the Air Force are
developing technology roadmaps aimed at providing a
mechanism by which greater visibility and coordination
can be achieved in U.S. interdepartmental activities and
advances in the area of space technology development.
These technology roadmaps are at a critical stage of
development and will be a vital step to the
implementation phase of technology transfer and future
commercialization by private industry, as well as
improving upon our own government operations. The
roadmaps currently being developed and implemented are
a coordinated effort of all the agencies involved in the
space technology interdependency.
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The SOC has compiled more than 20 roadmaps in its
areas of responsibility. Typically a roadmap provides
vision and objectives for a particular technology thrust. It
identifies involvement of various agencies in research,
design, development, demonstration, and flight
experiment for the technology thrust. Key persons
responsible for the interdependency management of
various phases of development are identified. Estimated
resources and schedule for the completion of the work are
also provided. Details of anticipated milestones are
provided along with a brief description of the goals to be
achieved. These roadmaps are in their initial draft
preparation stage. We are providing two such roadmaps
in Figures 4,5 Robotic Exploration Vehicles and Human
Workload Modeling.
It is crucial to emphasize that these roadmaps are
being revised to reflect new budgetary data and are
merely presented here to illustrate the usefulness such a
resource for our National technology development. This
author believes that such roadmaps should be revised on a
yearly basis to accommodate new budgetary data and
strategic emphasis. Furthermore, publication and
distribution of such roadmaps can provide the catalytic
effect for accelerating partnership by various
organizations wanting to explore avenues of using
interdependent efforts to achieve their goals. In the least,
just to prepare these roadmaps and to review the
achievements periodically will result in many government
agencies and organizations getting together and, thereibre,
forging meaningful interdependencies.
Conclusions
The Space Technology Interdependency (STI) is a
manageable task since space technology needs are
relatively understood and there is a mechanism to
periodically update the list of high priority space
technologies (Ref. 10). The STI would facilitate
identification of technology requirements with realistic
specifications. The foremost requirement for the
management structure for STI should be its ability to
provide motivation to personnel to implement and
promote cooperative efforts. Communications should be
effective at all levels and decisions should incorporate
both top-down and bottom-up inputs. There should be
clear guidelines for measurement of success. The
implementation of successful management infrastructure
provides a challenge. It should be a process oriented and
flexible approach. There should be emphasis on team
work, and not on preconceived results. Most important, it
should incorporate rewards and incentives for those who
produce desirable results.
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ROBOTIC EXPLORATION VEHICLES
VISION: To develop autonomous vehicles operating in harsh terrains and capable of
reconnaisance, surveillance, data collection, and scientific experiments
OBJECTNE: To augment soldiers in the field by enhancing autonomous search and
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FUTURE PLANS: control, pattern recognition,miniature actuators,etc. Stereo visionfrom JPL developments
willbe usedin ARPAUnmannedGroundVehicle (UGV) project and by AF unexplodedordnance
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SOCComn_ttee
TECHNOLOGY GOAL: To develop autonomous vehicles capable of operating In harsh
terrains and capable of reconnaisance, surveillance, data
collection, and scientific experiments.
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HUMAN WORKLOAD MODELING
humanpresence in space.
To accessthe utility of task network modelingfor studyin_ Function|tlocatlon stratcgies; effects of
temporal, ble4ogk:aland environmentalstressorson humanperformance;0-g andpartlal-g effects on human
Performance;psychomotor, 10_ceptual,& informaUon-processingCalNibiitiesof the htmlanOperator, and
INVOLVEMENT FY9S > FY96
AI: ARMY NAVY _
PAGE 1 OF 4
AREA:
HumanFactors
:IPUNE:
Life Sciences
FY97
WORKLOAD
MODEL COMPONENT
x x RONT-END DEVELOPMENT SCALE
, DEVELOPMENT
!
I
Models
& Demo
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Other:
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NASA CENTERS: NASA-JohnsonSpaceCenter/Flight CrewSupport Division
IX)D/OTHER AGENCIES: None,
Me task network simula_ developed will lead to a mamberof products that will ba applied to futwe
FUTURE PLANS: tssk networks slmulatlo_l of the workload Ilke_j to be expefleftced during future mls¢ons. Specifically,
the task'network simulations wll Imm the foundation for identifying ovedoad conditions & developing
atr=_ie ft_r r_d,_Pb_l _._nmd _lHnn .nsr= _k(dM,
HUMAN WORKLOAD,..,.,^.MODELING
TECHNOLOGY uu_L. To provide missionplannerswith a method for optimizing allocation
I of missiontasks; optimizing formulation of timelines,schedulesand
I equipment design; and assessment of the feasibility of proposed missions,
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Illustrating the steps that crewmembers must accomplish to complete the operation.
3_38 Fig. 5. Human Workload Modeling
Background
The Human Workload Analysis program of investigation is a joint effort between NASA/Johnson
Space Center and Brooks AFB. The center of overall responsiblity for the implementation of
the project is the Crew interface and Analysis Section of the FrK3ht Crew Support Division of
NASA-JSC.
Major Milestones
USAF Cooperative/Human Workload Analysis Project is a 3-year, 4-phase program of investigation.
FY95 - Front-End Analysis
FY96 - Workload Component Scale Development
FY97 - Execution and Model Validation
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Management Approach
The NASA-JSCprincipalInvestigator, in conjunctionwith the HumanInterfaces Oepa_r_t atLockheedEngineeringand Sciences
Co. (LESC), supportsthe overalleffort for J6C. The PrincipalInvestigate*will report directly to the FlightCrew Support
Division.Underthe directionof the NASA-JSCT_ Monitor, the Engineering Supe_isor of the Human Factorsand
ErgonomicsLaboratory (HFEL) and the humanworkloadanel_aislead will be responsiblefor completiono4=all deliveralde_
Technicalsupport is pro_idedby BrooksAFB,ArmstrongLal0oratories,_ the form of implementingthe woddoad modelsIn
computer models. The Air Forceprovidesexpertise in workloadmodelingusingSAINT',a network analysistool Thispredicts
workload on any of severalchannels. The AF hasexpertise In programmingin SAINT, and takes the models developedby NASA
and implements them. The programs are transmitted e_,_r_ro_calyto be run on NASA equipment.
The Foject b managed bythe NASA technicalmanager,with It. Mitcha providing Air Forcemanagementof budget, manpower,
andwork as assignedby NASA. All fundingcomes from NASA'sOffice of Life and MicrogravityScienceand Applications,and funds
are transferred to the Air Force to cover their efforts.
End Products Users
The task network workload modeling tool currently under development will provide mission
planners with a method for :
1 ) optimizing allocation of;mission tasks,
2) optimizing f:_"mulation_of timelines and schedules
3) optimizing equipment design, and
4) assessment of the feasibility of proposed missions
PAGE 4 OF 4
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Major Deliverable And Periods Of Performance
I Front-End Analysis
II Model Development
III Workload Component
Scale Development
IV Execution & Model Validation
36
Preliminary i..'(-'.:-.'.::-_;-_;...;.:,...:..1
Final X
Fig. 5 (cont.). Human Workload Modeling
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I. Abstract
Defining transportation architectures for the human
exploration of the Moon is a complex task due to the
multitude of mission scenarios available. The mission
transportation architecture recently proposed for the
First Lunar Outpost (FLO) was not designed from care-
fully predetermined mission requirements and goals,
but evolved from an initial set of requirements, which
were continually modified as studies revealed that
some early assumptions were not optimal. This paper
focuses on the mission architectures proposed for FLO
and investigates how these transportation architec-
tures evolved. A comparison of the strengths and
weaknesses of the three distinct mission architectures
are discussed, namely (1) Lunar Orbit Rendezvous, (2)
staging from the Cislunar Libration Point, and (3) direct
to the lunar surface. In addition, several new and revo-
lutionary architectures are discussed.
II. Introductioq
Since the inception of the space age, transporta-
tion nodes, such as parking orbits about the Earth and
Moon, have been utilized to maximize mission planning
flexibility while minimizing program risks. However,
defining transportation architectures for the human
exploration of the Moon is a complex task due to the
multitude of mission scenarios available.
The mission transportation architecture currently
baselined for the First Lunar Outpost (FLO), was not
designed from carefully predetermined mission
requirements and goals, but evolved from an initial set
of requirements, which were continually modified as
studies revealed that some early assumptions may not
have been optimum. This paper will discuss the mis-
sion architectures currently under consideration for
FLO and will investigate how these transportation
architectures evolved.
There are three distinct mission architectures, (1)
Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR), (2) staging from the
Cislunar Libration Point (CLP), and (3) direct to the
lunar surface (Lunar Direct). These architectures are
defined by how the vehicle(s) arrival at and departure
from the Moon. Subsets of these three architectures
are defined by whether the vehicle(s) depart from a
space station and whether the crew returns to a space
Copyright (_) 1994 by S.F. Everett.
Published by AIAA with permission.
station, splashes down, or lands propulsively on the
ground.
A literature search revealed literally hundreds of
papers involving various aspects of these three archi-
tectures and their numerous subsets. However, only a
few papers attempted to compare one architecture to
another, and those only compared a few specific
parameters. One study was found which compared all
three architectures; but it was based on a specific set
of predetermined assumptions, and was not formally
published.
III. Background
On 25 May 1961, President Kennedy committed
the United States to the goal of landing men on the
Moon by the end of the decade, z That goal was
achieved when Apollo 11 placed Americans on the
Moon on 20 July 1969.2 The United States performed
five more successful missions to the Moon between
1969 and 1972, using a mission transportation archi-
tecture called Lunar Orbit Rendezvous or LOR. 1 Some
useful Apollo statistics are listed in Table 1. Note that all
were brief, near equatorial, front side missions, with
surface stay times between two and three days.
Table 1: Apollo Landing Sites 4
Apollo
#
11
12
14
15
16
17
Date Latitude Longitude Stay
d/m/yr Time hr
7/20/69 00 ° 41' 15" 23 ° 26' 00" 21
(landing) N E
11/19/69 03* 11' 51" 23 ° 23' 08" 31
(landing) S W
1/31/71 03°40'24" 17 ° 27' 55" 33.
(launch) S W
7/26/71 26°06'03" 03 ° 39' 10" 66
(launch) N E
4/16/72 08 ° 59' 29" 15 ° 30' 52'" 71
(launch) S E
12/7/72 20 ° 09' 55" 30 ° 45' 57" 74
(launch) N E
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An overview of the LOR mission Architecture uti-
lized by the Apollo missions is shown in Figure 2. Direct
ascent from the ground to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and
Trans-Lunar Injection (TLI) were performed by a Sat-
urn-5 rocket. The trajectories were designed to pass in
front of the Moon, allowing the command module to
perform the Lunar Orbit Insertion (LOI) burn on the
back side of the Moon if all systems were performing
well, placing the vehicle in Low Lunar Orbit (LLO). 1
The vehicle consisted of two pressurized capsules,
the command module, and the lander. The command
module housed the crew of three on the outbound and
return legs of the mission, and performed a hyperbolic
direct reentry at the Earth, splashing down in the
ocean. The lunar lander consisted of two stages. The
first performed the de-orbit and descent burns, taking
two astronauts to the surface, while the third astronaut
remained in LLO with the command module. After a
one to three day stay on the lunar surface, the upper
portion of the lander performed the ascent burn and
rendezvoused with the command module in LLO. The
lower stage remained on the lunar surface, while the
upper stage was expended in LLO, meaning it was left
behind were its orbit would decay causing it to crash
into the lunar surface.
On 20 July 1989, on the 20th anniversary of the
Apollo 11 landing, President Bush challenged America
to go, "back to the Moon, back to the future. And this
time, back to stay."2
The NASA Administrator at that time, Richard H.
Truly, quickly formed a task force to perform a three-
month study of the human exploration of the Moon and
Mars. 5 In November of 1989, the task force published
the "Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration
of the Moon and Mars", s or the '90-Day Study' as it
was dubbed. The majority of subsequent studies
involving lunar exploration architectures evolved from
this report.
IV. Evolution of Lunar Exploration
Mission Architectures
The lunar mission architecture outlined in the '90-
Day Study' was derived from the Apollo architecture,
but included a number of important changes. There-
fore, a summary of their findings and assumption is
important.
EARTH's
EQUATOR
Lunar Orbit Rendezvous
Fig. 2. Apollo LOR Mission Architecture
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Summary of the 90-Day Study 5
The team, faced with a short-term deadline, chose
an overall architecture they knew would work, Lunar
Orbit Rendezvous. However, the goal of the return to
the Moon is to achieve a permanent presence there,
which requires much longer stay-times, and thus a sur-
face habitat and additional cargo. The initial habitat
was required to support a 30-day stay. To achieve this,
the team chose to split the mission into two parts, a
cargo mission and a piloted mission. An autonomous
cargo vehicle delivers a surface habitat and cargo to
the lunar surface prior to the piloted mission.
The vehicle design consists of two pressurized
modules as did Apollo, a Lunar Transfer Vehicle (LTV)
and a Lunar Excursion Vehicle (LEV) (see Figure 3).
,'k
,J
Aerobrake
LTV LEVCrew
Modules
Drop Cranks
Cargo
Fig. 3. '90 Day Study' Vehicle Configuration
The LTV is a reusable 'tug' that carries a crew of
four and their cargo to the Moon and back, and trans-
ports the LEV to low lunar orbit. The assumed payload
capability of the transfer vehicle is 33 metric tons or 16
tons plus the crew and excursion vehicle. The fuel cho-
sen for the vehicles was liquid oxygen / liquid hydro-
gen.
The LEV is similar to the Apollo lander, an expend-
able two-stage lander. The first stage performs the
descent to the lunar surface and is left behind. The
second stage performs the ascent, rendezvous with
the transfer vehicle, and is expended in LLO.
An additional departure from the Apollo architec-
ture was the choice to assemble and launch the vehicle
from Low Earth Orbit (LEO) near Space Station Free-
dom (SSF), rather than perform a direct ascent from
the Earth's surface. Furthermore, a free-return trajec-
tory was required for the piloted missions. An overview
of this mission architecture is shown in Figure 4.
The mission begins with a translunar injection
maneuver (TLI) performed by the LTV at a safe dis-
tance from the space station. A lunar orbit insertion
(LOI) maneuver is performed upon arrival at the Moon.
The LEV separates from the LTV and descends to the
lunar surface with the crew and payload.
After a specified stay time, the Earth return leg of
the mission is initiated with an ascent-rendezvous
strategy designed to transport the crew and payload (if
any) to the LTV waiting in lunar orbit. At this point, sev-
eral options are available. The LEV can be brought
DESCENT I ASCENT
LOI _i _ TEl
_i --
__--- SSF ORBIT
_.= REGRESSED
!
= LTV
Earth's
Equato=
AEROCAPTURE & EOI
TLI ... Trans-Lunar Injection
LOI ... Lunar Orbit Insertion
TEl ... Trans-Earth Injection
EOI ...Earth Orbit Insertion
TLI
LEAVE FROM
SSF ORBIT
LTV / LEV
Fig. 4. '90-Day Study' Mission Architecture
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back to the space station to be refurbished and reused.
This option tends to significantly increase the initial
mass in low Earth orbit (IMLEO) required to perform
the mission. A second option is to leave the LEV in
lunar orbit for reuse on the next mission. This increases
mission planning complexity due to the additional ren-
dezvous requirements placed on the following mission.
In addition, long term stability of the lunar orbit is a non-
trivial issue due to the complex selenopotential effects.
This option also restricts landing site accessibility to
those latitudes which are below the inclination of the
LEV's orbit. A third option also enables LEV reusability
but requires an in situ propellant infrastructure on the
lunar surface. This requires storing the LEV on the
lunar surface and taking advantage of lunar oxygen to
reduce propellant transportation requirements from
Earth. While an attractive option if lunar oxygen can be
produced efficiently, it was not considered in this study
due to the a priori requirements for a lunar base infra-
structure. The fourth option utilizes an expendable LEV
strategy, which has the effect of reducing both the initial
mass in low earth orbit and the mission complexity, and
was therefore chosen by the '90-Day' team. The LTV
performs a transearth injection maneuver (TEl) which
places it on an Earth return trajectory while leaving the
expendable LEV in lunar orbit. An Earth aerocapture
maneuver then places the LTV in an orbit whose apo-
gee is ideally suited to a space station rendezvous.
When the LTV is near apogee, a perigee raise maneu-
ver, referred to as Earth orbit insertion (EOI), is per-
formed. This maneuver places the LTV in a circular
orbit compatible with the space station. The final ren-
dezvous sequence completes the mission. The LTV
and the aerocapture heat shield are refurbished at the
space station for reuse on subsequent missions, s
Alternate Mission Mode_
Following the '90-Day Study', numerous studies
were performed to assess their design. Many of the
studies unearthed problems with the assumed mission
architecture. Some of the key problems are discussed
below.
One of the first aspects of the '90-Day Study' archi-
tecture that was analyzed was the constraint of a free-
return to the space station. Studies showed that oppor-
tunities for free return trajectories that would return the
vehicle to the station are very rare, due to the complex
geometry of the Earth-Moon system combined with a
regressing station orbit. Opportunities during the eigh-
teen-year lunar cycle occur at best once every few
months, and in the worse years, are not available at all.
Free-returns are available once every 6 to 10 days if
the vehicle is not constrained to return to the station;
however, free-returns are only available when targeting
for near-equatorial lunar sites, regardless of where the
vehicle departs from or returns to. s This was identified
as a problem by a lunar site selection committee, which
indicated global access is desired by the scientific com-
munity. 7
Other studies showed that for non-equatorial mis-
sions, which must have higher inclination orbits, the
orbits regress up to a degree per day. This, coupled
with the rotation rate of the moon (about 13.2 degrees
per day) can result in surface wait times of up to 14
days before the excursion vehicle can lift off to rendez-
vous with the transfer vehicle. In addition, high inclina-
tion orbits may only have minimum energy transfers
available twice per month, and these opportunities may
not coincide with the required alignment for a return to
the regressing space station orbit, s, 9
As a result of these and other studies, two new
mission architectures were identified as worthy of
study, lunar direct and high lunar staging, lO
Lunar Direct
Under the lunar direct transportation architecture,
the entire vehicle descends to the lunar surface. No
components remain in lunar orbit as opposed to the
LOR architecture. This eliminates orbit rendezvous,
simplifies mission planning, removes imposed surface
stay times, allows global access, and requires the
development of only one pressurized vehicle. However,
the vehicle mass must be much higher than that of the
LEV and LTV, since it must carry all of its Earth-return
fuel down to the lunar surface and back. This mass
increase corresponds to a larger IMLEO, which implies
the need for either larger liftvehicles or more launches
and assembly in LEO, when compared to the LOR
architecture. In addition, the sensitivity of total vehicle
mass to crew module mass limits the cargo capability
of the lander, meaning it would be very expensive in
terms of both mass and dollars to build a lander capa-
ble of staying a month or more at a time. Thus, an
autonomously delivered surface habitat could be
required, perhaps necessitating another launch. 10
Hiqh Lunar Staqinq
The high lunar staging architecture is, in general,
just a variation of lunar orbit rendezvous. By staging far
from the Moon's gravity well, larger plane changes can
be made with reasonable propellant use, allowing glo-
bal access; something not feasible from low lunar orbit.
The payload capability is greater than that of the
direct mode, but somewhat less than that of the LOR
option. However, many of the phasing problems asso-
ciated with the low LOR architecture apply to the high
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Fig. 5. Lunar Direct Mission Architecture
LOR as well. That is, with the exception of one special
high-altitude staging point, the cislunar libration point.
Staging from the cislunar libration point, alleviates
many of the phasing problems associated with lunar
orbit rendezvous, because it does not actually orbit
aboutthe moon, but remains fixedabove the lunar sur-
face, at a point between the Earth and Moon. 10
The cislunar libration point (CLP) staging scenario
allows for a smaller lander than the direct mode, while
providing moderate payload capability with a lower ini-
tial mass in LEO. It allows global access and a return
any time from the surface. In addition, free returns on
the outbound transfer are always available. 8
Cislunar Libration Point Staqinq
Libration point locations are found as special solu-
tions of the restricted three-body problem which is
defined as follows: two mass points m 1 and m 2 of
arbitrary finite mass revolve in circular orbits about their
center of mass under the influence of their mutual grav-
itational attraction. A third body (m 3 ) of infinitesimal
mass (that is it does not influence the motion of the pri-
maries m 1 and m2) moves under the gravitational
influence of the primaries. The "problem" is to describe
the motion of m 3 , which is not required to move in the
plane of motion of the primaries. All motion takes place
in a rotating cartesian system whose origin is the cen-
ter of mass. The x-axis is along the line connecting m 1
and m 2 and the z-axis is normal to the plane of motion
of m! and m 2. For this analysis, the larger of the two
masses (Earth) is denoted by m 1 and is separated
from the smaller mass (Moon) denoted by m 2, by a
distance d. 11
This problem has no general analytical solutions as
does the more familiar two-body problem. However, it
does have some very special solutions which are quite
useful. There are five stationary points or solutions for
this problem. They are depicted in Fig.6 for the Earth-
Moon system.
^
/
" " d
MOON ," d
Translunar", Cislunar
• i
d", At
v
EARTH I
I
E3
,_ Transearth
Center of mass
6. Libration Points in the Earth-Moon System 11
'Stationary' means that an infinitesimal mass would
have no motion in the rotating system if placed at the
point with zero initial velocity. The stationary points will
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be referred to as libration points in this paper; although
they are also referred to as equilibrium, Lagrangian
and Eulerian points. Three of these libration points,
known as the collinear points, lie on the Earth-Moon
line. In this paper, these are referred to as "translunar"
for L 1, "cislunar" for L 2 and "transearth" for L 3 . The
other two points (L 4 ancl L ) form equilateral triangles5
with the primaries and are called the Lagrangian
points. 11
A stability analysis reveals that the collinear libra-
tion points are always unstable. This fact suggests that
station keeping would be required to maintain a satel-
lite at the collinear points even in the idealized environ-
ment of the restricted three-body world. The equilateral
points are found to be stable provided the mass param-
eter (m2/(m 1+ m2)) is less than 0.0385. This is true for
the Earth-Moon system, whose mass parameter is
approximately 0.01215058. 11
The CLP strategy requires twice as many propul-
sive maneuvers as the LOR strategy (excluding ascent
and descent) and therefore a new naming convention
was developed. The additional maneuvers occur at the
CLP where the LTV is stored, while the crew uses the
LEV to explore the Moon. The naming convention is
presented in Table 2, with the analogous LOR maneu-
ver acronyms listed for comparison. An overview of the
CLP strategy is depicted in Figure 7.
Table 2: CLP NAMING CONVENTIONS
Maneuver
ECLI
Definition
Earth-Cislunar
Injection
Correspon
ding LOR
Maneuver
TLI
CLOI-1 CisLunar Orbit
Insertion-1
CLLI CisLunar-Lunar LOI
Injection
LOI Lunar Orbit Insertion
LCLI Lunar-CisLunar TEl
Injection
CLOI-2 CisLunar Orbit
Insertion-2
CLEI CisLunar-Earth
Injection
EOI Earth Orbit Insertion EOI
The CLP scenario is similar to the LOR strategy
CLOI-1
LEAVE FROM
SSF ORBIT
/ LEV
ECLI
Fig. 7. CLP Mission Architecture
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with the exceptionof the four additionalpropulsive
maneuversrequiredto stopat and departfrom the
CLP. On a typical mission, the LTV would depart the
space station with the ECLI maneuver and insert at the
CLP with the CLOI-1 maneuver. After separating from
the LTV, the LEV and crew leave the CLP by perform-
ing the CLLI maneuver and insert into an intermediate
low lunar orbit with the LOI maneuver. When the proper
landing site phasing is attained, the LEV descends to
the lunar surface, leaving nothing in lunar orbit. Another
option is to land directly on the surface without stop-
ping in an intermediate lunar orbit. However, this gen-
erally requires larger changes in velocity (AV), due to
increased gravity losses. Landing site exclusion zones
also exist when using this scenario. 12 These zones
can be eliminated with a three burn strategy, but this
complicates the mission planning, and can increase
the total AV requirements. The return scenario uses a
similar strategy by ascending to an intermediate low
lunar orbit before injecting into a CLP transfer orbit with
the LCLI maneuver. The CLOI-2 braking maneuver at
the CLP permits the LTV/LEV rendezvous. The crew
transfers to the LTV and returns to the space station
using an aerocapture technique similar to the LOR
strategy. This is accomplished using the CLEI and EOI
maneuvers. Notice that, unlike the LOR strategy, the
LEV is left at the CLP for reuse on subsequent mis-
sions. This is possible because the rendezvous compli-
cations associated with leaving the LEV in lunar orbit
are eliminated.
Stability analysis has shown that station keeping
near the unstable CLP is very little, on the order of one
meter per second per year. 13Thus, storage of the LEV
at the CLP would not be a problem from a storable fuel
standpoint, but might be a challenging autonomous
guidance and navigation problem.
V. Earth Return Options
Another factor which complicates the choice of
architecture is how the crew is returned to the Earth's
surface. There are three basic Earth return scenarios
available for each of the modified mission architec-
tures: (1) capture the crew cab into LEO either propul-
sively or via an aerobrake maneuver and rendezvous
with either the space station, space shuttle, or some
other form of crew return vehicle in low Earth orbit
which would transport the crew to the surface, leaving
the crew habitat in LEO to be refurbished or expended,
s (2) capture the crew cab into LEO and land either
propulsively on dry land, as the cosmonauts do, or
glide to a horizontal landing as the shuttle does, ts or
(3) return to Earth on a hyperbolic trajectory, perform a
direct entry, splash down 'Apollo-style' in the ocean,
and be recovered by ship. 4
Vl. Revised FLO Architectures
After much analysis, two new design requirements
were identified by the Exploration Program Office,
which necessitated a change of architectures: global
lunar access and any-time return capability.
The lunar exploration architecture must make the
entire moon available, since the geology is very
diverse, and since there is a desire to search for ice
hidden in craters at the lunar poles. In addition, the
crew must be able to leave the lunar surface to return
14
to earth at any time in case of emergency.
Analysis of the three different staging architectures
resulted in the deletion of the requirement of departure
from and return to the space station. This was due in
part to the following reasons: (1) return to a regressing
station node was too constraining on mission planning,
(2) free return aborts to station are almost non-existent,
(3) architectural dependency upon the station was a
high-risk factor, (4) the station node delays treatment in
10
case of medical emergency.
The modified architectures also called for direct
entry at Earth with a splash-down and recovery. No
other return options were considered viable at that
time. is The advantages and disadvantages of each
option are summarized in Table 3.
VII. Final FLO Proposal
Unfortunately, funding for FLO was cut only
months after the contract was awarded. The FLO study
was concluded in early 1993 with the recommendation
of the lunar direct architecture.
Under this proposal, a new heavy lift launch vehi-
cle capable of placing 225 metric tons in LEO would be
developed based on the Saturn V. An unmanned crew
habitat, derived from the space station modules, would
land autonomously on the lunar surface prior to the
launch of the piloted vehicle. The crew transfer module,
resembling the Apollo re-entry module would support
the crew during the outbound and return legs of the
flight and double as a lunar lander, performing the lunar
descent and ascent. The crew would transfer to the
surface habitat shortly after arrival, and transfer back
prior to their departure. The module would perform bal-
listic re-entry and splash down like Apollo. is
This architecture negated the necessity of develop-
ing two crew transfer modules and deleted all the phas-
ing problems involved with staging to and from lunar or
Earth orbiting nodes. However, this option was the
most expensive in terms of initial mass in LEO, and
required the development of a heavy lift launch vehicle.
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Table3: Comparisonof RevisedLunarTransportationArchitectures
Advantages Disadvantages
Lunar Orbit Rendezvous
- Minimizes vehicle mass requirements
by leaving parts in LLO
- Well suited for near-equatorial sites
Lunar Direct
- Provides global access
Any-time abort available
Single cab development
Eliminates orbital rendezvous
- Eliminates long-term orbit maintenance
High Lunar Staging Point
- Global access available since plane changes
less expensive in high orbit
- Any-time abort available
- Crew can live out of lander
- Provides Moderate payload delivery capability
- Not well suited for off-equatorial sites due to phasing
constraints and very long or short stay times
- Any-time return not always available due to earth
return phase alignment
- Dual crew cab development
- Sensitive to crew cab mass
- Larger launch vehicles required
Cargo transported with crew is more limited
- Smaller crew cab implies greater need for prior
delivery of a habitat
- Dual crew cab development required
Round-trip travel times can be a few days longer
than LOR or Direct
VIII. Beyond FLO
Some figures of merit used in previous studies
include: (1) Initial Mass in Low Earth Orbit (IMLEO)
requirements, (2) new technology requirements, (3)
infrastructure requirements, (4) vehicle development
requirements, (5) abort options, (6) mission leg travel
times, (7) surface stay times, (8) station keeping
requirements / orbital stability (in terms of AV), (9) mis-
sion planning complexity, and (10) cost in terms of dol-
lars.
In the aftermath of the FLO cancellation, studies on
new and revolutionary lunar mission architectures have
continued, with emphasis on reducing cost and com-
plexity.
Of all the figures of merit, lowering the IMLEO has
perhaps the most direct effect on cutting cost. In addi-
tion, reduction in mission complexity, such as rendez-
vous, docking, and proximity operations, and negation
of multiple crew modules, has a major cost benefit,
allowing for the development of a simple crew module.
The third major cost driver is infrastructure. In general,
less infrastructure will mean lower program cost. 17
Lunar Oxvaen Utilization
One revolutionary architecture that could produce
the greatest cost reduction relies on the production of
oxidizer from lunar soil for use on the return leg of the
mission.
Almost half the mass of lunar regolith is trapped
oxygen, which can be extracted and refined into liquid
oxygen. A number of extraction methods have already
been patented, and one has been successfully tested
on lunar samples.
Approximately 85% of the propellent mass for oxyo
gen/hydrogen rockets is due to the oxygen; thus, if the
oxidizer required for the return trip (lunar ascent,
transearth injection, Earth capture, and deorbit bums)
could be manufactured on the moon, the IMLEO could
be drastically reduced.
This option would remove the difficulties associ-
ated with LOR operations without incurring the mass
penalty of the FLO lunar direct architecture, since no
Earth-return oxidizer would be taken to the lunar sur-
face. Initial studies show that this architecture could
require as little as 113the IMLEO of comparable Apollo-
style LOR or FLO lunar direct architectures.
With such drastic mass reductions, the develop-
ment of a heavy lift launch vehicle would not be neces-
sary. A single shuttle-derived launch vehicle would
suffice.
Like the FLO architecture, this so called LUNOX
architecture would require the emplacement and
checkout of infrastructure prior to launching the piloted
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mission. Estimates indicate two shuttle-derived
launches would be required to deliver the lunar oxygen
production equipment. 17
The cost of the first piloted mission was estimated
to be around $19.6 billion, as opposed to the first FLO
mission at $25 billion. After a half dozen missions, the
savings compared to the FLO option would be $18.5
billion. The development cost of the robotic surface
vehicles and oxygen production systems was esti-
mated to be $3.4 billion. 18
Future Architectures
Another architecture which may hold promise
when a strong human presence is finally in place on
the moon is the use of a rapid nuclear powered lunar
shuttle to ferry crew and cargo back and forth between
Earth and lunar orbit.
A proposal by NASA's Lewis Research Center and
Aerojet's Propulsion Division envisions the use of a
high Isp nuclear thermal rocket (NTR) augmented by a
liquid oxygen afterburner to provide a rapid transit shut-
tle capable of delivering 25 tons of cargo / crew to lunar
orbit in 24 hours.
Their scenario envisions workers and cargo being
transported to LEO via a scramjet, where they would
be transferred to the rapid transit shuttle module. Once
in lunar orbit, the module would de-couple and mate
with a lander, which would take it to the surface. 18 The
surface infrastructure would presumably rely on lunar
oxygen to supply the lander taxi with oxidizer for ascent
and descent.
!X. Conclusion
The only thing that can be said of lunar mission
architectures with any certainty is that they will almost
certainly evolve as technology and experience
advance.
If ice is discovered in sufficient quantities at the
lunar poles, if the mining of helium 3 becomes realistic,
or if lunar tourism becomes a reality (as proposed by
Japan) 18, cheaper and faster methods of transport will
certainly be required.
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A logistics system comprised of two orbital stations for the support of a 500 GW space power satellite scenario in
a geostationary orbit was investigated in this study. A subsystem mass model, a mass flow model and a life cycle
cost model were developed. The results regarding logistics cost and burden rates show that the transportation cost
contributed the most (96%) to the ovarall cost of the scenario. The orbital stations at a geostationary and at a
lunar orbit contributed 4% to that cost.
This study was performed in the time period Oct.
1987 to June 1992 as part of a Solar Power Satellite
(SPS) Project at the Aerospace Institute of the
Technical University of Berlin. The Space Power
Satellite system is a large number of photovoltaic
space power plants partially manufactured and
assembled in geostationary orbit. They deliver
electrical energy via microwave to rectennas on
earth for distribution to consumers. The major
driver for this type of analysis was the assumption,
that the energy production and supply on earth using
solar power satellites at a geostationary orbit can
only be provided at economically competitive
prices, if the solar satellites and the geo-
infrastructure are fabricated and implemented using
lunar resources in addition to the resources provided
from the earth surface: the use of lunar resources
reduces the logistics cost up to 67 % compared to an
"all earth" resources scenario. Several studies were
already performed analyzing, e.g., the impact of
alternative propulsion types utilized for the scenario,
or optimizing the design and fleet composition of
such a scenario involving earth and lunar resources.
This study aimed to identifiy the basic parameters
with respect to the type and cost of the logistics
support associated.
In order to perform the analysis a survey of related
publications was made, relevant studies were
reviewed and a logistics scenario was established.
The scenario considered the development, on-orbit
integration and operations of a 500 GW solar power
satellite system consisting of 111 5-GW-Satellites in
a geostationary (GEO) orbit, its supporting GEO-
and LUNAR-Infrastructure, as well as the dedicated
logistics orbital stations and resupply launchers and
vehicles.
The scenario started with the early deployment and
operations of an exploration base on the lunar
surface early in the 21st century. This first lunar
outpost was to be developed into an exploitation
Lunar Base with up to 16 facility elements. The
Lunar Base was to provide mining, production,
manufacturing and power generation facilities, as
well as habitation facilities and a Lunar Spaceport,
where up to 800 people (peak) were to live and
work. The Lunar base was to export to the
geostationary infrastructure among others raw and
construction materials for satellite subsystems and
structures, microwave converters and liquid lunar
oxygen as propellant.
Parallel to the Lunar Base development, there was
also to be a strong build up phase of the
geostationary orbital infrastructure (GEO-
Complex). It was to start with a demonstration
flight unit of a 10 MW Solar-Power-Satellite in low
earth orbit (LEO) and a 500 MW prototype in
geostationary orbit. The further assembly and
integration of a total of 111 5-GW-Satellites was to
be performed in GEO at dedicated orbital assembly
and maintenance facilities, supported by habitation,
laboratory and space port facilities. The production
peak with up to 600 people would arise at about
year 40 after operations start. The GEO-Complex
was to consist of up to 10 orbital facilities. The
transportation and distribution of pressurized and
unpressurized cargo, propellants, pressurants and
other supplies and the rotation of crew members
was to be performed by a local transportation
company (Geostationary Regional Transportation
Company, GRET), which served 39 routes in GEO
with a fleet of vehicles of different types. After the
peak there were only maintenance and post-
production activities assumed.
The earth facilities were to provide the liquid
hydrogen, propulsion subsystems, as well as
"Copyright © 1994 by the American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics Inc. ,All rights reserved"
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electronics, crew supplies and other dedicated
equipment to the lunar and to the geostationary
infrastructures. The study logic is shown on figure
1.
THE DEFINITION OF THE LOGISTICS
SYSTEM
The Logistics System supported through its
elements the build up, the operations and the phase
out of a Solar Power Satellite System by providing
the transportation, storage and distribution functions
for the GEO-Complex and for the Lunar Base,
figure 2. The transportation function was performed
through dedicated launchers (Heavy Space
Freighter, HSF) and vehicles (Orbital Transfer
Vehicle, OTV). The storage and distribution
function was performed by dedicated orbital stations
in GEO (Geostationary Space Operations Centre,
GEO-SOC) and in lunar orbit (LUO-SOC).
GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS
The analysis of the implementation and evaluation
of a cis-lunar logistics system was carded out under
the following assumptions and ground rules:
o Transportation of the Lunar Base elements
and supplies by reusable Heavy Space
Freighters (HSF) based on the NEPTUNE
concept design introduced in/2/.
o Transportation of lunar crew and crew
related supplies by large capsules (third
stage of HSF).
o Establishment of a Lunar Space Operations
Centre in low lunar orbit as a
transportation node for maintenance and
fueling of space vehicles.
o Use of reusable, chemical propelled orbital
transfer vehicles with aerobrake return
from lunar and GEO orbit to earth orbit.
The third stage of the HSF (cargo OTV)
return to the earth surface.
o Utilization of lunar produced LOX for the
propulsion of the orbital transfer vehicles
departing from GEO-Complex, lunar orbit
and surface. All liquid hydrogen is
produced on earth and distributed to GEO
and Lunar Base by the HSFs and OTVs.
o Establishment of a Geostationary Space
Operations Centre in the GEO-Complex as
a transportation node for maintenance and
fueling of space vehicles.
o Transportation of GEO-Complex elements
and supplies by reusable HSFs.
o Transportation of GEO-crew and crew
supplies by large capsules.
o Stay time of the crew at GEO facilities and
on the Lunar Base is 6 months on an
average.
An overall time period of 50 years was
considered for scheduling and life cycle
cost estimation.
Three models were developed for the analysis of the
logistics parameters:
o the mass analysis model
o the mass flow model
o the life cycle cost (LCC) model
MASS ANALYSIS MODEL
It served as a tool for the evaluation and analysis of
the subsystem mass of the Space Operations Centres
and Orbital Transfer Vehicles. The objective of the
model was to develop algorithms for the estimation
of mission and design dependent subsystem mass
data. These mass data were used for cost evaluation
purposes in the LCC-MOdel.
Splace Operations Centre
The mass breakdown was performed considering
mission dependent (product tree approach) and
technical layout (work break down structure
approach) functions of a Space Operations Centre.
The technical design of a SOC was derived from the
second stage of the NEPTUNE heavy launcher
concept.
SOC Net Mass
Structure
Propulsion
Propellant Tanks
Attitude Control
Pressur. Habitation
Pressurized Storage
Truss Structure
MicrometeoridProtection
Servicing Facility
Docking/Berthing
Re fuelling/Reliquefaction
Robotics
OrbitalSupportEquipment
Spares
Scientific Facilities
Power Generation
Crew Safeguard/Escape
(Mg)
91.91
0.12
26.11
7.37
87.06
25.68
14.48
38.44
57.66
8.89
8.74
10.30
7.31
1.22
1.74
20.48
15.16
Total Net Mass On-Orbit
Tank Capacity
Table 1: Reference subsystem mass of a SOC
422.67
1404.75
The reference layout concept of a SOC is depicted
on figure 3. The SOC consists of structure,
habitation modules, storage modules for pressurized
cargo, facilities for unpressurized cargo storage and
for docking and berthing, handling and servicing of
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
OTVs. Mass algorithms were developed for each of
the SOC subsystems established, see table I for
mass breakdown. The SOC initial launch mass
calculated is approx. 1800 Mg, the net mass 422
Mg.
Orbital Transfer Vehicle
The mass breakdown of the OTVs was derived
from already established design concepts based on
chemical propulsion subsystems, i.e. liquid
oxygen/liquid hydrogen. It was further assumed that
a few types of vehicles would perform all the
logistics flights. A fleet of modular cargo/propellant
vehicles (cargo OTV) and crew vehicles (passenger
OTV) had to transfer cargo, propellants and
personnel to GEO and to the Lunar Base
autonomously. The dimensioning of the vehicles
was performed for the leg LUO- > GEO, because of
the traffic density experienced there. The cargo
OTV has a calculated launch mass of 204 Mg
(payload 100 Mg) and the crew OTV 83 Mg
(payload 23 Mg).
o Logistics cargo and propellant mass
requirements for SOC operations in GEO
and LUO
o Logistics crew resupply mass and OTV
resupply mass requirements
o SOC and OTV maintenance working hour
requirements
The integration of the SOC activities in the scenario
is depicted on figure 5. The main variables of the
primary mass flow of the scenario, i.e. cargo,
propellants and passengers, are shown. Parallel to
the primary there is the secondary mass flow for the
logistics resupply of the SOC in terms of own
(SOC) resupplies, e.g. maintenance, propellant and
crew, as well as the resupplies for the OTVs, i.e.
maintenance and propellant. The services provided
by each SOC are also shown as an output of the
station. The services provided are measured in
working hours and are divided into services for the
GEO and the Lunar Base cargo, for the OTV
ferries and services for the own SOC-subsystems.
MASS FLOW MODEl.
The mass flow model was developed for the
simulation of the primary mass flows between the
infrastructures on the moon, the GEO-Complex and
the terrestrial surface.
The overall mass flow is depicted on figure 4. The
major system variables, which were used as input
parameters for each scenario year to the mass flow
model, were:
o Length of the design and development
phase (years)
o Length of the operations phase (years)
o Length of the phase-out operations (years)
o Number of working persons in GEO
o Cargo mass from Lunar Base to GEO
(Mg)
o Lunar oxygen mass from Lunar Base to
GEO (Mg)
o Terrestrial hydrogen mass from Earth to
GEO (Mg)
o Number of working persons on the Lunar
Base
o Cargo mass from Earth to Lunar Base
(Mg)
Through the processing of the input values the
following logistics parameters were calculated for
each year of the cis-lunar scenario:
o Number of HSF launches and OTV flights
for each traffic route of the scenario
o Storage requirements for cargo and
cryogenic propellant mass on the SOCs
o Working hour requirements for SOC
operations in GEO and LUO
Through the simulation of the primary cargo and
propellant mass flow required for the Solar Power
Satellite operations, the mass flow of the logistics
support required, or secondary mass flow, was
derived. The ratios of primary to secondary logistics
support parameters were established as logistics
burden rates for mass and workload for the overall
logistics system in geostationary and lunar orbit.
The analysis revealed that the SOC in the lunar
orbit require the largest amount of propellants for
the OTV ferries to the GEO. This is explained due
to the fact that the ferries from lunar orbit to GEO
must carry all the propellant for the trip to and back
from GEO. This amount of propellant in LUO
influences the overall logistics mass burden rate of
751 (kg/Mg) established, i.e. to every 1000 kg
cargo mass transported through the logistics system
751 kg of logistics support mass are required by the
logistics system itself. 99.8% out of that support
mass consist of propellant for the OTV
transportation activities. The corresponding burden
rate for workload is 0.25, i.e. 25% of the actual
services (working hours) provided by the two SOCs
are required for the own subsystem and OTV
support activities.
LIFE CYCLE COST MODEL
The objective of the life cycle cost model was to
establish cost figures for the logistics support
provided by the SOCs and the orbital ferries.
Through the LCC model the overall cost of the cis-
lunar logistics system utilized was estimated. The
LCC model is depicted on figure 6. Cost algorithms
were developed for the calculation of the SOC
development and production cost using Cost
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Estimating Relationships (CER) of the following
type:
C=aM x
where
C = cost in manyears
a = system specific parameter
M = Subsystem mass in kg
x = cost specific parameter
In order to apply the CER algorithms to the
elements of the SOC, the SOC mass was broken
down to a lower level, e.g. the mass of the
pressurized modules was described through
structure, electrical, electronical and mechanical
subsystem mass.
o
Further assumptions of the LCC model:
o Commonality factors were established
considering the parallel development of the
SOC subsystems, a fact which leads to a
lower overall development cost.
The cost figures were calculated in
manyears and then transformed into
$(1990); the value manyear is not
influenced by inflation.
No detailed cost analysis was performed
for the OTV development and production,
since this analysis was already done in
other studies. Instead transportation cost
figures were derived, and transportation
prices were established for each leg of the
traffic model and vehicle type.
The design, development and production of
the SOC lasts 10 years, the implementation
and build up 4 years. With the operations
start of the LUO-SOC begins the
operational phase of the LCC model (50
years).
The following major cost groups were established,
see figure 6:
o Amortization Cost
The amortization cost considers the amount
of SOC development cost, the non-
recurring production cost and the
acquisition cost for ground support
facilities. The amortization cost is
distributed over the operational phase of
the scenario. No interest rates were
charged on the investments because the
program was assumed to be financed with
public funds.
o Indirect Operations Cost
This cost category considered all the cost
of the personnel, facilities and services on
earth, e.g. SOC mission control.
Direct Operations Cost
The direct operations cost includes all cost
elements of the on-orbit SOC operations
o
and OTV transportation flights, e.g. SOC-
personnel, transportation cost, external
services of L .roT.atBase.
Recurring Cost
The recurring cost includes the cost
elements for the system engineering, the
follow on production of SOC-
subassemblies for preventive maintenance ,
the spares and repair parts as well as their
integration and test.
The total SOC-development cost for the 1st flight
unit is calculated to approx. 17,8 billion $(1990)
and the production cost to 7,8 billion $(1990). The
overall life cycle cost of the cis-lunar market and
the life cycle cost of the SOC logistics system were
also calculated. The overall cis-lunar market
includes cost figures for the overall payload (cargo)
transported to the GEO-Complex and the Lunar
Base in the frame of the SPS scenario, while the life
cycle cost of the SOC logistics system includes the
cost elements of the two orbital stations (operations)
themselves and the supporting flights only.
OVERALL MARKET
Since the calculated quantitative cost figures are
valid for the particular scenario and the assumptions
applied, it was more interesting to fred out
qualitative figures, i.e. cost allocations in (%) of the
stations and vehicles in the cis-lunar market.
Provided that the average annual cost of operations
in the overall cis-lunar market was calculated to
approx. 80 billion $(1990), the transportation cost
represents the largest amount with 96%. The
distribution of the calculated cost percentages over
the life cycle of the market and the stations is
depicted on figure 7. The specific cost for cargo
mass transported and distributed through the stations
in LUO and GEO was estimated to approx. 760
$(1990) per kg mass. 75% of that cost fall into
GEO-SOC due to the high mass flow rates and the
associated cost, and 25 % into the LUO-SOC.
LOGISTICS SYSTEM
The specific logistics cost at the two space stations
was calculated to 27 $(1990)/kg, i.e. 27 $ for each
kg cargo mass transported through the logistics
system of the LUO and GEO stations, and
represents 3,6% of the overall life cycle cost. The
major contributor to the LCC of the orbiting
stations is the recurring cost (35,4%) of the stations
hardware. The transportation cost contributes 9,6%
to the overall station cost, see figure 8.
The cost for personnel on the SOCs was calculated
for both LUO and GEO, pending on the workload,
the traffic density of the stations and the cargo mass
flow. The personnel cost consisted of cost elements
for crew transportation, crew training, on-orbit life
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support and salary. Specific cost figures were also
derived for on-orbit working hours. As an average
value 5000 $(1990)/hour was calculated for the
GEO-SOC. The specific cost of a working hour at
the LUO-SOC was in the range of 30% of that
value. The on-orbit stay time for the crew members
was rated accordingly to approx. 12,5 million
$(1990) per person per year. The cost of the LUO-
SOC was approx. 32% lower than that of the
GEO.
Specific cost elements for the incoming and
departing ferries, as space port fees, were also
derived by applying the cost figure 27 $/kg payload
mass and station specific factors. This amount was
distributed to 93 % to the LUO station and 7 % to the
GEO station. This was due to the fact that the
ferries were transferring full loaded cargo mass
from LUO to GEO and returning back empty (mass
flow direction). Passenger ferries were carrying in
both directions crew members and showed rather
balanced figures; the fees for passenger ferries were
distributed to 54% to the GEO station and to 46%
to the LUO station.
An impression of potential clusters of space
operation centres in GEO and LUO is given on
figure 9. The analysis indicated a higher demand on
propellant storage capabilities in the lunar and a
higher demand for space ferry operations in the
geostationary orbit.
SUMMARY
The logistics analysis of the operations of a lunar
based solar power satellite scenario revealed that the
transportation cost is the major contributor (96%) to
the overall cost of the cis-lunar market. Logistics
burden rate evaluations indicate that 0.75 kg of
logistics mass for each kg of cargo mass and 0.25
maintenance hours for each working hour for cargo
servicing were required. The average life cycle cost
of a logistics system comprised of two orbital
stations in geostationary and lunar orbit including
the dedicated resupply flights was approx. 2.7
billion $(1990) per year.
The logistics system of the two stations analyzed in
this paper is only a part of the overall system in
GEO and LUO. Since the real demand on logistics
support and services depend on the cis-lunar
market, the optimization of the whole system, i.e.
orbital stations plus launchers pins orbital ferries,
may lead to a reallocation of functions and services
envisaged and thus influence the cost figures
presented. Logistics cost elements and burden rates
contribute the most to a transparent evaluation and
economic trade off analyses of alternative scenarios
and their supporting infrastructures.
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Introduction
The U.S. space launch program no longer
dominates the world and is now playing "catch-up" with
the world's first commercial launch company,
Arianespace. A healthy U.S. commercial launch
program is essential and will assure continued low-cost
military access to space. The effort to regain the lead
in commercial space launch market has been hindered
by declining Department of Defense budgets. President
Clinton's space policy prohibits expensive new launch
vehicles and limits the Department of Defense to low
cost upgrades of existing launch vehicles. The U.S.
government created the space sector and must ensure a
smooth and effective split from the emerging
commercial space program in order to regain world
dominance. Until U.S. government and commercial
ties are severed, the Department of Defense must
consider commercial space launch interests when
making military decisions.
Ariane provides an excellent "bench mark" for
the U.S. to base future launch vehicle upgrades.
Ariane advantages were identified and low-cost
recommendations have been made. If the U.S. sets the
target of first equaling and then surpassing Ariane by
incorporating these recommendations, then the U.S.
could once again dominate the world commercial launch
market and ensure low cost military access to space.
Does the U.S. have a commercial space launch
problem?
The U.S. space industry lost its lead in
launching commercial satellites several years ago, and
is falling further behind every day. The United States,
for seventeen years from 1965 to 1981, launched every
commercial satellite. The world's first and only
commercial space launch company, Arianespace, is
responsible for taking the lead away from the United
States. Arianespace now dominates the commercial
launch market by launching 65% of the world's
commercial satellites. _ The entry of China, Japan, and
Russia further reduced U.S. launches to less than 26 %
(Figure 1). An estimated $1 billion each year is lost to
outside space launch competition. The demise of the
U.S. commercial launch business will continue at an
ever increasing rate with the emergence of the Chinese,
Japanese, and Russian commercial space launch
programs and the debut of the Ariane 5. The future for
U.S. commercial space launch business looks grim
unless immediate corrective action is taken.
FIGURE 1. COMMERCIAL SATELLITE LAUNCH
VEHICLES, 1988-1992, 74 SATELLITES
Why should anyone care about the U.S. commercial
launch program?
Why should the American public care whether
or not the U.S. commercial space launch business is
lost to foreign competition? There are four reasons
why Americans should be concerned about the U.S.
commercial space launch future.
The first and probably the most important
reason is the economic future of the United States. The
standard of living for Americans depends on the
economic health generated by successful worldwide
competition. The rules of worldwide trade will be
written by those who dominate the market and everyone
else will have no choice but to play by those rules. 2
RELEASE C
159
The second reason is the concern for excessive
expenditures of tax dollars. Military space programs
consume a large amount of tax dollars and every effort
should be taken to keep those costs down. Competitive
commercial space launch businesses can help keep
military expenditures down for those companies that
take on both commercial and military contracts.
The third reason is national security by
providing continued access to space for the U.S.
military. A healthy U.S. commercial launch program
will assure continued low cost military access to space
because of shared technology between the government
and commercial sectors.
The fourth reason is national pride, which has
driven many previous space activities. President
Kennedy was the best example of one man who pulled
the nation together for the race to the moon because he
believed that the United States could not be second in
the eyes of the world, because second was last. 3 The
American people should be concerned about the future
of the U.S. commercial space launch program.
What has the government done to help the commercial
space launch program?
Each of the mainstay launch vehicle
manufacturers (Atlas, Delta, and Titan) have been
products of a nineteen sixties government sponsored
space race. The government needs to support the
emergence of a commercial launch program from the
womb of the original government dominated space
program. The separation of government and
commercial programs has been a slow and difficult
process that is far from complete. Government,
military, and commercial launch programs have been
interwoven into a maze of restrictive, overlapping,
inconsistent, and politically driven U.S. space policies.
The U.S. government has conducted numerous
surveys and organized many committees to research the
space program problem and provide recommendations
to Congress. During the last administration, The Vice
President's Space Advisory Board Report, November
1992, and the Final Report to the President on the U.S.
Space Program, January 1993, both recommended a
new family of launch vehicles and centralized
management. The U.S. fiscal crisis worsened with the
end of the Cold War and military budgets became easy
prey for the fiscal feeding frenzy of the last thirty
years. 4 A number of President Clinton's initiatives are
under way to again study the problem and recommend
a less expensive plan of action. 5 A recently released
draft of the Clinton's launch policy recommends that
the military be limited to improving existing launch
vehicles for military payloads. 6 The U.S. military has
been limited to low cost incremental changes to the
existing older Atlas, Delta, and Titan launch vehicles
for improving both the military and commercial space
launch programs.
Why does the government need to rescue U.S.
commercial launch companies?
U.S. commercial space launch programs need
to be freed from burdensome policies that prohibit rapid
and consistent decisions that are required of competitive
programs. The following example shows how a simple
government decision to modify a launch pad destroyed
commercial opportunities for Martin Marietta. An
earlier government decision to convert a Titan 3 to a
Titan 4 launch pad left only one Titan 3 launch pad
capable of launching commercial satellites. True, there
was a second launch pad on the west coast, but it has
never been capable of launching commercial satellites
into their required geostationary orbits. Martin
Marietta's, commercial division, launched just three
satellites before the only remaining launch pad was shut
down for Titan 4 modifications. The launch pad was
out of commission for two years and all commercial
Titan 3 launches were terminated while customers
sought launches elsewhere. For the benefit of the
nation and the future of the U.S. commercial space
launch programs, the government has an obligation to
ensure a smooth and effective split between government
and commercial space launch programs.
Why has Ariane been able to capture the commercial
launch market?
Arianespace recognized the potential of
commercial space transport and built a line of launch
vehicles tailored specifically to the needs of the world's
commercial satellite organizations. 7 The Ariane family
of space launch vehicles is specifically designed to
deliver payloads directly to geostationary transfer orbit
because commercial payloads are geostationary
communications and observation satellites. They offer
sixteen different launch configurations that cover a
broad range of payload sizes at consistently low prices.
Ariane also offers multiple launch capability that allows
all sizes of satellites to be matched to one of the sixteen
different launch configurations to achieve a consistently
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high maximum payload. The Kourou, French Guiana
launch facility is located near the equator, which
provides a 15% energy savings over U.S. launched
spacecraft bound for geostationary orbit s The large
family of Ariane space launch vehicles offers a number
of significant advantages that help explain why
Arianespace has captured the commercial launch
market.
What about other foreign launch competition?
China, Japan, and Russia have launch vehicles
capable of providing tough competition with the United
States. Launch competition from these three countries
has been temporarily held at bay because of satellite
export restrictions from the United States. U.S.
companies still build most of the world's commercial
satellites even though foreign competition is thriving.
Sixty nine percent of all the world's commercial
communications satellites scheduled for delivery from
1992 to 1997 will be built by a U.S. prime contractor. 9
The U.S. government has placed a number of export
bans on U.S. built commercial satellites to foreign
countries in order to protect the U.S. commercial
launch business.
The major reason for export bans has been the
unfair pricing advantage of government subsidized
launches. Export licenses of U.S. manufactured
satellites have been withdrawn from China for
accusations of price dumping, internal human rights
disturbances, and missile proliferation. 1° Concerns
over unfair Chinese pricing prompted the U.S.
government in 1988 to limit satellite exports to nine by
the year 1994, and all costs would be compatible with
the international launch market.11 The Russians have
also been denied export licenses, in 1989, for U.S.
manufactured satellites for reasons of illegal technology
transfer and price dumping. President Bush reversed
the decision in 1992, and approved one launch of a
U.S. built satellite. 12 A more recent U.S and Russian
agreement was reached in 1993 that allowed eight
Russian Proton geostationary commercial satellite
launches through the year 2000.13 Both the Chinese
and Russians have obtained commercial satellite
contracts that have been outside the jurisdiction of the
United States, which explains their gradual growth of
the commercial satellite market.
The Japanese, on the other hand, have not
offered competitive prices to foreign commercial
satellite customers. The earlier N1 and HI launch
vehicles were hybrid American and Japanese designs
that were never price competitive even though they
were very reliable. The new all Japanese H2 is one of
the world's most efficient heavy launch vehicles, but
the high development costs have temporarily prohibited
competitive launch pricing. 14 The Japanese intend to
reduce the costs of their H2 to make them competitive
with the Ariane, by simplifying production with
increased automation and reducing material costs by
using cheaper materials and simpler structures. _5
Another tremendous setback for the Japanese H2 is the
internal environmental restriction of only four launches
per year to protect the nearby fishing industries from
unnecessary loss of fish. 16 The Japanese H2 will
become a competitive launcher of commercial satellites
only when and if they can bring their prices down.
How will the U.S. compete with the emerging foreign
launch competition?
Americans do not seem to care that they are
falling behind the most advanced part of the industrial
world. Their most comfortable hypothesis is the belief
they do not need an economic game planJ 7 For
nearly a decade, Ariane has been consistently launching
more commercial satellites than the all of the U.S.
launch vehicles combined. Many years have passed
without a concrete plan to maintain the lead or at the
least, keep up with foreign competition, especially
Arianespace. Now, the U.S. has found that playing
"catch-up" is considerably more difficult than keeping
up with foreign launch competition. Lester Thurow,
author of Head to Head, provides the steps required to
catch up with the competition.
A country that wants to win
starts by closely studying the
competition. The purpose is not
emulation but what the business world
calls "bench marking." Find those in
the world that are best at each aspect
of economic performance. Measure
your performance against theirs.
Understand why they are better. Set
yourself the target of first equaling,
and then surpassing, their
performance. _s
Arianespace was selected as the "bench mark"
for this study because of their significant performance
and outstanding success in capturing a majority of the
world's commercial geostationarylaunch market. Their
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performance was then compared to U.S. launch
vehicles in four areas that were identified as being
important: (1) payload characteristics, (2) costs for
delivery, (3) launch vehicle selection process, and (4)
technology. Space launch program comparisons
uncovered a number of differences that gave Ariane a
significant advantage and those differences evolved into
"catch-up" and "get ahead" recommendations.
The first measure of performance: payload
characteristics
Payload characteristics were selected as the
first performance standard because of their importance
to the launch vehicle. The sole purpose of the launch
vehicle is to deliver a payload to a particular stellar
location. The world's space launch vehicles have
placed 392 communications and observation satellites
into 22,300 mile geostationary orbit from 1965 through
1992. A little more than 50%, 198, of those have been
commercial satellites that have cost about $12 billion,
1993 U.S. dollars, for delivery to orbit. Because the
U.S. had such a strong lead in the beginning, Ariane
still has only launched 66 compared to 117 U.S.
launched commercial satellites (Figure 2).
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Arianespace's goal, from the very beginning,
has been to launch half of the world's commercial
satellites. 19 Their goal will become a reality within
the next few years.
An average of fifteen commercial satellites per
year are now being launched and that number will
steadily increase if past trends continue. 2° Average
payload weights have also steadily increased (Figure 3)
from the first 39 kg (86 lb) Intelsat 1 to an average of
nearly 1200 kg (2700 lb). 2' Payload quantities and
size will continue to increase in the foreseeable future.
Ariane closely monitors increasing payload sizes and
ensures that their vehicle upgrades keep up with
commercial needs. U.S. launch vehicles, on the other
hand, are still being tailor made to specific military
payloads.
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The second measure of performance: launch costs
Commercial satellites typically are designed to
go to higher, more expensive, geostationary orbits
where they travel in synchronization with the Earth's
rotation and appear to be stationary. Space launch
vehicles take only the payload and a booster motor to
an orbit called a geostationary transfer orbit (GTO). A
GTO is a highly elliptical orbit used to take the payload
out to 22,300 miles where the satellite booster motor
fires to move the satellite into its final circular
geostationary orbit (GEO). Lanneh costs were
estimated using payload costs per pound to reach a
geostationary transfer orbit. The overall cost for a
flight was divided by the payload weight to obtain the
cost per pound rate. The U.S. Atlas, Delta, and Titan
launch costs were compared to the "bench marked"
Ariane for all commercial flights from 1988 to 1992.
The Atlas 1/2, Delta 2, and the Titan 3 cost
per pound rates were all unbelievably less than Ariane
4 by as much as 25 % (Figure 4). How can this be true
after hearing all the accusations of U.S. launch vehicles
being too costly? The lowest rates were commonly
achieved by U.S. launch vehicles carrying military
satellites. Military satellites typically used 100% of the
payload capacity for the tailor-made U.S. launch
vehicles, n Commercial satellites have been poor
matches to U.S. launch vehicles and averaged less than
80 % of the rated payload capacity. 23 Ariane payloads,
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on the other hand, averaged more than 90 % of the rated
maximum payload. :4 The average launch costs for
commercial satellites aboard U.S. launch vehicles was
slightly greater than $17,500 per pound, whereas,
Ariane dual payload launch costs averaged $15,600 with
single payload launches averaging only $12,200. z5
Afiane multiple payload configurations gives
Ariane an excellent tool for keeping costs down for
different sized payloads. Two different sized payloads,
hat may cost considerably more on any other vehicle,
can be matched to obtain a near full payload on an
Ariane launch vehicle. Ariane's multiple payload
capability and 16 different launch configurations
provides the significant advantage of being able to
launch almost any size satellite for a reasonable rate by
maximizing the launch vehicle takeoff weight limits.
The Ariane launch site in Kourou, French
Guiana, offers a 15 % advantage over launches from the
U.S. because Kourou is near the equator. The Ariane
launch advantage should be factored out when
comparing Ariane to U.S. launch vehicles. With a full
load, rates as low as $7,500 for Atlas 2A, $9,300 for
Delta II 7925, and $8,800 for Titan 3 could be obtained
if the Ariane launch advantage is factored out,
compared to Ariane's $12,000 per pound average for its
sixteen configurations.
The third measure of performance: launch vehicle
selection
Launch vehicle selections were reviewed for all
of the commercial launches from 1988 to 1992, in order
to identify basic selection criteria used by the satellite
owners. Launch vehicle decisions made by satellite
organizations were found to be primarily dependent on
cost per pound rates offered by launch vehicle
manufacturers. A number of basic pass-fail criteria was
first considered before the decision was reduced down
to one of cost. Reliability, warranty, accuracy of
placement, stress on the payload, export restrictions,
and launcher availability were some of the key pass-fail
items that sometimes narrow down the choice of launch
vehicles. A few exceptions to the lowest cost per
pound selection were noted by some organizations and
countries that had loyalties to particular manufacturers.
China, France, Russia, and the U.S military have
always used specific launch vehicle manufacturers
within their own countries. Even a few international
communications companies with worldwide ownership
seemed to have launch vehicle manufacturer preferences
that related to the ownership percentages. But, without
a doubt, most launch vehicle selection decisions were
based on cost per pound rates to deliver the payload to
geostationary transfer orbit.
The fourth measure of performance: launch vehicle
technology
The review of launch vehicle technology was
divided into three areas: (1) engine efficiency, (2)
payload-to-takeoff weight ratios, and (3) reliability.
Engine performance criteria was identified as engine
efficiency rated in specific impulse (Isp), which is a
ratio of the amount of fuel consumed to maintain a
particular engine thrust. The payload-to-takeoff weight
ratio was identified as a performance characteristic to
measure how much rocket mass was expended to
deliver a payload to a geostationary transfer orbit.
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Reliability is another performance characteristic that
estimates the odds of the payload reaching the desired
orbit.
Liquid engine performance ratings have not
increased significantly in the last thirty years and all of
the world's launch vehicle manufacturers seem to have
the latest liquid engine technology. The 1960's Russian
Proton engine is still the most efficient kerosene liquid
engine and the 1970's Shuttle liquid hydrogen and
oxygen main engine is the world's most efficient
engine. 26 Solid propellent motor performance has
been slowly improving and the Titan 4, SRMU solid
propellent strap-on booster, is the world's most
efficient. Ariane launch vehicles use conservatively
rated engines that are less efficient than any of the U.S.
engines. There seems to be little advantage in the type
of engine used for launch vehicles because the cost-to-
performance tradeoffs are not significantly different.
The lower performance solid boosters are less
expensive and the higher performance liquid engines are
more expensive.
The payload-to-takeoff weight performance
ratios were found to be a relative indicator of payload
launch costs. Most geostationary transfer orbit launch
vehicles expend 99 % of the takeoff weight in reaching
orbit (Figure 5). Generally, the lowest payload cost per
pound launch vehicles were near the high end of the
payload-to-takeoff weight ratios and the more expensive
ones had low ratios. Launch vehicle takeoff weight
brings out the seriousness of weight reduction programs
because cost efficiencies must drive the performance
ratings and not the other way around. The Atlas
has the highest payload-to-takeoff weight ratio, 1.6%,
of all the world's launch vehicles. 27 The Titan 4 with
the SRMU solid strap-on boosters and the Centaur
upper stage has a higher ratio than all of the Ariane
configurations. The Delta is in the lower third, below
Ariane.
Strange as it sounds, launch vehicle success
rates had little influence on the vehicle selection
process. Launch vehicle customers seemed to be very
tolerant of companies that were experiencing temporary
setbacks from failures. Even when launch companies
were suffering from consecutive failures, the customers
for the upcoming flights never withdrew their payloads
from the launch manifest for a number of reasons: (1)
a rescheduled flight on another launch vehicle would
have delayed the launch for about two years, (2)
contract penalties would have been costly, and (3) there
was a high probability that the launch vehicle problem
would be corrected before the next flight. For
customers that unfortunately lost their payload to a
launch vehicle failure, they typically collected a
percentage of the satellite construction costs from flight
insurance and were offered another free launch as part
of the warranty.
The plan to regain U.S. commercial launch dominance
Ariane has only three technical advantages over
the U.S. launch vehicle companies: (1) 16 different
launch vehicle configurations, (2) multiple payload
capability, and (3) a 15% energy advantage of
launching from Kourou, which is near the equator. If
these three advantages are factored out, then Atlas 1/2,
Delta 2, and Titan 3 would all be significantly more
cost effective than Ariane. President Clinton's basic
space launch policy prohibiting large expenditures on
new spacecraft and limiting the military to low-cost
upgrades to existing launch vehicles provides enough
funding to solve the U.S. space launch problem, but
only if the funding is used to implement multiple launch
capability, additional configurations, and a new launch
facility near the equator. His suggested upgrades
include such things as replacing hydraulics with
electromechanical systems, using lighter-weight
materials, and updating avionics and software. 2s
Clinton's launch vehicle upgrades may lower the costs
even more for military payloads, but they do not
address any of the issues that would help the U.S.
commercial launch organizations reclaim the
commercial launch market. The military is only
watching out for themselves by lowering the costs for
their military payloads. They have not yet realized the
importance of a healthy U.S. commercial launch
program that will, in the long term, provide continued
low cost access to space. The U.S. could reclaim their
once-held lead in launching commercial satellites if
upgrades to the existing launch vehicles included the
multiple launch capability, additional configurations,
and a new launch facility near the equator.
Recommendation 1
Fund a multiple payload option upgrade for the
existing Atlas 1, 2, 2A, 2A Block 1, 2AS and 2AS
Block 1 configurations in order to compete with Ariane
4 multiple launch capability. Also, fund a multiple
payload option, four or more satellites, upgrade for the
existing Titan 4, SRMU and Centaur configuration in
order to compete with the Ariane 5 multiple launch
capability.
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The most important difference between Ariane
and U.S. launch vehicles is Ariane's ability to launch
multiple payloads. This one advantage is the key to
understanding why Ariane now dominates the
commercial launch market. U.S. launch vehicles had
full load rates as low as $7,500 per pound for the Atlas
2A, $9,300 for the Delta II 7925, and $8,800 for Titan
3, but their average costs for commercial satellites were
an incredibly high $17,500 per pound. Most of their
launch vehicles flew with half empty cargo holds
because they were not able to match payloads to
optimize the payload capacities.
The military Titan 3 has the same payload
capacity as the Ariane 4 and has been launching dual
payloads for the military for over twenty years. The
Titan 3 upgrades never kept up with increasing
commercial payload sizes at economically competitive
prices. The Titan 3 was designed to be both a low-
Earth and a GTO launch vehicle with design efficiency
emphasis on low-Earth orbit injection. Because of the
low-Earth design emphasis, the second stage must go to
low-Earth orbit before sending the last stage on to a
geostationary transfer orbit, which makes the Titan 3
less efficient at sending payloads to geostationary orbit.
The Atlas, on the other hand, is a perfect candidate for
a multiple payload configuration upgrade. The Atlas is
smaller than the Ariane 4, but could lure plenty of
smaller payloads from Ariane. Ariane would then have
a difficult time matching the larger payloads for
multiple payload Ariane 4 and 5 configurations. Going
after the smaller payloads is one way to regain part of
the commercial launch market.
The Ariane 5, multiple launch configuration,
will be capable of launching three satellites, which will
provide a tremendous opportunity for Arianespace to
match an even wider range of payloads to fill the
spacecraft to its takeoff limit. Costs will be unbeatable
unless the U.S. tops that with a Titan 4, SRMU and
Centaur configuration, capable of launching four or
more satellites to a geostationary transfer orbit. The
Titan 4 also needs to be modified for a more efficient
flight trajectory that would go directly to a
geostationary transfer orbit instead of stopping at low-
Earth orbit.
Recommendation 2
Fund economical launch vehicle upgrades to
increase the number of launch configurations that widen
the payload window while keeping the cost per pound
rates low.
The second most significant technical
advantage Ariane has is their ability to accommodate a
wide variation of payload weights with their 16
different economical launch configurations. Any one of
these configurations is available for use, whereas, U.S.
launch companies are forced to phase out older
configurations because they are no longer needed for
military payloads. Every effort should be made to
increase the number of usable launch configurations for
Atlas, Delta, and Titan launch companies. Many
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military payloads. Every effort should be made to
increase the number of usable launch configurations for
Atlas, Delta, and Titan launch companies. Many
different launch configurations are necessary to provide
low cost rates over a wider range of payload weight.
Recommendation 3
The Department of Defense and commercial
launch companies should build a launch facility near the
equator to obtain a 15 % savings in geostationary launch
costs.
The third most significant advantage achieved
by Ariane is their ability to launch from near the
equator, which provides them with an immediate energy
savings over comparable U.S. launch vehicles launched
from Florida. A new U.S. launch facility would
provide an immediate 15 % cost savings for all flights
to geostationary orbit. Ariane is not the only
organization that will be taking advantage of the
equatorial advantages, representatives from the Space
Transportation Systems, Ltd., of Australia and four
Russian enterprises have signed an exclusive 20 year
$750 million contract for commercial equatorial launch
services from Papua, New Guinea. The Russians claim
the Proton can lift an additional 40 % payload from the
equator over their own northern Baikonur Cosmodrome
launch facility. _ The U.S. already owns two islands
near the equator that could be used for a new U.S.
launch facility. U.S. Baker Island and Howland Island,
south of the Hawaiian Islands, are located closer to the
equator than either New Guinea or Kourou. The initial
investment would take many years to recover, but the
advantages may make the difference for U.S. space
launch survival.
Recommendation 4
Reduce the size and weight of future military
satellites to be consistent with the size and weight of
commercial satellites to benefit both the U.S. military
and commercial launch sectors by providing common
designs.
Military payloads have been designed to
specifically carry out the intended mission regardless of
the size and weight, which means that military payloads
were seldom the same size and weight as commercial
payloads. The Titan 3 was designed over thirty years
ago and was capable of carrying military payloads that
were many times the size of the largest commercial
payload. The Titan 4 is also a very heavy lifter for its
day and is capable of carrying more than twice the
weight of today's largest commercial payloads. The
size of military satellites needs to be scaled back to the
same size of commercial satellites so that common
spacecraft can be used for launching both military and
commercial payloads.
Recommendation 5
Continue and encourage the split of military
and civilian space launch programs in order to provide
commercial sectors enough freedom to make
competitive choices and react quickly enough to catch
commercial opportunities.
Add a civilian contingent to the U.S. Space Command
management structure and the Pentagon who would
have the power and authority to influence decisions that
concern commercial launch issues.
After "bench marking" Ariane and studying
their performance strengths, a number of options have
been uncovered that can be used to catch up and even
surpass the success of Ariane. The survival of the U.S.
commercial launch programs is in the hands of the
Department of Defense until the commercial programs
can become autonomous. Ground operations, launch
facilities, and space policies are largely government
controlled even though each of the three major launch
companies (Atlas, Delta, and Titan) have their own
commercial divisions and manufacture their own
spacecraft. Too many military decisions are being
made that have been detrimental to the future of the
U.S. commercial launch business. Until commercial
launch vehicle companies can break away from military
entanglements, they will be unable to make the required
competitive choices to ensure a future in the world's
commercial launch market.
Conclusion
The U.S. commercial space launch program no
longer dominates the world and is now playing "catch-
up" with the world's first commercial launch company,
Arianespace. The U.S. government created the space
sector and must ensure a smooth and effective split
from the emerging commercial space program in order
to regain world dominance. Ariane, who is beginning
to create their own world trade rules, is no longer
tolerating subsidized launch vehicles. Until U.S.
government and commercial ties are severed, the
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Department of Defense must consider commercial space
launch interests when making decisions.
Ariane has provided an excellent "bench mark"
for the U.S. to base future launch vehicle upgrades.
Ariane advantages were identified and low-cost
recommendations have been made. If the U.S. sets
the target of first equaling and then surpassing Ariane
by incorporating these recommendations, then the U.S.
could once again dominate the world commercial launch
market.
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ABSTRACT:
Our satellite systems are mega-buck items. In
today's cost conscious world, we need to reduce
the overall costs of satellites if our space
program is to survive. One way to accomplish
this would be through on-orbit maintenance of
parts on the orbiting craft. In order to
accomplish maintenance at a low cost ! advance
the hypothesis of having parts and pieces
(spares) waiting. Waiting in the sense of having
something when you need it, or just-in-time.
The JIT concept can actually be applied to space
processes. Its definition has to be changed just
enough to encompass the needs of space. Our
space engineers tellus which parts and pieces
the satellite systems might be needing once in
orbit. These items are stored in space for the
time of need and can be ready when they are
needed -- or Space Based JIT. When a system
has a problem, the repair facility is near by and
through human or robotics intervention, it can
be brought back into service. Through a JIT
process, overall system costs could be reduced as
standardization of parts is built into satellite
systems to facilitate reduced numbers of parts
being stored. Launch costs will be contained as
fewer spare pieces need to be included in the
launch vehicle and the space program will
continue to thrive even in this era of reduced
budgets. The concept of using an orbiting parts
servicer and human or robotics
maintenance/repair capabilities would extend
satellite life-cycle and reduce system
replacement launches. Reductions of this nature
throughout the satellite program result in cost
savings.
What we did in the past, we do not want to do in the future.
General Charles Homer 18 Sep 92
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DIS¢I, JSSION:
The simple fact of distance has never been a real
factor in material distribution--as long as you
were still on earth. Getting a specific pan when
needed or within set time parameters became
easier once the Just-In-Time (JIT) distribution
concept was recognized and implemented. The
JIT process is a material distribution concept
plan where external suppliers deliver raw
materials to the manufacturing facility just at the
time the customer is ready to use those
materials. As an internal continuation of the
process, one department is pushing the product
down the line just as the next department is
ready to start using the product for their internal
process. The JIT process has been proven to
reduce costs when used properly. Storage costs
are reduced, production time and costs are
minimized and the overall manufacturing
budgets are less. The work center is provided
with the proper quantity of materials and
components needed to do a given job at the
exact time the materials are needed--or just in
time.
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Again, this concept is great, while you are on
earth. One of the very first lessons learned from
space travel had to do with planning what to
bring along to assure you had what you needed
when you needed it, or Space-Based JIT. It
simply wasn't as easy in zero gravity to "space
walk" over to the store for a missing part or that
extra screw. We've learned our lessons well.
Spares planning has become a very important
aspect of every space mission: plan ahead for
every eventuality, expect the failure and be ready
for it. The concept of SIT needs to be expanded
into the space arena. JIT needs to go beyond
simple material distribution and enter a new,
more complex dimension in space. The SIT
distribution concept can work in space.
The integrated logistics support (ILS) elements
(Figure 1) are the cornerstone for every project
from conception to completion and concept of
the replacement project. They cover 10 very
important aspects of management functions
through a disciplined, unified and iterative
approach. While many logistics text books print
the ILS elements in the order as shown in the
referenced figure, I feel the last item on the list,
Design Interface, is by far the most important of
the 10. If not the first on the list, it should be
the t'n'st logistical element in place following
recognition of need. It needs to be the one
element around which all the others revolve.
1. Maintenance Planning
2. Manpower and Personnel
3. Supply Support
4. Support Equipment
5. Technical Data
6. Training and Training Support
7. Computer Resources Support
8. Facilities
9. Packaging, Handling, Storage and
Transportation
10. Design Interface
FIGURE 1. Integrated Logistics Support
Elements
Design Interface considers and accepts or rejects
aspects of initial conception and design. It
includes necessary activities and training
required for production. The design interface
process integrates parts requirements into the
overall picture throughout the life cycle. Design
interface also addresses disposal or removal.
Design interface is total support; total support of
a system/project/idea covered through
application of and processing through this one
element. Supportability planning and related
design considerations must be included in the
requirements definition process and thoroughly
evaluated during concept development to ensure
options can be reasonably implemented in the
operational system. 1 Design Interface will
support our Space Based JIT concept.
The space program we envision today for our
future will most likely be quite different from
the one we actually put into place. Budget
constraints and even public opinion will drive
and change many of our plans and designs. It is
likely that DOD will design high-value
satellites, including potentially large
constellations of strategic defense systems
spacecraft for periodic revisit, servicing, and
maintenance. 2 Even if the United States
continues working in an international arena for
space exploration, our share of the budget costs
could be quite large. Controlling those costs
creates a challenge for our space engineers.
Getting down to the basics of controlling costs
brings us back to another basic--designing for
cost control, cost effectiveness throughout the
system's life cycle. If space support is to be used
routinely, the costs per mission for accessing
space must be low. This extends to the costs
associated with the vehicle, flight operations and
the payloads. 3
What we are doing today, both in terms of plans
and actual building, will affect our entire
program and shape our space future. What our
engineers are creating in their minds today will
be the driving force of budget problems
tomorrow unless we show that changes in
program strategy which include design
constraints will not expose the overall program
to unacceptable cost growth risks. 4 What we are
developing in the face of budget constraints is
very much dependent on our understanding of
design interface. Our final designs, if they are
going to work, must be specified in design-
related terms that can be unambiguously
interpreted, designed to and demonstrated, s In
addition to working a design for cost
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considerations, more attention must be directed
toward such design characteristics as reliability,
maintainability, human factors and
supportability. 6 What we are considering within
today's budget figures must be supportable
within the range of tomorrow's money, for
throughout the design process, the key words to
remember will be operability, manufacturability,
supportability, availability and cost-
effectiveness. 7
Planning for the future through design has all of
the ILS elements working as one within and
across specific programs. Taking those lessons
learned from our past space flights and applying
them in the design of our future space programs
is not only the smart way to go, it is the only
way to go. We cannot continue designing
spacecraft systems without incorporating
supportability elements. Supportability refers to
the design of a system such that it can be
supported effectively and economically
throughout its planned life cycle) Even while
trying to remain competitive with other
companies, supportability of space assets must
be programmed in so that those assets become
and remain vital components of an overall space
system. These ideas, if implemented on future
space vehicles or during block upgrades to
existing space systems could quickly produce the
design, employment, and capability of on-orbit
support. 9
Designing in on-orbit support makes sense when
you start looking at dollars and cents in light of
handling tomorrow's budget. '_Foday, fully one-
third of our space budget goes to maintaining
the support infrastructure, buying and operating
launch vehicles, maintaining and upgrading the
launch infrastructure, sustaining the satellite
control network...when you add to that one-third
the cost of replenishing our current on-orbit
capabilities, GPS, DSCS...you've captured about
70% of our space budget. ''7 Between our
communications satellites, weather birds, the
family of navigational aids and the various
intelligence groups, we've got alot of space
assets out there in various orbits depending on
the mission. Those assets are also in various
stages of their respective life cycles. Logistics
support problems increase with the age of the
system and the rate of obsolescence of the
technology employed in its manufacture. 5
Essentially, these space-based systems either
directly or indirectly support all of our major
military weapon systems. The capabilities and
force enhancements provided by these systems
are so important that extreme measures axe
taken to ensure their performance and
survivability. Being able to access spacecraft
on-orbit and perform servicing functions has the
potential to increase performance, improve
survivability and lower the total program cost. 4
Our lessons learned have proved to us that on-
orbit servicing is not only feasible, but practical.
We've also learned that spacecraft lifetimes of a
decade or more are achieved with servicing.
Properly designed spacecraft can be upgraded in
orbit and critical spacecraft replacement
hardware must be factored into future
programs. 4 The concept of on-orbit
maintenance has been proven over and over
again, but in all instances, it was performed
through an extra vehicular activity (EVA) on a
specific, previously defined problem. Some of
the missions went well and were relatively easy;
others required more effort and time. In all
cases, the necessary parts were packaged and
carried out to the repair site. While this has
worked very well in the past, our thinking and
our planning must become futuristic. The
changing world events and an ever-shrinking
defense budget strongly suggest that we must
change the way we think about things and do
things, especially in the logistics community. 1°
Those persons involved with space programs
need to include more thought processes in the
design interface aspect of their programs.
Constraints and limitations of funding, existing
support structure, and manpower, they all must
be addressed. The overall objectives of the
concept development program must include
more thoughts of integrating the future servicing
possibility in the initial design.
Servicing is defined as any activity performed
on-orbit to assemble, maintain, repair, resupply,
upgrade, deploy, retrieve, or return various
spacecraft and/or facilities. 11 Servicing, or on-
orbit support, covers all activities required to
keep the space asset alive and well. Servicing
when the parts are readily available is easier and
in the long run, can cost less. Planning for on-
orbit support covers all activities before launch
and brings the future closer through the JIT
concept.
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Planning for servicing requires more than just
how many screwdrivers are needed. Knowing
what is to be repaired will drive the kinds and
numbers of tools required. The manned versus
robotics servicing process will compel the
engineers to be creative in their thinking. A
robotics servicer can perform better than a
human. Or can it? Certainly, that same robotics
servicer can be placed in areas where it is not
feasible for humans to be, but there are many
other differences to consider. Once those
differences are challenged and addressed, we
can move forward in planning. The def'mition
of servicing as defined above can be expanded to
include not only the maintenance repair and
resupply functions, but also replacement during
scheduled or unscheduled servicing times.
Any on-orbit servicing capability must start with
a specific number and type of tools and
equipment to perform known tasks. This
capability for servicing depends on many things,
but proper equipment to perform the mission is
paramount. How many times will it be
necessary for the astronaut or the robotics
servicer to return for a different size tool? How
many tools must they carry? Tools fall into
three basic categories--existing, current
development and recommended future designs.
Those existing are already in the EVA
inventory, the current development are those
that are funded or are in prototype and the
recommended have not passed the drawing
board ideas. .2 What we have and what we will
have in the future are a quantifiable item that
can be used over and over again. Battery
replacement for many spacecraft is a frequent
servicing requirement. Tools need to be
standardized to cut down on numbers required
for performing the multitude of tasks necessary.
This would in turn benefit the entire program
through lower costs, uniform interfaces and
wider availability. Many existing tools were
developed for specific tasks on specific
spacecraft and many others were developed
because of specific missions. A more universal
set of tools which could be applied to servicing
on all spacecraft would be desirable and would
result in lower transportation costs and less
EVA crew training.
Fuel/fluid replenishment is another aspect of
servicing to consider. A major drawback with
fuel/fluid replenishment is the standardization--
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or non-standardization--of the connectors in use
in the various spacecraft families. In order to
handle this type of servicing, it would be
necessary to develop the necessary connectors
and have a variety of them available for use.
However, there are many spent craft that cannot
be refueled because that capability was not
designed into them. This design flaw has left us
with basically one support concept and that is
abandonment. We cannot do any space-based
on-orbit servicing and in most cases, there is no
fuel or not enough fuel left to bring the space
asset back to earth. An empty fuel tank is
certainly the most obvious life-limiter of our
space assets. 7
So, what's being done? Abandonment of a
single satellite might be acceptable if that
satellite has repaid its initial costs twice over,
but the concept of abandonment of large and
expensive satellites, such as Milstar, is
counterproductive in a time of reduced budgets.
Some space vehicles are outliving their expected
lifetimes. This is great. Others are not.
Perhaps the argument could be for abandonment
of those systems, but is it reasonable and even
prudent to abandon them? Our space engineers
are limited only by their thinking. And their
thinking is hampered by dwindling budgets.
And yet, studies have shown that no technology
breakthroughs are required to perform on-orbit
servicing of space systems. 9 Many of the
systems, if repaired while orbiting, could carry
out their respective mission even though more
advanced technology will be used on later
vehicles. Most existing space assets can be
serviced and future families of satellites can be
designed for on-orbit servicing to include
replacement of parts and replenishment of
fuels/fluids. Some of these will be necessary
with robotics equipment, but many can be
accessed by humans. In either case, the space
community must expand beyond today's designs
and produce those families of future satellites
which operate at the efficiency we expect and
operate within budget constraints. Life-cycle
costs and improved system effectiveness can be
undertaken through standardization of those
elements that are similar across system
boundaries.
Those satellites that cannot be supported by
human astronauts must be capable of accepting
robotics intervention. That family of satellites
autics and Astronautics
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that is beyond the reach of our human capability
can still be serviced and maintained. But, by
today's standards, we still can and must take
care of what's out there with what we have - and
without the standardization of tools and
fuel/fluid connectors, our servicers (both human
and machine) must carry an array of extra tools.
This possibility will not always be acceptable.
Let's take a look at what we have and what we
can do with it. The very idea of a storage unit is
nothing new, but where do you put it and what
do you put in it? There are certain orbits which
can be used where an object that is orbiting will
continue at that specific orbit almost
indefinitely. These orbits can be used to hold
that storage unit. There are five of these orbits,
Libration Points, also known as Lagrangian
points for Earth-Moon orbits as well as similar
points for Sun-Earth, Sun-Venus, and Sun-Mars
orbits. Two of these Lagrangian orbits in Earth-
Moon location are very stable and require a
minimum of energy for an orbiting storage unit-
-a parts servicer. A parts servicer is simply a
vehicle that holds the various and assorted tools
necessary for servicing those satellites within
orbital reach. This parts servicer can be placed
in a strategic position for easy access by any
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV). Many of
the satelhtes we would want to service are out of
human reach and would need to be serviced
through robotics intervention. The robot that is
being sent to perform the servicing can easily be
attached to the OMV. The number of parts
servicers needed would be based on orbits
available and numbers of satellites easily
reached within each orbit. Based on reliabihty
predictions, the parts servicer would be outfitted
with parts specific for those satellites to be
serviced and planned satellites to be launched.
Based on design interface, the parts servicer
could be available and ready when needed or
Space-Based JIT.
Just to prove a point, that of cost savings, look at
some tables that represent launch costs for some
specific vehicles. These vehicles were chosen as
all launch into Low Earth Orbit (LEO),
Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO) and
Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO). Their weight
loads range from 1,420 kg on the smaller Delta
Payload Assist Module (PAM) to 4,600 kg for
the larger Titan IV.
Unit Cost ($M)
1978 1984 1990
Delta PAM 20 35 55
Atlas G 31 50 72
Titan IV 73 96 264
Cost/kg ($k/kg)
1990
GTO/GEO
38.7 / N/A
30.5 / 54.6
22.0 / 57.4
Figure 2 Launch Costs History
Simple math of cost per kilogram times weight load produces the next figure.
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Vehicle Weight Load
GTO/GEO
Launch Cost
GTO/GEO
Delta PAM
Atlas G
Titan IV
1,420 / N/A 54,954 / N/A
2,364 / 1,330 72,102 / 72,618
12,000 / 4,600 264,000 / 264,040
Figure 3 Costs per Launch
As we look at the figures represented above,
simple economics tells us that continual
replacement of any satellite family is expensive.
The 1990 figures are almost triple the 1978
figures and will very likely continue to increase
even more. The more we can put into orbit at an
acceptable, lowest-possible cost, the more
efficiently our space program will operate. One
or two launches of the parts servicer on a Delta
PAM into Libration Points could hold down the
weight on payloads put onto an Atlas G or a
Titan IV by having repair parts already in orbit
waiting. One or two launches of a Delta PAM
carrying an on-orbit parts servicer saves a great
deal of money when compared with the launch
of a heavier vehicle carrying a replacement
satellite that has no on-orbit capabilities.
As we think more about a parts servicer orbiting
with assorted parts stored, waiting for the time
when there is a need, the idea of design interface
begins to take on a new dimension. We simply
cannot be cost effective while we store six or
eight of one type part for various satellites. We
need to design in and enforce some sort of
standard in order to reach the point where we
need store only one or two parts at the most.
Satellites need to be designed for refueling and
the ports for each unit must be within certain
standards to allow use of one or two couplers for
the vast majority of them. The interface
between modules and the other parts of the
satellite could be unique to each satellite design
if necessary, but appears to be a good candidate
to become a standard. It would allow the
stowage of orbital replacement units from more
than one satellite in the parts servicer.
Standardization becomes a primary means of
lowering life cycle costs and providing improved
system effectiveness. 12
Space logistics must become an increasingly
critical element of the planning, design,
development, and operation of future space
systems--both manned and unmanned. The
complex new challenges to be introduced in the
emerging field of modern space logistics
demand early recognition and planning by those
in the related disciplines, in order to provide
effective solutions to problems affecting
program goals accomplishment and
affordability. 2 Space-Based JIT becomes a vital
link between the life cycle prediction and the life
cycle actuality. Budget constraints already make
it more economical to consider repair vice
replacement of assets. With some repair parts
already in space, payloads would be smaller and
launch costs would reflect the weight reduction.
With design interface considered, future
satellites--standardized satellite--would be
launched into orbits where they can be reached
by the parts servicer and serviced when needed
to extend their expected lifetimes. All things
considered, some standardization of space assets
through design interface incorporates many
issues beyond just design changes. The outcome
of the design process concerning space support
issues which eventually effect budgets far
outweighs the problems caused by making no
changes at all. Logistics support has taken on a
new urgency when we consider the space arena
and that urgency must be met if we are to be a
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vital part of the space world, in today's markets
with today's money. Supportability has never
seemed so critical, has never been so important
until this time of ever-shrinking budgets, scarce
resources and increasing demands made on the
space asset. The support of a satellite system is
vital, no matter the mission of that system. Our
repair robot or astronaut must be able to have
the proper equipment to do the best job possible
and the time is coming when we will not be able
to launch everything we need in one package.
We must have the means to put some of the
more frequently used parts in a place where they
can be stored, waiting for use--Space Based JIT.
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SPACECRAFT AVAILABILITY ENHANCEMENT BY IN-FLIGHT TESTING OF SPARE PARTS
Abs_act
Robert M. Cutler*
The MITRE Corporation
Greenbelt, Maryland
This paper describes an approach to improve
availability by testing redundant parts at pre-determined
intervals. The purpose of the testing is to detect non-
functional back-up equipment and develop work-around
measures or replacement spacecraft before a failure of
the primary equipment reduces availability. The work
reported here is an outgrowth of the NASA Space
Network's program for the maintenance and
replenishment of the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
System.
The approach is based on a standby factor and a
cyclic stress factor. The standby factor accounts for the
effects of adverse storage conditions encountered as
part of the in-flight environment. The stress factor
accounts for the effects of physical or thermal cycling
due to the application of force or power that
characterizes the operation or use of a component.
By the quantitative consideration of standby and
cycling risks, a regular testing interval can be calculated
- an interval for testing that furnishes information for
availability planning but does not subject the spacecraft
to undue risk. This paper includes quantitative
solutions for appropriate testing intervals for equipment
configurations and failure rates that are representative
of a Tracking and Relay Data Satellite. The effect of a
single test on the availability of certain equipment is
also illustrated.
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I. Back_ound
The NASA Space Network includes five
geostationary Tracking and Data Relay Satellites
(TDRSs) controlled by ground terminals located
primarily at White Sands, New Mexico. The TDRSs,
from their high orbits, can view almost the entire
surface of Earth. Each TDRS relays commands from a
ground terminal to user spacecraft in low earth orbit
(LEO). Each TDRS also relays data and telemetry from
user spacecraft to the ground terminal. User spacecraft
benefit from the Space Network's ability to
communicate between fixed ground facilities and
rapidly moving spacecraft at almost any time, and at
almost any location in LEO.
To ensure the continuity of Space Network
services, NASA monitors the state of health of the
TDRSs, plans for changes in user requirements, and
replaces or supplements TDRSs as necessary.
Constellation replenishment planning depends on
accurate estimates of TDRS lives. TDRS lives are
predicted by reliability models. These models perform
Monte Carlo simulations of the failures of all
components except those already known to have failed.
In most cases, a TDRS has a primary and a back-up
component for each required function. Thus, except for
the time required to identify a failure and activate the
back-up component, most component failures do not
reduce the availability of TDRS communication
services. A partial or complete communication failure
occurs only if both a primary component and its back-
up components fail. Back-up components are either
active (e.g., connected to live electrical circuits, and, as
a result, warmer than their environments) or inactive
but ready to be activated by an up-linked command to
throw a switch.
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II. Avvroach
Availability Improvement by In-Flight Testing
The NASA Space Network's TDRS's are not
normally subjected to in-flight testing of spare
components because the tests involve risk and expense.
In the absence of in-flight testing of a spare
component, the availability of the component type in a
redundant configuration depends on two factors. The
first factor is the availability of the primary component.
The present functionality of the primary component is
assumed to be obvious because it is in use. However,
the primary component is subject to the possibility of
failure at any future time. If its failure rate _, (often
obtained by using MIL-HDBK 2171) is constant, then
its availability Ap after a time interval t i is:
Ap = e-gti (1)
and its unavailability is the complement of the
availability, i.e.:
Up = 1 - e'_i (2)
The second factor is the availability of the back-up
component. The back-up component, or its switching
circuit, could be in a failure state that will not be
apparent until the item is switched on or otherwise
placed in active service. Its exposure to environmental
factors such launch acceleration and vibration, vacuum
with out-gassing, ionizing radiation, and thermal
cycling could have been responsible for its latent failure
state. Alternatively, the passage of time alone could be
responsible for its internally generated physical or
chemical degradation to a latent failure state. The
availability A b depends on the standby factor Q
multiplied by the failure rate _,, and on the accumulated
time in flight (since checkout) tf
Ab = e'Q_'tf (3)
and the unavailability is the complement of the
availability, i.e.:
U b = 1 - e-Q_'tf (4)
The overall risk of unavailability U is the product of the
two factors:
U = Up Ub (5)
Substitution gives:
U = (1 - e'_'ti) (1 - e-Q_'xf) (6)
The overall availability for the case without in-flight
testing is the complement of the unavailability:
A = 1 - (1 - e-kti) (1 - e'Qktf) (7)
If in-flight testing is under consideration, the
predictive time interval ti between tests should not
exceed the time required for the implementation of
alternative back-up or work-around measures.
Furthermore, the accumulated time in flight tf should
not exceed the time required for the completion of the
spacecraft's mission. In the meantime, there is an
expected value for the shortfall S in spacecraft-years of
service availability, depending on the time R required to
respond to the failure:
S = U R (8)
Substitution gives:
S -- (1 - e-kti) (1 - e-Q_'tf) R (9)
Risk of In-Flight Testing
In-flight testing of a spare component could result
in a failure because of the cyclic stress due to each test
itself. The stress can affect the switch that applies
power to the spare, the switch that connects the spare to
other devices, and the spare equipment itself, but these
phenomena are treated together for the purposes of this
paper. If we assume that the cyclic stress C is given in
1-equivalent hours of failure risk per in-flight test, then
the failure risk to the spare component due to each test
is:
Fb = 1 - e" _,C (10)
Since the overall risk results from the failures of both
the primary and the back-up components, the expected
value of failed spacecraft-years F in terms of potential
spacecraft life (since launch) L is:
F=UaFb (11)
Substitution gives:
F = (1 - e'_i) (1 - e -kC) (L - tf) (12)
Appropriate Testing Intervals
In-flight testing of a back-up component could be
beneficial if the shortfall S in spacecraft service
expected during the failure response period is
significantly greater than the testing stress failure
expectation F. The in-flight testing of spare
components would not prevent any failures, but it could
facilitate operational planning to maintain service and
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toobtain value from the programs being served. TDRS
services are believed to be much more valuable than
TDRS costs, because the services are needed by many
user spacecraft that may greatly exceed TDRS in cost
and value - but only if a TDRS can return their data.
TDRS user spacecraft programs include the following:
AXAF
COBE
EOS
ERBS
EUVE
GRO
HST
ISSA
LSAT
SS
TOPEX
TRMM
UARS
XTE
Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility
Cosmic Background Explorer
Earth Observing System
Earth Radiation Budget Satellite
Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer
Gamma Ray Observatory
Hubble Space Telescope
International Space Station Alpha
Landsat
Space Shuttle
Ocean Topography Experiment
Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission
Upper Atmospheric Research Satellite
X-Ray Timing Explorer
Furthermore, in-flight testing of spare components
could enable expensive and time-consuming
procurements of replacement spacecraft to be either
accelerated or delayed, whichever may be appropriate,
depending on the functionality of the in-flight
equipment.
For these reasons, advanced knowledge and
prevention of potential spacecraft service shortfalls
could have value comparable to, or greater than, the
spacecraft themselves. Assuming that the values of S
and F are comparable directly, the net testing benefit
NTB in spacecraft-years can be defined for any test
event as:
NTB=S -F (13)
Substitution gives:
NTB = (1 - e'kti) (1 - e-Qkxf) R
- (1 - e'kti) (1 - e -kC) (L - tf) (14)
For application to a periodic testing program, the NTB
must be summed over the life of the spacecraft. Note
that small testing intervals may not be practical if they
result in cycling that approaches or exceeds the finite
life of a component, which is not considered in the
above constant failure rate-based equations. Also note
that the implementation of small testing intervals could
be costly, reducing the NTB.
Cyclic Stress and Testing Interval
The first example illustrates the determination of an
appropriate testing interval. The numerical values used
here are typical of many TDRS components that are
configured with an active primary unit and an inactive
back-up unit that is switched on if and when it is
needed. A typical failure rate k for the active
component is one failure per million hours and the
standby factor Q for the back-up component is 0.1, in
accordance with standard failure rate data 1 and project
documents 2-4. The response time R (based on the
highly variable average time to build and launch a
replacement spacecraft) is estimated at three years, and
the lifetime L of a spacecraft is estimated at 15 years
(also an uncertain estimate, probably by plus or minus
five years). On the basis of the above formulas used in
spreadsheet calculations, the testing interval ti that
maximized the net testing benefit NTB was evaluated as
a function of cycling stress C in k-equivalent hours
(see Figure 1).
For low values of cyclic stress, the test interval is about
one month. As cyclic stress increases to about 2000
hours, the testing interval increases to about one year.
At higher cyclic stresses, the testing interval continues
to increase, indicating that testing may not be
appropriate. It may therefore appear that cyclic stress
needs to be determined before choosing a testing
interval. However, this probably is not the case. The
reason is that the net testing benefit for the entire range
of cyclic stress is only about 0.001 spacecraft-years.
This NTB appears to be too small to justify a testing
program.
Cyclic Stress and Net Testing Benefit
The second example involves a component
configuration in which the back-up equipment is active
(e.g., connected to live electrical power supplies) but
its functionality is not known until it is switched into
actual use. An example is the transponder in TDRS's
tracking, telemetry, and command (TT&C) subsystem
(though a small fraction of the back-up equipment is not
active). Numerical values are the same as in the first
example, except that the failure rate k is one failure per
100,000 hours and the standby factor Q is 1.0. These
higher values greatly increase the net testing benefit.
The testing interval that maximizes the NTB is
determined to be about two months, independent of
cycling stress. However, the NTB does depend on
cycling stress (see Figure 2).
In this example, the cyclic stress must be known,
not to determine test interval (which is about two
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monthsforallcyclicstresses shown), but to determine
whether testing is beneficial. However, because the
back-up unit is powered continuously whether tested or
not, the stress of testing appears to be small, almost
certainly less than 1,000 hours based on the author's
subjective estimate. Therefore, testing appears to be
beneficial by affording an expected value of almost two
years of notice of an impending failure. For
comparison, the expected value of additional spacecraft
failure-years attributed to the testing is less than 0.1
years.
Spacecraft Reliability and Useful Life
The third example involves TDRS 1, which was
launched on April 4, 1983, and, at an age of about 12
years, is operating beyond its design life. There has
been no testing program for the TT&C transponder on
TDRS 1. Therefore, the back-up transponder's
functionality is not known. According to a MIL-HDBK
217D-based, parts-count, Monte Carlo reliability model
shown here only schematically (see Figure 3), if the
back-up transponder were to be tested successfully, the
prospects for the life of TDRS 1 transponder
functionality would improve markedly (see Figure 4).
With no test, the predicted availability of the TDRS
1 TT&C transponder fits a two-parameter Weibull
formula:
A = e-(t/a)13 (15)
in which the scale parameter a is 18 years and the shape
parameter 13is 1.23. The future time t is limited to eight
years because by then the satellite will be at the
approximate limit of its foreseeable useful total life of
about 20 years. The nearness of the shape parameter to
unity indicates that the 12 year old back-up equipment
is probably no longer fully functional. The mean
remaining life of the TDRS 1 "I_&C transponder is 6.8
years.
If a test is performed and shows that the back-up
equipment is fully functional, a would increase to 23
years, indicating that the life of the transponder is likely
to be longer, and 13would increase to 1.64, a value that
indicates the presence of redundancy. The mean
remaining life of the TDRS 1 TT&C transponder would
increase to 7.5 years.
However, if the test is performed and shows that
the back-up equipment is non-functional, a would
decrease to 11 years, indicating that the life of the
transponder is likely to be shorter, and 13 would
decrease
to 1.00, a value that indicates the absence of
redundancy. The mean remaining life of the TDRS 1
TT&C transponder would decrease to 5.6 years.
IV. Conclusions
The in-flight testing of spare components, while
increasing rather than reducing failures, could be
beneficial if the knowledge of back-up functionality
were used to prepare and implement responses to
impending failures. However, as shown by the first
example in this paper, the testing would not be
appropriate for most back-up components on TDRS,
because their estimated failure rates are too low to
produce a significant benefit. This result is consistent
with the NASA Space Network practice of not normally
performing in-flight testing of spare TDRS components.
In some cases, the in-flight testing could be
appropriate. These cases can be identified by their high
estimated failure rates for both the primary and the
back-up components. The most likely candidate on a
TDRS appears to be the TT&C transponder. Of course,
the type of screening analysis shown in this paper is not
sufficient to warrant the implementation of an in-flight
testing program for the transponder. Failure rates,
failure modes, standby factors, cyclic stresses, wearout
phenomena, and the likelihood of test results affecting
future operations or procurements would all require
more detailed evaluations before deciding on whether to
test in-flight. For example, the historical TDRS TT&C
transponder failure rate appears to have been lower than
the MIL-HDBK 217D rate, and a reduction in the rate
would reduce the net benefit of testing. Nevertheless,
further evaluation of the possibility of in-flight testing
appears to be worthwhile.
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Introduction
In this age of shrinking resources, cost avoidance
has become as critical as direct cost savings. There
is no doubt that Effective Transition Management
achieves this aim.
What then, is Effective Transition Management and
how does it achieve its goal? It is the introduction
and use of a hierarchical decision model and
computerized tracking system which successfully
integrates capital acquisition into the support base.
You will discover that because this proven system is
generic, compatible and flexible, its applications are
virtually unlimited. It is this highly dynamic process
which I would like to share with you.
Skilled specialists are now rotated rapidly through
acquisition programs on a requirements-driven
basis. Managers continue their quest for inefficient
areas to trim, slash or cut. However, there is one
area of operations in every major corporation and
government department that, as yet, has not
received the attention it deserves. This essential
element is Transition Management.
Capital acquisitions, at some point, must be handed-
off to a support matrix for the "in-service" phase of
their life cycle. Most of us who have been on the
receiving end can usually cite outrageous examples
of adjustment, recovery or disaster. This means
buying what amounts to a second initial sparing
package, re-aligning the range and depth of
inventory to match a changed maintenance concept,
interpreting contractor-developed configuration
control data or ensuring that the latest information is
contained in the technical publications. This list is
endless. For major purchases, this "in-service" phase is
often fifteen, twenty or more years. The least
desir\able, yet most common condition, is to suffer up
to five years of recovering from errors or omissions after
the transition to the support matrix occurs. Without
Effective Transition Management, making new
equipment fully operational may thus become a long and
costly process.
Scope
This process applies to any organization which is buying
capital equipment and which is then required to
maintain the support of that equipment during its
ensuing in-service life cycle.
Conce.p_.t
The concept of Effective Transition Management has
two objectives. The first is the identification of
resources and timings to facilitate the long range
planning and programming. The second is the
development of a check list and procedures to smoothly
execute the transition of the capital equipment systems
management responsibilities from the Program/Project
Manager to the lead Matrix Support Manager.
A Transition Plan should be prepared at the earliest
possible date in the life of the project, usually two years
before the transfer is scheduled to take place and must
be approved by senior management. Normally, the
transfer will be for complete systems. However, in
certain instances, a system may be introduced by
Copyright © 1994 by Major TM Burke. Published by the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Inc with permission.
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components, in which case the plan should follow a
phased approach. As above, the Transition Plan for
the first component will normally be prepared at
least 24 months before it is transferred to the lead
Matrix Support Manager.
CONCEPT
• IDENTIFY RESOURCES
AND TIMINGS FOR LONG
RANGE PLANNING
• DEVELOP CHECKLIST AND
PROCEDURES TO
EXECUTE SMOOTH
TRANSITION
Definition of Terms
1. Transition Plan (TP).
• The document which outlines actions,
responsibilities and agreements relative
to transferring systems management
from the program/project to the support
matrix. It contains a schedule of events
for an orderly and timely transfer of
systems management responsibilities and
addresses resource implications. Senior
management will normally approve the
Transition Plan.
2. Transition Plan Steering Committee (TPSC).
The TPSC is a decision level group
comprised of the Program/Project
Manager and key Support Managers or
their representatives involved in the
introduction and support of the newly
acquired system.
3. Transition Plan Working Group (TPWG).
The TPWG is a Working Group of
program/project and matrix representatives
whose responsibilities include developing the
Transition Plan detail and executing the
detailed transition activities. Membership, as
a minimum, will include the losing and
gaining managers. The size and scope of the
TPWG will depend upon the size and
complexity of the program/project. Lead
responsibility lies with the Program/Project
Manager. In general, the chairmanship of
the TPWG is delegated to the project's
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Manager
and the gaining lead Matrix Support Group's
Transition Manager becomes the deputy of
the TPWG. Members of the TPWG are
those who are designated as support staffs
and subject matter experts of the various
related activities usually listed in an
Implementation Plan.
4. Transition Manager.
The Transition Manager is the individual,
nominated by the lead gaining Matrix
Support Manager and approved by senior
management, responsible to ensure that
Transition Plans prepared for the system(s)
to be handed over to the in-service support
matrix are successfully concluded.
5. Matrix Manager.
A Matrix Manager is an individual in the
fixed array with cognizance for the staff and
area of expertise that the program/project
office draws upon to carry out its
responsibilities.
6. Senior Review Board (SRB).
A senior decision-making body normally
chaired by the senior manager and
comprised of permanent core members
determined by areas of responsibility.
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7. Master Transition Agreement and Schedule
The coordinating schedule for
identifying the losing and gaining
managers, equipment transition dates,
and resource impacts, as well as all
agreements between gaining and losing
organizations. The MTAS is a riving
document agreed to by all levels of
management up to the SRB or senior
manager as applicable. It will be
published semi-annually or more
frequently, as required.
Applications
The transition of each system or major component
will be tailored to the level of management required
and the ability of the gaining organization to assume
system responsibility. If the prime equipment exists
or if there is an association with existing equipment
already being managed, the new system or
component shall go to the office with the equipment
unless otherwise directed by the SRB.
APPLICATIONS
TAILORED TO LEVEL OF
MANAGEMENT REQUIRED
ABIUTY OF GAINING
ORGANIZATION TO ASSUME
SYSTEM RESPONSIBIUTY
NEW SYSTEM NORMALLY
DESIGNATED FOR OFFICE WITH
EXISTING EQUIPMENT
Formal Organization
Transition Planning is based on the efforts of two
organizations, the Transition Planning Steering
Committee (TPSC) and the Transition Planning
Working Group (TPWG) which may entail ancillary
TPWG Sub-Working Groups. Figure 1 illustrates their
relationship to the Senior Review Board (SRB).
The TPSC is normally formed at least two years prior to
the required transition date. The TPSC consists of the
Program/Project Manager and key support managers or
their representatives from all the areas of responsibility
involved with the Materiel Management of the system
being introduced.
The TPSC's function is to oversee the transition of the
Materiel Management of the system to the in-service
support matrix. Subordinate to the Steering Committee
is the Working Group consisting of a Chairman (the
Program/Project ILS Manager), a Deputy (the
Transition Manager), a Secretary (a designated Working
Group member), regular members (pertinent support
staffs) and ad hoc members (representing all subject
matter experts in areas addressed in the Implementation
Plan on a consultative basis).
Sub-Working Groups will be formed by the TPWG on
an as required basis. The membership will be
representative of the subject matter under consideration.
Responsibilities of the Groups
The losing and gaining managers are jointly responsible
for system/component transition. Each transition will
occur at an agreed-upon date and under agreed-upon
conditions. The overriding factor is that the operational
management of the existing system(s) will not be
adversely affected as a result of a system or component
in transition.
A Transition Manager will normally be appointed by the
gaining Life Cycle Management component. However,
other options are either to establish a position in the
capital project when the personnel requirements are
being identified and staffed, or utilize an appropriate
program/project manager who is intended to move to
the managing component when the program/project is
complete. The term Transition Manager may or may
not include other staff which will be determined by the
level of effort required. When the prime contract has
been signed, the Transition Manager will likely reside
in the program/project management office. The
Transition Manager will remain there until the major
share of the Transition Plan has been completed.
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RESPONSIBILITIES
• JOINT
• AGREED CONDITIONS
• MAINTAIN OPERATIONS
MANAGEMENT READINESS
Functioning
The chairmanship of the Steering Committee is the
joint responsibility of the Program/Project Manager
and the lead Matrix Support Manager (co-chaired).
The Steering Committee reports to the SRB
through the Program/Project Manager.
In the TPWG, each Sub-Working Group (SWG)
Chairman provides a monthly written progress
report to the Working Group Chairman. These
reports are normally reviewed by the Transition
Manager. From these reports and the TPWG
meetings, the Working Group Chairman brings
forward to the Steering Committee any unresolved
item(s) considered beyond the scope/authority of
the Working Group and provides regular updates on
the progress of the Working Group.
The TPSC is intended to be few in numbers yet
have enough authority to make most decisions
without seeking the approval of higher management.
Members are chosen from areas considered vital to
the success of the transition; ie the Program/Project
Manager, the lead Matrix Support Manager and
other relevant matrix support managers. The
Chairman of the Working Group, on the other
hand, is mandated much narrower parameters of
autonomy and authority. Progress is to be reported
to the Steering Committee and action is to be
agreed to by the Steering Committee. The TPSC is
a decision-making body which chooses between
alternatives presented by the TPWG and
investigates the broader policy implications. If the
proposed solutions exceed their authority, the
Program/Project Manager is responsible for presenting
agreed upon options to the SRB. The TPSC is
co-chaired by the Program/Project Manager and the
lead gaining Matrix Support Manager.
The TPWG is charged with preparing and implementing
the Transition Plan. The TPWG is responsible for
identifying the areas that require investigation and
setting up the Sub-Working Group(s) to carry out the
investigation. If the proposed solutions can be
implemented by the TPWG no further action is required
except to inform the TPSC. If not, the problem is
passed to the TPSC for resolution. The TPWG is
normally chaired by the project ILS Manager with the
Transition Manager as deputy.
The TPSC should hold a meeting at least every six
months (more frequently depending on activity). There
will normally be two Working Group meetings for every
TPSC meeting. Sub-Working Group (SWG) meetings
are less formal and more frequent. Each SWG
Chairman provides a monthly written progress report to
the Working GroupChairman through the Transition
Manager. The Working Group Chairman will bring
forward to the TPSC any unresolved items(s) considered
beyond the scope/authority of the Working Group and
provides regular updates on the progress of the Working
Group.
The format used at the TPSC meetings will be to review
previous minutes and be updated by the TPWG
Chairman on the progress of the Transition Plan. This
is to be followed by the tabling of unresolved items with
available options for discussion and resolution/decision
by the TPSC.
The established governance structure at Figure 1 will be
used to escalate unresolved items for
direction/arbitration where required.
The Transition Plan is deemed to be approved once all
members have signed off and the presentation has been
accepted by SRB or the applicable senior manager.
The Master Transition Agreement and Schedule
(MTAS) should be revised every six months or more
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D frequently as directed.
Contents of the Transition Plan
The following is a list of the major elements and
reports (examples given illustrate an imaginary
status as of Dec 4, 2000) in the Transition Plan:
the Transition Plan Data Flow
(Figure 2);
a recommended list of Transition Plan
Work Packages from the Work
Breakdown Structure;
the MTAS report for the complete
system to be transitioned showing by
percentage those Work Packages
remaining incomplete and those already
100% completed. This provides an
overview of the project's current status
at a glance;
a second report showing only the
incomplete Work Packages remaining to
complete the transition;
a breakdown by functional group within
the project of progress-to-date and an
average percentage completed;
a third report providing a breakdown of
all incomplete tasks by functional group
and an average percentage completed;
the "key" graph which illustrates current
System Transition Progress. This graph
is produced automatically when linked
to the database. When the database is
posted up-to-date, a graph may be
produced showing Management at a
quick glance, the status of the project,
equipment system, subsystem, or
component, depending on the data kept
in the database; (Figure 3 - "a picture is
worth a thousand words");
each task may be subdivided into as many
subtasks and sublevels as management
considers necessary;
• an iterative process may be used; and
a suggested handover document to be used
when the transition is completed.
Additional information may be tracked by expanding
tasks at the subtask level, for example:
financial assistance required by line
organizations involved in the transition
process;
training required by the matrix and the lead
time necessary to get that training;
short/long term manpower/ funding
required by the matrix;
tools and test equipment in an automated
environment required to manage the in-
service life cycle phase;
maintenance of warranties and the follow-on
buys that are a continuation of the same
system;
publications to be transferred such as:
specifications, independent evaluation plans,
results of any trials/test including the raw
data, and the management of the database
and selection of tools required for its life
cycle management;
maintenance and tracking of engineering
change proposals, design change proposals
and failure reports to be transferred to the
matrix life cycle managers; and
lastly, initiation of the replacement system
and necessary studies, if required.
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Note:
Due to individual requirements of each project,
this is not meant to be an exhaustive list but
only to highlight the main tasking areas which
most programs/projects must address.
Responsibilities of the Transition Manager
The Transition Manager must be responsible to
ensure that Transition Plans prepared for system(s)
to be handed over to the in-service support matrix
are successfully concluded:
TRANSITION MANAGER
• NORMALLY FROM LEAD
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION
• ENSURES PLANS PREPARED
• BRINGS TRANSITION TO
SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION
by developing, maintaining and
controlling the overall time line
transition schedule;
by assuring that all transition issues are
brought to a successfull conclusion.
Major Marty Burke is Faculty Head for Materiel
Management Training at the Canadian Department
of National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa,
Canada. He is responsible for major training
programs in Project, Life Cycle and Procurement
Management. In addition to completing graduate
studies in Logistics Management, he is a Logistics
Specialist in the Canadian Air Force.
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TRANSITION PLAN PROGRESS
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Figure 3 Transition Plan Progress
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Abstract
To keep in tune with the rapidly
changing "Hardware" technology, it is
imperative that all of the "Supporting"
components of a program's efforts reflect
these increases in technology. To maintain a
work force that keeps in tune with the ever
increasing technology base, training needs to
remain a major consideration in all types of
organizations.
This paper focuses on the area of
training and education and suggests a
reasonable, cost effective alternative to
carrying the entire burden of developing,
training and maintaining a workforce in a
rapidly changing, highly technological
environment.
Introduction
It has been known that one of the
most important and costly components of a
company's make-up is that of training. With
the current state of the economy, it is
becoming increasingly more difficult, in terms
of time and money to adequately train
individuals to perform in today's high tech
environments with any degree of competency.
This is even more imperative when
one looks at the mission of organizations such
as government. The government has a
requirement to maintain a highly trained
workforce for internal operations and, due to
downsizing, incurred a requirement to take on
work previously handled by contractors and
consultants.
In a large number of organizations, be
they commercial or government contractors,
training/education was seen as a "necessity";
however, during lean times, the training of
individuals is often one of the first areas to be
drastically scaled back, with even whole
departments being eliminated.
Today, to reduce operating costs
within the government arena, we are seeing
more and more jobs, that were considered
contractor jobs, being performed by
government personnel. These jobs range
from office support to highly skilled,
engineering related.
With earlier technology, it was
possible to "Develop" individuals based upon
the experience of the senior members of the
organization. The scenario within the
government area is that some of the jobs
being taken over were not performed by
government employees. Therefore, "senior
personnel" are not becoming trainers of the
junior personnel. Add on to this the fact that
training is rapidly becoming more costly and,
due to rapidly advancing high technology,
even the senior level personnel have
requirements to be trained.
Current technology is software
intensive, the amount of code written to
operate and support current systems has
increased geometrically. Space systems
being developed require "training" over and
above current practices. We are in a high
technology environment, the computers and
machines of ten years ago have grown in
technology by leaps and bounds.
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Customers of high technology
systems realize that the training, needed to
support the system is very costly and that
they are becoming more actively involved in
operational aspects of the systems; therefore,
the customer workforce needs to reach the
level of maturity that the contractor's
personnel are at. This will allow for a
smoother transitioning period to occur.
Reason For Training
The following represents three (3) reasons
why training is needed:
1. Program requirement. This is
found on the majority of high technology
government contracts. The contractor
develops the product, and since the customer
probably has no experience with the piece of
hardware, operator and maintainer training is
required to support the equipment. The cost
of the training development is borne by the
customer and is included as a line item in the
contract.
2. Purchase of a new piece of
hardware and/or software for conducting day
to day business. Here the company has
purchased hardware or software for achieving
the goals of the organization in a hopefully
more competitive and/or cost effective
manner. The cost of training is borne by the
organization and will come out of current
profits. It is anticipated that this cost will be
more than offset by the new process once the
personnel are trained and the "new" system is
running up to speed. To some extent, this
type of training is required to provide support
for space operations.
3. Increase the overall skill and
knowledge base of the organization. This
usually entails allowing the personnel to
attend seminars or college to work on a
degree or work related courses. This cost
comes out of profits and the anticipation is
for a happier, well educated work force.
better transition from contractor to customer
responsibilities.
Economic Climate
Everyday you can read about some
problem in the economy. There is reduced
spending money for the organization which
results in an organization folding or perhaps a
reduction in force (RIF) - layoffs. This is
becoming even more prevalent in the
government sector. Criticisms abound with
paying a government worker and a contractor
to "work the same job". This is part of the
reason for transferring more of the jobs from
contractor to government worker it represents
an attempt to reduce operating costs.
Now a rather large decision needs to
be made, what jobs are to be transitioned?.
There can be a large learning curve involved
with the higher technology tasks. In the
meantime, however; the support type work
can be transitioned over in a phased
approach. It needs to be kept in mind that if
not done correctly, more labor could be
required to keep from missing deadlines (and
possible loss of equipment, life and budget.
Even with transitioning those tasks
that are considered mundane, there exists a
requirement for training personnel.
The following questions now come to
mind - what type of training is needed?, how
do the existing personnel get the training to
keep up with existing technology and do the
job?, where is the training to come from?
First we need to look at the type of
training that can be involved.
Trainin.q Types
There are four (4) basic types of training that
will be addressed and these include:
In-House Trainin.q
This paper will focus on this last
reason. Increasing the skill and knowledge
base will certainly assist in bring about a
In-house training is controlled by the
internal training department. Here the
organization must maintain the training
department and all necessary support
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personnel (administrative support, training
developer, instructors.)
not be accomplishing any work during the
time of the training.
Advantage: training courses can
easily be developed and geared to a particular
organization's way of doing business.
Personnel have knowledge of the
organization's policies and work load and can
minimize the amount of time needed to "rack
the brains" of the in-house experts
(knowledgeable users) specifics on
requirements.
Disadvantage: in tough economic
times, this department has large cuts or is
eliminated totally. Additionally, Training
personnel need to keep up with advances in
technology and revise material, if the
department is reduced, who will do this?
In the case where government
personnel are to perform jobs previously done
exclusively by contractor personnel, the
contractor is the organization with the "in-
house experts". The government will need to
receive assistance from the contractor.
Therefore, in-house development
would be utilized for the support type
functions and job assignments.
Seminars
Consultants
Consultants can provide the needed
guidance in developing training for use by an
organization.
Advantage: Consultants are experts
in their line of work and are normally well
versed in extracting information needed to
develop training and incorporating the
organization's policies and practices.
Disadvantage: Consultants, unless
they are subject matter experts in your
organization's way of doing business, will
need to interrupt employees during their
research. Consultants can also cost a lot of
money, - money that is not readily available in
today's economic climate. Typical costs are
$2,000 a day (plus expenses).
Traditional Institutions
Here we will consider the local
college. In order to stay competitive and
increase enrollment, are developing state of
the art training facilities. They are not just
looking at recent high school graduates but
personnel in the work force.
Seminars are defined here as those
instructional courses that are given off-site of
an organization. Advantage: normally the
material being delivered is kept up with
current advances in technology. In good
economic times, seminars are very good for
keeping your personnel current with advances
in technology. There are limitations as to the
type of courses that can be offered.
Seminars are usually limited to type of
technology, not with specifics. For example, a
seminar on how radar works not a specific
radar system.
Disadvantage: This type of training
can be extremely expensive. For a 30 hour
seminar it can typically cost $1,200 to
$1,400 per person. This does not include
travel, room and board. The employee will
Advantage: Relatively low cost to the
employer. Provides relatively current and up
to date technology, though not as quick as
consultants or seminars. This has to do with
the process involved in establishing or
revamping a course. Since the majority of
courses are given at night, the employee is
available for completing normal work
assignments.
Disadvantage: Cost for establishing a
new training facility usually not in the
"Budget". Remember, colleges also feel the
impact of the economic climate.
Training Alternatives
It is acknowledged that to remain a
viable, effective organization in today's high
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
technology environment, it is imperative that
the work force remains trained. This also
holds true if one wishes to transition work
from one type of organization to another
(contractor to government).
There are numerous alternative ways
of accomplishing this training. The focus will
be on three (3) "High Tech" ways: computer-
based training, interactive video, and long
distance learning.
Computer Based Training
Computer-based training is utilization
of a computer for direct interaction with the
student presenting lesson content, providing
practice and testing student progress.
Due to the flexibility an capability
possessed by the computer to provide
branching instructions, the computer can
become an infinitely patient tutor. Computers
can also be used to control other media and
to provide students with necessary reference
materials, performance aids, and simulate
environmental or laboratory facilities.
Successful computer-based instruction
depends upon the proper mix of instructional
content and methods delivered by an
adequate delivery system. This is
accomplished by conducting a thorough
analysis of instructional requirements as well
as the commitment of time and resources to
produce quality training programs (and not a
page turner).
Computers utilize a variety of different
interactive terminals or combine other media
(i.e. video) to present individualized
instruction. Students may be shown or
placed in highly simulated environments by
combining computer capabilities in
conjunction with other media or equipment for
purposes of instruction or testing.
A large number of an organization's
computing hardware will suffice for the
running of computer-based instruction,
thereby reducing some of the acquisition
COSTS.
The major cost would be that of
development. There are a number of
software courses available for purchase that
may be helpful in the training of some support
type jobs.
Advantage: For today's problem,
training in-house personnel with reduced
spending a form computer based training
offers a good alternative. A larger number of
persons are able to be trained with minimum
employee downtime.
Disadvantage: Few developers of
Computer Based instruction are aware of
certain requirements when developing this
form of training, as a result, CBI was known
as a "page turner" and a very costly one.
Computer-based development costs can range
from 50 to 500 hours of development time to
produce 1 hour of student classroom time.
Where large numbers of students are
to be taught and/or annual participation is
required, computer-based training can be
effective.
Interactive Video
This type of training offers realistic
type of training and can simulate the actual
work scenario. Flight simulators utilize this
technology.
Advantage: This is very useful for
training people where one mistake can result
in the loss of money and lives. Or where
there is one piece of unique equipment and
training equipment is not feasible. An
example of this is the current Space Station
program.
The Space Station program will utilize
interactive video with long distance learning.
Astronauts will be able to read the text and
watch a demonstration of a maintenance task
by a diver (neutral buoyancy) while
performing the task. This is accomplished by
means of uplink/downlink capability (this is
taking long distance learning one step
further).
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Disadvantage: To come up with an
hour of training time (using interactive video)
it would not be outlandish to spend 800
hours in development time.
Long Distance Learning
In-House Trainin,q
In the situation where the organization
has need of training all its personnel in the
use of standard office software, computer
based training has been used successfully.
This provides instruction to many
people in many different locales. Long
distance learning can be accomplished by
television or by modem, with computer based
instruction. A common form of long distance
learning is television courses. Here the
student can receive all the information that
the students in the class are exposed to.
This type of medium can provide two-
way communication with the instructor,
which allows for interaction among all "class
sites".
The typical training scenario has a set
schedule for the training class, a limited
number of students that can effectively be
taught per session. Due to the fact that the
classes are held during working hours, no
shows are typical. Also, the computer
experience of the students are typically wide
in range, resulting in some individuals being
bored, some learning and some lost. To
offset this, the course would need to be
taught at three (3) different skill levels. This
would further reduce the number of students
actually taking courses at any one time.
No matter which of the "High Tech"
delivery systems that are employed, it is
important to recognize that a type cost versus
benefit analysis is mandatory.
Additionally, it is important to
remember that not all training situations lend
themselves to the aforementioned three ("high
tech" methodologies.
Our original question was to find a
feasible solution to develop and maintain a
trained work force. If we are currently
looking at training large numbers of personnel
with reduced costs there are two (2)
methodologies to consider.
Problem
To develop and maintain a skil/ed and
knowledgeable work force even during a bad
economic climate, Of all the scenarios
presented, what viable solution or solutions
are available?
Solution
The following addresses two (2)
plausible solutions that are available and can
work.
With computer based instruction, the
course consists of program files, student
work files and student manual. Once written,
it costs next to nothing to make copies. The
make-up of the course can be such as to
incorporate all three skill levels. People can
set the schedule for completing the course to
those times when their work load is lessened.
The student manual provides a reference book
for those situations when the individual needs
to refresh how to accomplish something.
One organization, uses video in
conjunction with computer based instruction
for teaching office software. The result was
four (4) times as many students were taught
in the same time frame as previously taught
using traditional in class training. Specific
Computer-based courses have been developed
and employed for courses that are recurring in
nature (mandatory annual recertification).
Traditional Institutions (Cooperative Venture)
The following is a solution that allows
organizations to maintain skilled and
knowledgeable personnel. Previously, it was
brought out that in times of tight money,
training suffers. The requirement for
maintaining a skilled labor pool still remains.
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D The problem is How canorganizations maintain this labor pool? By
cooperative venture with the local college. In
this scenario, commercial organizations can
get together with the college and pool
resources.
Instead of each organization building a
state of the art training facility, at each
individual site, maintaining the facility,
developing the courses, and maintaining a
large training staff this is done at a central
location - namely the college.
This cooperative provides many
benefits: (1) the cost of the facility is shared
by the members of the cooperative, (2) the
labs are available to the employees of the
cooperative, (3) the college receives a
potential increase in student enrollment, (4)
commercial organization with training at a
reasonable cost, the cost of a college course
is substantially less expensive than any
alternative form of training, (5) the
commercial organization gets trained
personnel in utilizing state of the art
equipment, (6) knowledgeable instructor can
gear course to individual organization's way
of doing business (provide examples of how
to use the information).
An example of this alternative is
Brevard Community College (BCC) in Cocoa,
Florida. Situated in the Space Coast of
Florida, BCC has numerous technology
programs. For example, Within BCC's
Institute for Space Technology there is a
Logistics Technology program that offers an
Associates of Science degree in Logistics
Technology; Hazardous Materials; Quality
Assurance; Space Engineering. Within this
program there are courses that, are
competitive to seminars and provide an
inexpensive alternative.
For example a seminar on LSA/LSAR
ranges from $1295 to $1,400 for 30 hours
worth of training and give continuing
education credits. BCC has an LSA/LSAR
course that is 48 hours in length and gives 3
college credits and all for $105.
II SEMINAR
I
LENGTH 1130 HOURS
COST SEMINAR I $1,295
ROOM/BOARD VARIES
AIR VARIES
CREDITS @3 CONTINUING
BCC COURSE
48 HOURS
$105
NONE
NONE
3 COLLEGE
The above chart shows the potential
benefits accrued by adopting the cooperative
venture There is 60% more class time and
1133% savings in cost of the seminar per
person. This does not include the savings in
the other expenses.
BCC recently completed building a
state of the art technology facility including a
computer lab with current releases of
engineering software, and other forms of
multi-media equipment.
BCC, as do other educational
institutions, are able to set up degree
programs on the client site. A number of
colleges in the area of Kennedy Space Center
offer varying degree programs, as well as
individual courses, for the specific purpose of
satisfying educational requirements of
Kennedy Space Center and do quite well.
This demonstrates what can be
accomplished by joining together as a team.
Not all cooperatives would be set up exactly
the same; however, the bottom line is that
industry and educational institutions need to
work together to survive and prosper in
today's rapidly changing high technology
environment.
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THE THIRD KIND OF LOGISTICIAN
Benjamin Ostrofsky,*
University of Houston
Houston, Texas
O/v 7
Abstract
Technological advances during and since
World War II have created complications to
the effective accomplishment of logistics
functions. These complications are due to
the added functional areas required for
effective support as well as to the increased
sophistication required for logisticians. This
paper identifies the backgrounds of past and
current logisticians and makes
recommendations for the educational and
technical background of future, effective
logisticians.
Definition
Historically "logistics" was defined as:
"Management Operations and Technology
associated with the time and place utility of
men and materials".
This definition in the days of simpler
technology, resolved itself into the provision
of supplies where and when needed. Even
when Hannibal crossed the Alps to invade
ancient Rome, his primary concern in
making the treacherous journey was to keep
his troops fed, his elephants comfortable, and
all healthy so that they could be effective
fighters. Consequently logistics primarily
meant "supply" and this philosophy was
sustained up to and through World War II.
*Professor, Industrial Engineering and of Operations
Management; Fellow/SOLE, Associate Fellow AIAA
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The First Kind
During World War II all able-bodied men
were called into the military services, in
effect draining the universities of males.
The government recognizing this dilemma,
and, to keep the university operational,
created programs whereby young men were
returned to the university in uniform to study
various relevant areas, one being inventory,
warehousing, and distribution. Colleges of
Business picked up on this and recognized a
profitable area of instruction where industrial
companies employed these graduates, and
faculty could research, develop, and further
improve this approach to logistics.
Heskett et al (1) from this perspective
defined logistics as:
"The management of all activities which
facilitate movement and the coordination of
supply and demand.
Notice the emphasis on supply and
movement.
• Principles of Management
• Marketing
• Accounting
• Finance
• Economics
• Operations Management
• Quantitative Methods
Table 1: Basic Core Content of the
Business Administration Degree.
Table 1 indicates the basic areas of
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instruction for this first kind of logistician
while Table 2 shows the specialty or
"option" areas for this type of background.
• Warehousing
• Materials Handling
• Packaging
• Traffic and Transportation
• Inventory Control
• Order processing
• Information Flow/Systems
• Customer Service
Table 2: Specialties for the logistician of the
first kind.
A recent survey (2) indicates that:
most Colleges of Business Administration
generally follows this type of content; some
even specializing their degree requirement
further (i.e degrees in Transportation).
The Second Kind
Colleges of Engineering currently produce
the second kind of logistician. In the
engineer's education emphasis is placed on
scientific knowledge and technical
performance and generally, when time
permits in the curriculum, a rudimentary
understanding of the necessity for
deployment (or distribution) operations and
retirement of the equipment is studied
Historical precedent is so strong that even
where the word "logistics" is used it
generally refers to distribution and inventory
handling, ignoring the lessons learned since
World War II.
Table 3 indicates the general
academic content of the most current
engineering degrees.
• Mathematics/Statistics
• Chemistry
• Physics
• Systems Engineering/Management
• Human Factors
• Information Systems/Computer Science
• Scientific and Engineering Disciplines
• Economics
Table 3: Degree content for Logisticians of
the Second kind.
While some engineering degrees offer the
technical knowledge required to become
effective logisticians, they do not relate this
knowledge to what actually occurs in the
"real world" to smoothly transition through
the phases in the equipment's life cycle,
dealing with equipment performance.
The Third Kind
During World War II it became evident that
the deployment of thousands of copies of
complex equipment could not be adequately
supported by traditional methods of supply.
By the time this was recognized it was late
1944 and there were strong indications that
the U.S. and its allies would win the war.
Further, the disruption to ongoing operations
from major organizational changes was
considered too risky to the total war effort so
that the decision was made to reorganize
after the war was won and demobilization
had occurred.
The famous Boeing B-17 "Flying Fortress"
nicely illustrates the problem. There were
literally hundreds of B-17's sent to the
European theater and the Pacific Theater.
Each airplane had ten crewman requiring
training that ranged from two years in length
to six months. In addition, technical
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support people, equipment, and facilities had
to be provided to sustain an effective force.
Now, when one multiplies this effort by
literally hundreds of different total systems -
some larger and some smaller than the B-17
aircraft, an indication of the complexity of
the problem is achieved - and it became
obvious that a new philosophy of support
was needed to effectively use the national
resources. This led to the logisticians of the
third kind.
In the early 1950's the first documents
defining a "Systems Management" approach
to the development of technological systems
emerged from newly formed Department of
Defense. This documentation led to the
definition of a "System Engineering"
methodology which in turn changed the
meaning of logistics from a "Supply"
emphasis to the broader "Support" definition
(3). Now the logistician had to be capable of
meeting the ever increasing dependence on
high technology aids to solve increasingly
large and complex problems in the logistics
domain in order to meet the requirements of
logistics as defined in DOD Directive
100.35G (3):
"... A composite of the elements necessary
to assure the effective and economical
support of a system or equipment at all
levels of maintenance for its programmed life
cycle."
Six years later in 1974, after much debate,
the Society of Logistics Engineers defined
logistics as:
"... The art and science of management,
engineering and technical activities
concerned with requirements, design, and
supplying and maintaining resources to
support objectives, plans and operations"
(4).
Table 4 lists the major disciplines now
included under the logistics umbrella,
showing clearly that supply alone is far from
adequate even on a conceptual basis:
• Reliability
• Maintainability
• Maintenance Planning
• Support and Test Equipment
• Supply Support
• Packaging, Handling, Shipping &
Transportation
• Operations and Maintenance
Instruction
• Facilities
• Personnel and Training
• Computer Facility
• Funding
• Management Data
Table 4: Elements of integrated Logistics
Support (ILS).
These elements have been modified or added
to reflect current technical needs and
capabilities.
The scope of ILS is more aptly pictured in
figure 1 where the X dimension represents
management requirements, the Z dimension
is the ILS elements, and the Y dimension is
the life cycle. Consequently when pictured in
this manner, the complexities of providing
adequate support to a large scale, complex
system can be more clearly seen. In general
the first kind of logisticians, coming from
Colleges of Business Administration
comprehend, more or less, the XY plane
(Systems Management), while logisticians,
when they exist at all, coming from
Engineering Colleges are represented by the
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YZ plane. What is needed for now and the
fore seeable future are individuals who are
competent in all three, XYZ, dimensions.
These will be our future logistics leaders.
Long Term Requirements:
College of Business Administration:
The following are considered the long term
requirements for logisticians coming from
colleges of Business:
.
.
Increased awareness between the
activities in the management of the
firm and the integrated logistics
support elements.
Expansion of Systems Management
awareness to include the notion of the
life cycle phases and associated
support requirements.
College of Engineering:
.
.
.
Integration of Life Cycle awareness
and requirements into engineering
design instruction.
Similarities and differences in life
cycle requirements for macro and
micro systems.
Improved awareness of the physical
distribution environment for all
engineering disciplines (not just
Industrial Engineers).
Short Term Requirements:
College of Business Administration:
The following are considered the important
short term requirement for college of
Business Administration:
° Introduction of the notion of product
or system life cycle and the attendant
development decision structure with
its implications for logistics.
° Continued emphasis of operations
management and physical distribution
topics.
College of Engineering:
Colleges of engineering should enhance the
notions of systems engineering and life cycle
requirements while clarifying the semantics
of logistics in Industrial, Electrical,
Mechanical, Civil, and Chemical Engineering
programs.
Conclusions
I. While government and military
systems have maintained their
currency with logistics changes, most
of business and industry has not - and
considerable performance enhancements
are currently not being achieved as a
result.
, College of Business and/or Management
need to reinforce the understanding that
their graduates focus on logistics
requirements emanating from the design
phases thus requiring them to satisfy, or
do the best they can with what comes
comes out of the engineering phase.
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Hence they should become involved in
design activities.
3. College of Engineering needs to foster
the comprehension that equipment
performance needs to be sustained in
the field and if the equipment cannot
be supported or maintained performance
in an ideal environment is useless.
4. The Logisticians of the Third Kind
will be the Project leaders of
tomorrow and the leaders of industry!
. Ostrofsky, Benjamin, Conor
O'Muirgheasa, A Survey of
Logistics Degree Programs in North
America, University of Houston,
Houston, Texas, Spring 1992.
. Integrated Logistics Support for
Systems and Equipment, DOD
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Abstract
It has been said that Continual Improvement (CI) is
difficult to apply to service oriented functions,
especially in a government agency such as NASA.
However, a constrained budget and increasing
requirements are a way of life at NASA Kennedy
Space Center (KSC), making it a natural environment
for the application of Continual Improvement tools and
techniques. This paper describes how KSC, and
specifically the Space Shuttle Logistics Project, a key
contributor to KSC's mission, has embraced the
Continual Improvement management approach as a
means of achieving its strategic goals and objectives.
An overview of how the KSC Space Shuttle Logistics
Project has structured its Continual Improvement effort
and examples of some of the initiatives are provided.
Introduction
The 1994 KSC Strategic Plan challenges KSC to
provide safe and efficient space vehicle launch and
landing, and payload preparation services while
reducing costs center-wide. The Space Shuttle
Logistics Project plays an important role in the pursuit
of this goal. It is responsible for providing functional
flight and ground support equipment (GSE) assets to
the Shuttle Program in support of shuttle processing at
KSC. These assets are obtained either through the
purchase or manufacture of new hardware, or by repair
of existing assets. KSC's prime contractor for orbiter
logistics is Rockwell International Corporation.
Rockwell accomplishes the procurement, manufacture,
or repair of assets either through subcontracts with the
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), other
vendors, or at the NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot
(NSLD) in Cape Canaveral. Rockwell also operates
the Thermal Protection System (TPS) Facility at KSC.
KSC's prime contractor for shuttle processing is
Lockheed Space Operations Company. Lockheed is'
" e
responsible for stocking, storing and issuing flight
hardware which is provided by the Shuttle Project
elements. They are also responsible for providing
spares, repair and off-line maintenance for ground
support equipment (GSE) and facility systems used in
shuttle processing.
How Continual Improvement Works at KSC
KSC initially adopted the Continual Improvement
management approach in 1991. Since that time, KSC
has made great progress toward becoming a quality
management organization. In 1994 and 1995 NASA
KSC was selected as a finalist in the President's
Quality Award Program conducted by the Federal
Quality Institute. This award program recognizes
federal government organizations that have
implemented quality management and achieved high
levels of customer satisfaction.
KSC's approach to CI features both top-down and
bottom-up aspects. A KSC Continual Improvement
Plan was published in 1994. This plan establishes the
framework by which KSC can balance the original
employee driven CI efforts with that of a management
driven approach. Not only are employees encouraged
to identify and implement process improvements in
their own work areas, but each organization's
management is challenged to select processes critical
to the successful performance of their organization.
Teams are established to evaluate these processes using
the CI tools and techniques such as process analysis
through flow charting, establishment of baseline
measurements, identification and implementation of
improvements and continual performance monitoring.
Candidate critical processes for such improvement
scrutiny are identified at the directorate level and
presented to the KSC CI Steering Committee for
approval. This senior management review assures
consistency with the KSC strategic goals and the CI
efforts of other KSC organizations.
• Copyright © 1994 by the American Inatitut¢ of Aeronautics and A_tronautics, Inc. No
copyrigltt is azaerted in the United Slates under Tire 17, U.S. Code. The U.S. Government
has a royalty-free license to exercise all rights under the copyright claimed herein for
Governmental purposes. All other fights are reserved by the ¢olrp'ight owner:'
The Shuttle Logistics Project abides by the CI
strategies of the KSC CI Plan. Shuttle Logistics has
found that integrated process improvement teams
I •
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 2 O1
which include representation from both NASA and the
contractor are most beneficial. Several successful
initiatives also included personnel from other NASA
centers such as Johnson Space Center (JSC). Just some
of the many CI initiatives conducted by the Shuttle
Logistics Project follow.
Continual Improvement Success Stories
Direct Buy Initiative
Procurement of spare parts for orbiter processing and
for establishing repair part inventories at the vendor or
the repair facility is a key process within the KSC
Shuttle Logistics Project. An investigation into this
procurement process resulted in a very successful
improvement initiative known as the Direct Buy
Program. The purpose of the Direct Buy Program is to
reduce spares costs through purchase of parts directly
from the actual manufacturer when there is no unique
added value provided by the subcontractor of the next
higher assembly. This reduces the procurement lead
time as well as eliminating redundant tasks in several
areas such as procurement administration, receiving
inspection and engineering.
Since it is essential to maintain the integrity of the
systems and equipment in which direct procured parts
are to be used, the Direct Buy Program itself involves a
process. The Logistics function initially screens for
repetitive procurements and projects direct buy savings
potential for each spares candidate. The screened
items include Line Replaceable Units (LRU's), Shop
Replaceable Units (SRU's), and piece parts. From this
screening, a direct buy spares candidate listing is
established. Once direct buy candidates are identified,
they are evaluated by an integrated technical team
representing Logistics, Engineering, Product
Assurance, Reliability, Configuration Management and
Material. JSC Subsystem Managers, OEM's and their
subcontractors are also represented in this technical
review. The team uses a standard criteria to assure
direct procurement is the optimum method of acquiring
the part. This direct buy analysis includes an
evaluation of the technical data availability, currency
and ownership; categorization of the part as either
specification controlled or commercial; assessment of
the value added by the current supplier; evaluation of
the design maturity/stability and a cost analysis. Once
a direct buy candidate passes all of the technical and
financial screening criteria, the approval cycle begins.
This approval process involves both KSC Logistics
Project Management and JSC Orbiter Project
Management.
As in any quality management organization, methods
of improving and streamlining the Direct Buy Program
candidate selection and approval processes are
continually investigated. For example, the mature
Direct Buy Program was averaging a process flow time
of 45 days from screening efforts to management
approval for direct procurement implementation.
Analysis of the processing flow reduced this time to
less than 25 days.
The Direct Buy Program has already resulted in
significant tangible savings and the anticipated cost
savings through the life of the Shuttle Program are
even greater. Since the Direct Buy Program was
implemented in 1991, it has shown a positive return on
investment, with program savings (as of June 1994) in
excess of $2.7 Million. The projected savings through
the life of the Shuttle Program are estimated to be
nearly $8 Million. This figure only represents
continuing the direct procurement of those items
already approved, and does not consider possible
savings to be achieved by application of the direct
procurement approach to additional candidates or
newly designed systems/hardware.
Thermal Protection System (TPS) Initiatives
Each Shuttle Orbiter has approximately 24,000
protective tiles over its outer skin. These tiles, as well
as soft-goods, make up the Orbiter's Thermal
Protection System (TPS) which protects the orbiter
from the heat of re-entry and the cold soak of space.
TPS components are manufactured and/or repaired at
KSC in the TPS Facility. A team of KSC workers in
this facility has undertaken several initiatives which
have resulted in, or will result in, significant monetary
savings to the Shuttle Program. Of primary
significance are the team's efforts related to tile
Production Unit (PU) production. PU's are the larger
blocks of TPS tile material from which the individual
Space Shuttle tiles are machined. In the past, tile PU's
have been procured from an outside vendor at an
estimated cost of $3,000 per PU.
Flight-certifiable PU's, as well as non-flight PU's, are
used in the day to day operations in the TPSF. Non
flight tiles are used frequently in testing and as
manufacturing aids. The TPSF team developed the
capability necessary to manufacture non-flight PU's
from recycled silica waste materials. The team's
innovation and cost consciousness resulted in
refurbishment and adaptation of excessed equipment
from KSC and other locations in order to develop this
recycling and fabrication capability. No longer using
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the costly flight-certified PU's for this purpose has
resulted in an estimated savings in excess of $500,000
since the initial prototype non-flight PU was completed
in 1993.
The team's success in non-flight PU production opened
the door to certifying the TPSF for the manufacture of
flight-certif'mble PU's. KSC has proven that it has the
resources, space, and capability to do such
manufacturing, and has received Shuttle Program
authorization to proceed. All of the raw materials are
on hand. KSC is in the process of acquiring all of the
necessary equipment, making required facility
modifications and finalizing manufacturing specifi-
cations. Plans call for the completion of the
certification effort by September 30, 1995.
Certification of the TPSF for PU production will better
facilitate the "just-in-time" manufacture of tiles for
replacement during orbiter processing. Additionally,
significant Shuttle Program savings will be achieved by
not having to procure the PU's from an outside vendor.
The team estimates that this savings could be as much
as $6.5 Million.
GSE Quick Disconnect (QD) Repair Relocation
In order to ensure the integrity of shuttle flight
systems, often the GSE is subject to stringent periodic
maintenance requirements. Due to the risk of flight
hardware contamination, QD's on the hydrazine
servicing carts and the Mobile Launch Platform
hydraulic panels require annual refurbishment. Until
September of 1993, these QD's were returned to the
OEM for this scheduled maintenance. However,
escalating costs and lack of responsiveness by the
vendor prompted KSC to seek alternative means of
accomplishing this task. Lockheed Supportability
Analysis initiated an investigation into transitioning
the repair site from the OEM to KSC's on-site
subcontractor for precision cleaning, Wiltech. This
resulted in another integrated team effort including
logistics, engineering and the cleaning facility
personnel, culminating in an effective transition of the
repair site and significant cost savings for the Shuttle
Program. The average repair turnaround time at the
vendor was 420 days at a cost of $5,300 per QD. On-
site QD repair has reduced this turnaround time to 38
days with significantly reduced costs estimated at
$1,300 per QD. Cost avoidance of $275, 000 is
estimated due to not procuring fifteen additional QD's
which would have been necessary in order to continue
to support shuttle processing with the excessive repair
turnaround time. The annual cost savings of repairing
on-site is estimated to be $180,000.
Air Data Transducer Assembly (ADTA)/SRU Repair
Process Improvement Team
The ADTA is a subsystem of the Orbiter's' Avionics
System, which provides guidance, navigation and
control information on the movement of the orbiter
through the atmosphere. This subsystem senses air
pressures related to spacecraft movement through the
atmosphere necessary to update navigation state vector
in altitude; provide guidance in calculating steering
and speed brake commands; update flight control law
computations; and provide display of other essential
flight parameters to the shuttle commander and pilot.
A concern over the increasing turnaround time for the
repair of failed ADTA SRU's prompted the formation
of a process improvement team to evaluate and
improve the repair process at Allied Signal Controls
and Accessories (ASCA) of Tucson, Arizona, the OEM
for the ADTA'S. This effort is an excellent example of
a supplier striving to assure customer satisfaction by
forming a partnership with its immediate and extended
customers in an endeavor to reduce the cycle time for
repairs without increasing costs. In August 1994 a
thirteen member integrated team of NASA (KSC and
JSC), Rockwell and Allied Signal personnel was
formed to review, analyze and improve the repair
process, with particular emphasis placed on reducing
the repair cycle time by 50%.
The team's focus is on the repair process for the
transducer components of the ADTA. The baselined
average repair turnaround time for one transducer is
280 days. The team established a goal of 150 days
based on their understanding of process capabilities
and support requirements for shuttle orbiter processing.
Allied Signal's process improvement/problem solving
model, Total Quality through Speed (TQS), is being
used in this initiative. This involves a nine step
approach to process analysis and improvement.
Process input and output boundaries are defined and
process flow charts developed. Potential process
barriers and root causes of process problems are
identified with proposed solutions. As solutions are
implemented, the repair turnaround time must
continue to be monitored to evaluate the success of the
process improvements. The first transducer since the
start of this improvement initiative was sent to Allied
Signal in late September. At the time of this writing,
the team is mid-way through the nine step process.
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Make vs. Buy Decision Process Improvement Team Conclusion
Once it has been determined that a part is needed, a
decision is made as to whether or not the part will be
manufactured at the NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot
(NSLD) or procured from an outside vendor. Ideally,
all relevant factors are considered and an optimum
decision is made. This make vs. buy decision process
was selected as one of the Shuttle Logistics
organizations critical processes by KSC management.
An integrated team of NASA and Rockwell personnel
has been chartered to review and improve this decision
process. The team is chartered to document the
existing process, define relevant decision factors, take
action to streamline and improve the process, and
continue to measure the effectiveness of the decision
process. At the time of this writing the team is in the
initial stages of process definition and analysis.
Shop Floor Data Collection System Initiative
KSC technicians that perform shuttle processing tasks
to prepare the vehicle for its next flight could be
considered logistics most important customers. The
proper parts, materials and tools must be available to
the technicians at the proper location and at the
scheduled initiation of the task in order to avoid
processing delays. The Shop Floor Data Collection
System (SFDCS) is an integral part of KSC's
Integrated Work Control System (IWCS). The SFDCS
is used to collect data on task duration and delay
occurrences and durations, for work conducted at the
major shuttle processing facilities such as the Orbiter
Processing Facilities (OPF), Vehicle Assembly
Building (VAB) and the launch pads. As delays are
experienced, operations personnel enter this data into
the computer system using a specific delay code. The
system can be used to provide real-time status of
processing activity, but more importantly, the data
collected can be used to drive process improvements.
Logistics and operations personnel have recently joined
together in the evaluation of the data indicating
logistics-related delays. At the time of this writing,
this effort is just getting underway. There is reason to
believe that the data already being collected by
operations personnel can provide the Shuttle Logistics
Project with an indication of customer satisfaction, as
well as pin-point opportunities for improvement in the
processes associated with providing parts and materials
to the shuttle processing floor.
The KSC Shuttle Logistics Project has been very
successful in implementing the Continual Improve-
ment approach to quality management. KSC's Shuttle
Logistics Project strives to enhance process
performance and ensure customer satisfaction through
the use of CI tools and techniques for process analysis,
improvement and measurement. Significant monetary
savings, greater process effectiveness, and customer/
supplier partnerships have already been realized.
Focus on quality management will continue as KSC
conducts its complex mission and pursues its ambitious
goals with less resources.
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Abstract
Total Quality Management (TQM), is easily
understood, can be implemented in any type
of business organization, and works. This
can be seen when one stops to realize that
TQM has been around quite a long time and is
increasingly being embraced by all forms of
organizations, both profit and non-profit. It is
being recognized that TQM can help an
organization continue even in a tough
economic climate.
The purpose of this paper is to show the
reader what TQM is and how to apply Total
Quality in the Space Systems and
Management arena.
Introduction
Process Analysis Techniques, Metrics,
Baselining, Quality Assessments, Customer
Satisfaction Continuous Improvement these
are just some of the terms that are associated
with Total Quality Management. Throughout
recent years, there have been a number of
theories or "management techniques" (non
TQ) that have surfaced to make "companies
better and more profitable".
It seems that the majority of these techniques
do not stay around long enough or are not
easily adaptable to be utilized by the different
type of business organizations. These "non-
TQ" techniques are developed and
implemented in high manufacturing,
manufacturing environments and are not
easily adaptable to other types of
environments. TQ on the other hand, is easily
adaptable to all forms of organizations.
This paper addresses the following topics and
concepts that provide for easy implementation
of TQM:
o Total Quality Management
definition
o Teams and Partnerships
o Types of Teams
o Process Analysis Techniques
o Disciplined Systems and Processes
o Total Quality Implementation
o Process Management
o Baselining
o Metrics
o Teaming
o Quality Assessments
o Process Flow Charts
What is Total Quality Management?
CUSTOMER FOCUS
QUALITY
(TQM)
%
/
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Total Quality Management consists of (1).
Chanqe - Changing paradigms: work smarter
not faster, look for process problems and
people problems, encourage participative
management. (2). Repeatability - Well defined
processes, consistency. (3). Productivity-
Defined, measured, how can we increase it?
(4). Quality- Defined, measured, defect
detection then prevention. (5). Customer
focus - Everything you do has a customer, are
your customer requirements defined? Is your
customer satisfied? What are the gaps
between what you provide your customer and
what they want, or even what they need?
Total Quality - A customer-focused,
systematic approach to continuous
improvement. It represents a management
philosophy that encourages teamwork, joint-
problem solving, communication, trust and
continuous improvement of products and
services. It is known by its use of analytic
techniques, particularly statistical methods, to
provide an objective reason for process
monitoring and change(s).
The main thrust of TQM is in that of
Customer Satisfaction. Customer satisfaction
deals with delighting you customer. Since an
organization is typically exchanging a product
or service for money, it is important to
remember your obligation to your customer.
The customer is the one who defines quality.
It is the contractor's responsibility to ensure
that the quality of the product or service is
meeting and exceeding the customer's needs
and expectations.
It is important to recognize who your
customer is both internal and external to the
organization. To properly understand the
customer's needs and expectations, you need
to recognize their place in your organization.
°u"°-/
Recognizing your customers place in your
organization, allows you to determine your
customer's needs and expectations.
For example: Lets say an organization has
100 employees, sells 200 widgets a week,
orders 1000 items a week and that this is a
90% perfect organization, there would be:
10 employees not paid per week
20 widgets not being delivered
on-time
100 items not received a week
It can be easily seen that this 90% perfect
organization is unacceptable. There are quite
a number of unsatisfied customers.
An expansion of this philosophy is known as
Continuous Process Improvement.
Continuous Process Improvement is a
methodology whereby an organization
describes in detail the processes necessary to
carry on the organization's business. It
assists in "weeding the garden" by identifying
short comings in the organization's way of
doing business. With the incorporation of a
feedback mechanism, it is possible to modify,
add and/or delete processes.
CONTINUOUS PROCESS IMPROVEMENT
tN'rERNAL INeUTSl
SUPPLIERE
FOR INPUTS/OUTPUTS PROCESS FLOWCHART
MEASUREMENTS THE PROCESS PROCESS
pF NECESSARY]
The "Best in Industry" organizations have
embraced and practice Total Quality
Management. To help an organization trying
to incorporate Total Quality and attaining
improvement, it is important that all
individuals in the organization learn, accept
and practice TQ in order for the transition to
work. This includes the development of
teams and partnerships. As mentioned
previously, no one individual, in an
organization, works in a vacuum and does not
have any customers.
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Teams and Partnerships:
The Total Quality effort within any
organization needs to have a structured
controlling procedure. This usually takes the
form of a [top-level] Executive Steering
Committee and continues on through the
organization to the lowest levels in the form
of subcommittees, and teams. This process
allows the organization to address quality
related issues at all levels and promotes
employee involvement.
The Executive Steering Committee would
have the following responsibilities:
o Develop the TQM Implementation
Model (these are the steps that are followed
to implement rQM)
o Write the plan for attaining TQM
which entails writing the strategic objectives
necessary to improve the organizations way
of doing business this includes identifying
organizational goals and objectives based on
customer inputs, evolution of the business
cycle and employee feedback.
o Be the formal delegation of
authority to charter cross-organizational
teams.
o Review the status of the TOM
implementation process
There can be steering subcommittees at all
levels of management, as needed, to assist in
formally addressing quality issues at the
various levels within the organization. Using
the critical processes and identified problem
areas as targets for continuous improvement
activity, the subcommittees in each
department perform tactical planning for total
quality improvements.
Operati.n.q Levels
This level is comprised of functional groups,
individuals and teams conducting TQ
activities. The TQ process is worked through
the establishment of permanent, temporary,
or Ad-Hoc quality improvement teams.
Permanent teams known as task teams or
integrated product teams (IPT), are cross-
functional in nature and are organized to
develop and produce specific systems or
subsystems. The composition of the IPT
leads to an interdisciplinary cooperation that
reduces product development cycle time and
defects.
It is important that the steering committees
utilize the expertise of the employees at all
levels to solve problems and improve work
processes.
The Steering Subcommittee is the vehicle for
the chartering of process teams who tasks are
to identify, define, measure, and improve the
organization's critical work processes.
Steering subcommittees also monitor teams
and report on status.
Types of Teams
Successful teams recognize the need for
utilizing a structured approach which includes
clearly defined roles and responsibilities of its
members. The following delineates categories
of TQM team membership:
TOM (Process)Specialist: Supports
the team in planning, team methodology,
metrics,
TOM training, and team process.
Coaches the Team Leader.
Leader/Facilitator: Orchestrates team
logistics, presents status, is the focal point
for team activities. Steers the discussion
ensures the members remain focused on the
problem at hand.
Facilitator: Keeps the discussion
focused. Controls dominating team members,
keeps the leader in charge. Elicits responses
from overlooked members. Brings
discussions to a close.
Recorder: Records the minutes of the
meeting. Can be a permanent or a rotating
responsibility,
Member: Contributes ideas and
efforts. Works actions.
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Process Action Teams - Target a specific
process for improvement using a structure
methodology that emphasizes baselining,
measuring and standardizing.
Development Teams - May address processes
or systems that are unclear, poorly
documented, or not yet in place.
Tiger teams - These teams solve critical
problems needing short term resolution.
Temporary teams are normally formed and
chartered for specific problem-solving or
process analysis issues, these teams follow
structured TQ approaches that are tailored to
enable a team to achieve its charter.
Integrated Product Team - this concept
realigns vertical organizational structure
centered around functions to horizontal teams
focused on specific elements of the product.
Quality Action Teams - composed of
employees who are tasked with resolving
specific problem areas and issues. This type
of team is focused toward achieving feasible
solutions, and is disbanded when their charter
is fulfilled.
Process Management Team (PMT) - this team
addresses much broader issues than quality
action team and can have a much longer life.
The Process Analysis Technique is made up
of the following:
PROCESS ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE
DEFINING THE PROCESS
o Describe the process
o Establishprocessbundaries
o Listkey external inputsand suppliers
o Listkey externaloutputsandcustomers
o Document the flowof activities withinthe process boundaries
o Construct process flowchart and/or logic flowchart
o L:._trequirements for each input and output and internal specifications fro each activity
o Determine if there are measurements for each requirement and specification
EVALUATING AND IMPROVING THE PROCESS
o Analyze and evaluatethe process
2O8
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Disciplined Systems and Processes
The organization needs to focus on defining
and improving processes. A process is a
definable set of tasks which produces
measurable outputs. A system is a set of
processes that work together to produce a
specific output:
r ...........................................
/ j ....
SYSTEM
A set of processes is known as a system if
the processes work together to produce a
specific output. Determine what makes of a
disciplined system or process.
Identify some critical processes that each
functional group within the organization
controls that could be improved. Take one of
the processes that were identified and list the:
Supplier, Input, Output and Customer. Next
list (1).. the task that initiates the process,
(2). the task that ends the process, and (3).
any applicable intermediate tasks:
INPUT__I N OUTPUT
i
i STARTS ENDS
J
................................. ,
To improve work processes it is important to:
o Identify critical processes
o Baseline (define and measure)
critical processes
o Improve critical processes
It is important to know that Process
Improvement is measurable it has to be to be
able to see if its working.
Process improvement can include:
o Reducing cycle time
o Reducing costs (workhours including
reducing rework and materials including
reducing scrap)
o Reducing defects
o Meeting schedules
o Meeting budgets and estimates
The following represents the common
elements of TQM:
1. Management leadership
2. Management style change to encourage
employee participation-participative
management
3. Focus on customer needs
4. Emphasize process problems and not
employee blame
5. Requires prescribed improvement plans
6. Uses statistical methods for process
improvement
7. Quality is directly related to productivity
and inversely related to cost
ChanQinQ Environment:
One of the most difficult things an
organization can effect is change. It is known
that individuals have a hard time coping with
changing the status quo in the work
environment. Resistance to change usually
rears its ugly head. This is true when the
employee feels that change will force that
individual to "release information" that was
known only to him/her. This interpretation of
protecting one's job. So the individual
employee ask - Why change?
Change, however, can be very beneficial. In
today's economic climate, there are less
dollars budgeted for existing programs and
future programs. In reaction to this,
organizations are attempting to scale down
day to day operations while increasing
productivity.
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The reasons why an organization needs to
change is as follows:
o Competition
o Budget/Profit
o Technology
o Customer Needs
o Efficiency
o Development
Competition - with less money available,
competition is increasing. We see where
large corporations are merging in order to
obtain a competitive edge.
Budget/Profit - if an organization is left
running "status quo", and less monies are
available, it can be seen that profit cannot
remain the same. To increase profit - change
is eminent.
Technology - the world today is experiencing
rapidly changing technologies, it is imperative
that, for an organization to remain marketable,
that the organization acquire the newer
technology in an expeditious manner.
Customer Needs - in years past customers
relied on the recommendations of the supplier
of products or services, what was given was
what not always what was needed. It is
important for the supplier to become aware of
what the customer needs. Change is
warranted in the way the supplier deals with
customers.
Efficiency - to remain competitive, an
organization needs to increase efficiency.
This could mean that the every day processes
be reviewed for shortcomings, then either
modify or develop new ones.
Development - Expansion of the organization
is accomplished through change.
Ever increasing demands from the customer
added to ever increasing costs will usually
force an organization to one of three
alternatives.
1. The organization decides that the
increasing demands and expectations of the
customer are unreasonable.
This results in losing the customer, lost
revenue, loss of profits, potential loss of other
business with a potential bottom line of the
disbanding of the business.
2. Organization could reduce the quality of
the products and services in order to reduce
costs. This results in losing the customer, lost
revenue, loss of profits, loss of other business
with an almost assured bottom line of going
out of business.
3. The organization could strive to exceed
the customer's demands and expectations,
and simultaneously lower costs incurred by
the organization by improving work
processes. This would allow for development
of the organization and increases the
probability of acquiring more business from
existing customers and business from new
customers.
Total quality Implementation Approach
Involve the application of TO principles as an
integral part of your day-to-day way of doing
business. The type of business the
organization engages in will dictate the
approach taken to satisfy their unique
operational needs and environment. The
organization needs to a). identify their
customer's top level requirements and
expectations for each business area, b)
identify the key processes and infrastructure
drivers that determine their outcome, and c)
develop metrics and closure plans to ensure
each of these key processes and drivers are
the "Best in Industry"
Process Management
Every supervisor needs to be focused on
improving the quality, reducing the cost, and
shortening the cycle time of the key
processes they manage and support. These
efforts need to be in-line with top-level
objectives that drive the organization's
bottom line and need to be in support of
internal and external customer requirements.
If your area's output is not directly linked to
the organization's business objectives,
selection of the process can be based upon
one or more of the following criteria:
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The process has the greatest
impact on the organization's
key customer(s), or,
The process creates the
greatest demand on the
organization's resources, or,
The process is a high priority
according to the upper
management, or,
The process most adversely
impacts organization's
adherence to schedule
Individual components need to
accomplish the following:
Define their key process, and
identify related customer
expectations
Establish metrics for
baselining, benchmarking and
improving the performance of
their key process
Set improvement goals,
provide the required
resources, monitor progress
and take actions to achieve
the planned improvements
processes, rank them by criticality and
develop flow charts. The flow charts are to
delineate the inputs an suppliers, customers
and products, process metrics, and cycle time
for each process. This information is used as
the baseline which is used to analysis any
process flow for potential streamlining
activities.
Metrics
The top-level operating organization needs to
develop and track appropriate metrics on
those key processes that support their
customer's top-level requirements and
expectations for each business area. The
metrics should be operational in nature and be
predictors of the processes desired outcomes.
Each functional area, in turn, needs to also
develop and track the appropriate metrics on
those key processes that support your
customer's top-level requirements and
expectation for their department's mission.
A TQM metric defines the unit in which a
characteristic or an attribute of a work
process is measured. TOM metrics can be
categorized along several dimensions - by
what the metric is supposed to measure; by
the type of measure (physical nature or units
of the metric); by the purpose of the metric.
Gain employee participation
and teamwork and partner
with both internal and
external customers and
suppliers by actively
solicitating their involvement
in process improvement
Establish process improvement
and customer satisfaction
goals with employees as
part of the performance
management and
compensation process.
Baselining
These metrics need to be d'sp.ayed so that
everyone in the organization have ready
access to how the group or operating unit is
progressing towards accomplishing its stated
objectives and goals.
Top-level reviews by appropriate senior
management from the organization are
recommended on a monthly basis to assess
progress and implement corrective action as
necessary.
Identification of suitable metrics within a
process is critical to resolving problems.
Wrong or irrelevant measures lead to a waste
of time in data collection and chasing the
wrong problem.
At the functional level within the organization,
functional components identify all work
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Types of Process Metrics
Productivity- This characteristic deals with
measuring units of output per fixed units of
inputs (fixed level of effort) It measures how
much work is accomplished and is based on a
fixed effort. An example would be how many
pages of text are completed in a maintenance
manual by the first in-process review.
Quality - This characteristic deals with
measuring the degree to which a customer's
requirements are satisfied. Discrepancies
where requirements are not satisfied are used
as a quality measure. This type of metric
depicts how well a process is working. An
example is also in technical publications
measuring the number of pages per comment.
This provides a measure of rework.
Timeliness - This characteristic deals with the
amount if time it takes to complete the
various steps of a process, particularly in
regard to performance against a schedule or
estimated time to completion. This metric
addresses the "how prompt" aspect of a
process. An example of this would be how
many days it takes to get a CDRL deliverable
through the review cycle.
Reliability - This characteristic deals with the
degree to which a process performs its
functions over a stated time period. This
metric is based on errors or failures per fixed
time. Reliability addresses the "how long
does it work" aspect of a process. An
example would be the Mean Time Before
Failures (MTBF) for a piece of prime mission
hardware.
Metrics can be categorized along several
dimensions:
o what is the metric supposed to
measure?
o what is the type of metric?
o what is the purpose of the metric?
After establishing process metrics, the next
step is deciding on the arithmetic category in
which the metric data is to be collected. The
nature of the metric can usually determine the
arithmetic category.
A process metric can be divided into one of
two types of categories:
o Attribute data - A metric is classified as an
attribute if it represents or is computed
directly from categorical data.
TYPES
1) Simple count
2) Classification
3) Percent
4) Ratio or count per
EXAMPLES
1) Number of lines of code written
2) Success or Failure
3) Operational Availability
4) Comments per document page
o Variables data - A metric is classified as a
continuous variable if it represents the
measurement of a characteristic over a
continuum. Processing time can be a
continuous variable when measured to a
high degree of precision. Types of variable
metrics include:
TYPES
1) Continuous measurement of dimensions or
time
2) Rates or time rates
EXAMPLES
1) Length, width, height, weight
2) Single lines of code per man-month
HO W DO METRICS WORK?
"_'_°;_'°_';_s
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Metrics depict a pictorial representation of a
process, and when designed correctly,
provide a feedback that allows for: 1. Error
detection, 2. identification of the causes of
the error, 3. corrective feedback mechanism,
4. improvement and adjustment capability.
Metrics provide useful information and can be
applied very successfully and parallels the
effort comprising Continuous Process
Improvement.
Teaming
The application of Integrated Product Teams
(IPT) is encouraged. Organizational planning
should include strategies for IPT
implementation and goals. To expand the role
of participative leadership, it is advisable to
encourage employee participation and
involvement in quality improvement teams.
Team activities need to be linked to the
satisfaction of key business objectives and/or
areas critical to the group's mission or
charter.
Quality Assessments
The primary responsibility for TQ
implementation rests with each functional
element. The Total Quality lead provides
guidance as to the approach and deployment
of the organization's overall total quality
strategy. To achieve a common
understanding across all functional areas, the
oversight process is conducted along three
dimensions of approach, deployment and
results.
Approach refers to the functional area's
leadership action having defined methods for
total quality implementation tailored to the
unique operational needs and special
environment of the organization.
As a minimum, the approach needs to outline
the strategy for linking the organization's
business goals to every affected manager.
Deployment refers to the communication of
the approach to employees with management
responsibilities for improving their key
processes in the near term and beyond.
Results refers to having completed baselining
the process being improved and showing
process performance trend data.
Process Flow Charts
Flow charts are used to obtain a better
understanding of each component of a
process and to determine how each
component contributes to the process
structure. Flow charts depict the overall
process better and make it clearer. Flow
charts make it easier to identify a problem
area(s) contained within a process. They can
be used as a training tool to show involved
individuals what the process is about. They
are used as the vehicle to document the
process. Flow charts are used to identify
solutions to a problem by modifying the
sequence of flow within a process.
Flow charting represents a key component of
baselining a process. The flow chart
represents a pictorial view of a process and
depicts how the process flow takes place.
Process flow charts show components (or
functions) within a process, the relationship
among these components ((or functions) and
any precedence. Flow charts depict the steps
involved in the process.
The following is an example of a flow chart
for generating a MRSA Output Report.
\
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
213
What wasn't discussed was what to do with
all the information that is collected when
incorporating TQ. The information becomes a
sturdier foundation upon which to build the
organization.
This is accomplished by the integration of the
overall customer and organization's
operational performance requirements.
The following picture, known as a Quality
Excellence Wheel, displays a foundational
basis for integrating the overall customer and
organization's operational performance
requirements
CORPORATE
'
/IX
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Conclusion
It should be noted that TQ has evolved and
will continue to evolve as time goes on. It is
important to recognize the components that
comprise TQ and to use them to their full
advantage. It is very important that all
individuals in the organization learn, accept
and practice TQ in order for it to work.
1. Identify and list your suppliers
2. Identify and list your customers
3. Identify and list your critical processes
4. Prioritize your most critical processes
5. Baseline (define and measure) the most
critical processes
6. Get a buy-in from your customer (solicit
customer and supplier input and feedback
7. Improve the most critical processes
8. Measure the improvement
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